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Abstract
This thesis explores the impact of the fundamental changes in China's FDI related 
policy, on the development of Western inward FDI in the country. To achieve this, 
this study, first of all, establishes a definition of the fundamental changes, then divide 
FDI in China into the different development periods based on the definition, and 
finally evaluate the fundamental changes in terms of why and how they take place, 
and what their impact is on FDI development periods.
The research covers the duration from 1978 until 2000, when FDI in China 
experiences three different periods led by three fundamental policy changes 
respectively: (a) in 1978, China made a historical decision: permitting western FDI to 
the country, to replace its long-pursued traditional strategy of "self-reliance"; (b) in 
1986, China started to adopt a new approach to deal with western FDI, which is 
promoting FDI, instead of permitting it; and (c) from 1995, the Chinese government 
adjusted FDI policies according to its economic development strategies and 
international practice. This shift indicated that China moved from FDI promotion to 
FDI management.
Each fundamental policy change brings China into a particular FDI development 
period. Looking at these three fundamental changes together, the shift from one 
change to the next, would provide an overall and consistent picture of China's FDI 
development periods between 1978 and 2000.
In addition, this research explores the root cause for three fundamental policy changes 
by looking at China's approach to western FDI. The Chinese special approach to FDI 
is discussed by comparing it with the world generally accepted approaches to FDI in 
terms of: (a) What is FDI - a definition of FDI. In this section, the world dominant 
definition of FDI is reviewed and discussed, and China's view on defining FDI is 
introduced; (b) Why does FDI take place - the theory of FDI. In this part, established 
FDI theories are examined, ranging from Marxist approach, and the Neoclassical 
Paradigm, to generally accepted theories of FDI, including Theory of Monopolistic 
Advantages, Theory of Product Cycle, Kiyoshi Kojima Thesis of Japanese Model of 
FDI, The Internalisation Theory, and Eclectic Theory of International Production; 
China's explanation for western FDI in China is given; and (c) How does FDI take 
place - the form of FDI. This section reviews the worldwide principal forms of FDI, 
and then looks at how the form of FDI is developed in the country.
Moreover, the relationship between the movement of different periods of China's FDI 
and the development of China's approach to FDI practice is examined. This thesis 
therefore concludes that it is Chinese special approach to western FDI which generates 
fundamental changes of China's FDI policies, then turns FDI in China from one 
period to the next.
JEL Classification: Y40, P33, F18
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
West foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has become topical since late 1978 when the 
country adopted an open door policy to welcome FDI. Much has been written about the 
significance of FDI in developing China's economy, the way the government has dealt with 
FDI, and successful stories of China's introduction of FDI.
Much of the existing research is, therefore, centered on the impact of FDI on China's 
economic development. Little attention is given to the impact of the government policy and 
its changes on the development of FDI in China, in particular, the research with in-depth and 
comprehensive analysis of major and overall China's FDI related policy changes and their 
impact on FDI further development is rarely seen (Lin, 1998). It has been increasingly 
important to examine that why and how both general theory and practice of FDI has been 
developed in China along with the development of China's FDI policy, as China is a socialist 
country, as well as a world major FDI recipient country (Pang, 2003). In addition, China's 
experience with FDI has, in turn, provided "lessons for other non-market economies. Apart 
from limited experience of foreign investment in Yugoslavia, and Hungary, China's policy 
was a novelty which has been followed by the USSR and other Eastern European countries, as 
well as the communist countries of south-east Asia. It is also relevant to large market 
economies which are heavily regulated such as India and Indonesia" (Pomfret, 1991, pp. 7-8).
This study will cover the period from 1978 to 2000. This period sees FDI in China experience 
three different development phrases in the country, as a result of the three fundamental 
changes in government FDI related policies. These fundamental changes lead to the turning 
points of China's FDI development, and these turning points lead China to different FDI 
development periods. The main aim of this study is to look at the impact of these policy 
changes, on the FDI practice in China. To achieve this, the author of this study will, first of 
all, establish a definition of the fundamental policy changes, then identify a number of key 
fundamental policy changes based on the established definition, and finally evaluate them in
terms of why and how these changes take place and what their impact is on the FDI 
development period in China.
In addition, this research attempts to explore the root cause of China's FDI development from 
one period to the next by looking at China's approach to western FDI, since it is believed that 
the shift of FDI in China from one development period to the next is in fact the result of 
Chinese special approach - politically oriented approach, together with their growing 
understanding of FDI itself, as well as the importance of FDI to its economic development.
1.1 Three Major FDI Development Periods in China
As Mark and Zheng (1991) claim, the continuous change of the policy environment is one of 
the fundamental features of China's FDI development. Major policy changes lead to important 
turning points of China's FDI development, and the turning points lead FDI in China to a new 
development period. Much existing research usually gives attention primarily to how much 
more or less of FDI inflows into China due to these changes. In addition, many researchers 
have paid only partial attention to this issue, as China's FDI development periods have been 
only a part or minor part of their research. Therefore, an in-depth and theoretical analysis of 
this topic is hardly seen. For example, little research has been done about why and how the 
fundamental changes in China's FDI policy take place, and how they affect FDI in a particular 
development period, and why China's FDI moves from one development period to the next. 
The research the author undertakes attempts to discuss this issue from four important aspects 
which have largely been ignored:
(a) To establish a definition of the China's FDI development period;
(b) To identify the major FDI development periods based on the established definition;
(c) To discover the relationship between one period and the next; and
(d) To examine the relationship between the movement of the turning points and the 
development of China's approach to FDI practice in the country.
Three different criteria are set up by this research in order to define the FDI development 
period:
(a) The period is defined in terms of the important changes in China's specific foreign 
investment policies. For example, according to Roehrig (1994), two turning points 
have been discovered from these three major phases of China's policy changes (1983 
- 1986) in foreign exchange balancing towards foreign invested enterprises: (i) from 
the universal tough foreign exchange requirement to relieving particular joint ventures 
form this requirement (1983); (ii) from partially relieving the foreign exchange 
balance problem to attempting overall resolution of the problem (1986).
(b) The period is defined according to the important qualitative and quantitative changes 
of FDI, as a result of changes in FDI policies and important events. Quantitative 
changes in FDI refer to how much more of how much less China attracts FDI after its 
FDI policy changes in terms of the number of FDI projects, or the amount of foreign 
capital. Qualitative changes in FDI, on the other hand, refer to changes in the form of 
FDI (Equity Joint Ventures, Contractual Joint Ventures, and Wholly Foreign Owned 
Enterprises), changes in the development of China's openness to FDI, and changes in 
the industrial fields to which foreign firms make their investment. This is a common 
approach followed by many researchers. This kind of research is useful in providing 
information on how and why China's FDI has been erratic up and down, but does not 
provide an in-depth analysis and theoretical implications.
(c) The period is determined by the important FDI related policy changes, which have 
more general, overall, and longer-term impact on China's FDI development, or have 
led to a fundamental change in all China's FDI environment. These FDI related 
policies can be the governmental political decision, overall economic development 
strategy, and important FDI policies, or a combination of these above.
Since this thesis attempts to look at the FDI development periods which are derived from 
overall and fundamental changes in China's FDI related policies and which have general and 
longer-term impact on China's FDI development, logically, the third approach out of the 
above three will qualify to fulfill this study.
According to this criterion, three major periods have been identified:
(a) Allowing or permitting western FDI to China, to replace China's long-pursued 
traditional strategy of "self-reliance". This historical change is a result of the 
governmental political decision and economic development strategy - opening
China's door to the outside world, in order to largely improve the country's backward 
economy and finally reach its ambitious long-term goal - realising four 
modernisations of its industry, agriculture, technology and military. This change is 
apparently fundamental as it makes western FDI possible to locate in China. As Ho 
(1984) states, the open door policy adopted in December 1978 is the "historical 
turning point" (p.3), as, for the first time, capitalist investment is allowed. More 
specifically, Pomfret (1991) recognises that "direct foreign investment (DPI) was 
permitted by the July 1979 Law on Joint Ventures" (p. 23), this Law was believed by 
Fan (1992) as "marking the China's open door policy" (p. 28). This dramatic policy 
change leads China to the first period of FDI development from 1978 until 1986, 
during which FDI is welcomed, but under strict socialist control.
(b) Encouraging FDI, instead of permitting FDI. The insurance of "the Provisions for 
Encouragement of Foreign Investment (also known as "22 Articles") in October 1986, 
marks another important turning point. As Pomfret claims (1991), the Provisions 
"indicated for the first time, China's FDI had moved from Permitting FDI to 
Promoting FDI" (p. 2). Fan (1992) regards "the significance of the Provisions as equal 
as the Joint Ventures Law, as it marked another new stage of FDI development in 
China" (p. 28). This second period of FDI development is led by important FDI policy 
change in 1986, since then FDI is treated much more positively as a result of the 
government's growing confidence in and understanding of FDI, and pressure from FDI 
makers and the need of further economic development of the country.
(c) Managing FDI according to China's economic development strategy, rather than 
simply stimulating FDI. Since 1995, the Chinese authority has made strategic changes 
in FDI policies. On June 7, 1995, the government promulgated "Interim Provisions on 
Guiding Foreign Investment Direction", and "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign 
Investment Industries", which classify FDI projects into four different categories: 
encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited. From April 1986, China started to 
withdraw preferential policies offered to foreign invested enterprises, and gradually 
replace them by "the National Treatment" for foreign investors. These significant 
changes indicated that the government, for the first time, decided to strictly and 
systematically direct the FDI based upon their priority projects, industries and regions, 
and started to consider treating FDI in line with international practice, such as "the 
National Treatment", and requirements of international organisations, such as World
Trade Organisation (WTO) in pursuing the membership of this organisaiton. This new 
and fundamental FDI policy change is seen as an important turning point "as Beijing 
shifts from investment promotion to investment management" (Brecher, 1995, p. 15).
This thesis sees each of the above three fundamental changes in China's FDI policy as equally 
important in the sense that they have all changed the general direction of China's FDI history. 
In addition, because these three changes are equally important, and they represent respectively 
a turning point in a different period of time, looking at all three changes together, the shift 
from one change to the next, would provide an overall, general, and consistent picture of 
China's FDI development form 1979 until 2000, and give answers as to how and why the 
turning points take place respectively. Moreover, this study will also seek to establish the 
relationship of the fundamental changes in China's FDI policy and the development of 
China's approach to FDI practice, as the Chinese government's understanding and 
interpreting of FDI could be a key to the development of FDI in China.
1.2 World Dominant Concept of FDI and China's FDI Theory and Practice
The concept of FDI is introduced and developed in China along with its introduction and 
practice of western FDI from late 1978 when it conducted an open door policy.
Since the country is a socialist country, as well as a recipient country of FDI, the concept of 
China's FDI carries special features: (a) It is based on inward investment, rather than outward 
investment, which is the basis of the world dominant concept of FDI; (b) China's concept of 
FDI is directed by the Marxist-Leninist approach, together with Chinese characteristics; (c) 
China's concept of FDI is created by government officials and official scholars, rather than by 
independent scholars; (d) There are primary parts of China's concept of FDI, such as the 
coverage of FDI forms, which are not clearly stated.
This research will look at China's concept of FDI by comparing it with the more generally 
accepted FDI approaches. This issue will be discussed from three aspects: (1) What is FDI - a 
definition of FDI; (2) Why FDI takes place - the theory of FDI; and (3) How FDI takes place -
the form of FDI. Through this comparison, the author attempts to bring out sharply the 
explanation for the root cause of turning points and their impact on China's FDI development.
(1) What is FDI? - a concept of FDI. The generally accepted definition of FDI is centered 
on the extent of the investor's control over the foreign enterprises and the amount of equity 
the foreign investors has in the business. Therefore, it provides a general criterion to 
distinguish direct investment from other types of investment.
The definition of FDI in China given by Chinese scholars and government officials, however, 
is somewhat different: (a) It is flexible, as some forms of foreign investment are included in 
FDI in China, which is not regarded as FDI by countries other than China; (b) political belief 
is involved. For example, the experience of joint ventures with several Eastern European 
socialist countries in the 1950s is not seen as FDI, although it is FDI based on the generally 
accepted model. With regard to the FDI from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, because the 
major proportion of China's FDI has come from these regions since 1979, and while these 
investors are all Chinese and these regions are not perceived as foreign countries, we must 
take into account the explanation of the Chinese government as to why their investment can 
be accepted as foreign investment even after the Hong Kong handover in 1997, and Macao's 
return to China in 1999.
(2) Why FDI takes place? - Theories of FDI. The global dominant FDI theories are based 
on the analysis of the motives of investors, while China's FDI theory is a special one, which 
sees FDI from the viewpoint of a recipient nation. In addition, China's FDI theory is based on 
the Marxist approach, that is, an analysis of political systems and class relations between the 
investing countries from the west and the host of China.
China's FDI theory believes that direct investment from western countries is capitalist in 
nature and thus opposed to socialism. While China introduces FDI, it should always monitor 
the behaviour of foreign investors. The reasons for China permitting capitalist FDI to enter the 
country are: (a) foreign invested enterprises are well monitored under China's political and 
economic requirements; (b) China's economy is dominated by the "socialist element", that is, 
in the entire country, the public ownership system is the dominant element, the proportion of 
FDI is regarded as a deal between the Chinese government and foreign investors, where the
Chinese side is perceived to be the winner, as they believe that with FDI, they benefit from 
western advanced technology and management skills, as well as taxation and employment, 
and thus benefit more than the capitalist investors. Consequently, the country's productive 
forces can be improved, and the socialist system can be strengthened.
In comparing China's FDI with the existing well-known FDI theories, especially the more 
popular one - Dunning's eclectic paradigm, this study has reviewed and discussed points that 
some independent Chinese scholars have made. These scholars have claimed that China's FDI 
is so special that modifications or redefining of world dominant FDI theories are required. 
For example, in an attempt at modifying Dunning's model, Chen (1994) suggests that, in 
terms of why FDI takes place, there are three elements in the decision of a firm to invest 
abroad: the ownership - specific advantages it possesses, the location - specific advantage it 
seeks abroad, and its ability to internalise operations. However, for the case of China, the 
principal reason for direct investment as apposed to other forms of foreign participation in 
China appears to be the location - specific advantages (such as cheap labour and large 
potential market) provided by China. The ownership-specific advantages possessed by foreign 
firms represent a necessary but only partial reason for FDI. In the absence of location-specific 
advantages, ownership-specific advantages cannot be exploited. The decision by foreign firms 
to locate their production process in China rather than exporting or licensing is determined by 
the Chinese location-specific advantages. Chinese location-specific advantages are the huge 
potential domestic market, cheap labour and land, and the endowment of certain raw materials 
including coal and oil.
Liu (1994) argues, the peculiar features of China's inward FDI have challenged the dominant 
FDI approaches, including Dunning's eclectic paradigm, as they do not readily and 
satisfactorily explain some of these peculiar features. One of the peculiar features of China's 
inward FDI is that the Chinese party often behaves as the initiator to allow and to promote 
China's inward FDI, rather than western firms taking the initiative to make FDI. Therefore, in 
order to explain the special case of FDI, an extended analytical framework based on the 
existing dominant FDI theories is required.
According to Kojima (1982), a FDI model should pay attention to macro-economic 
contribution of FDI, to increase employment, transfer of technology, orderly industrialisation,
growth of GNP, and balance of payment in both investing and host countries. China's FDI 
theory implies that the strategic reasons for China to introduce FDI include: (a) overcoming a 
shortage of funds; (b) gaining access to the international market; and (c) raising the tax 
revenue for the Chinese government; while Dunning's approach lacks the macro analysis.
Dunning (1993) himself is aware that relevant issues including China's inward FDI "remain 
unresolved" when he focuses his attention on "the opening up of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the People's Republic of China to FDI". However, to resolve this issue, Dunning 
considers this only needs "minor modifications (p. 9)" to the general paradigms. What sort of 
modifications is needed? Are these modifications minor or major? Dunning neither specifies 
nor makes the modifications. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the author of this dissertation 
has made recommendation of the possible modifications based on existing research.
(3) How FDI Takes Place - the Form of FDI. According to usual international practice, 
FDI is divided into two major forms: the traditional form and the new form. A wholly- 
owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) is considered to be the traditional form of FDI. The major 
new form of FDI is equity joint ventures (EJVs), which require that foreign investors acquire 
"equity stake" and "control". In the case of China, three key forms of FDI are developed: 
equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual joint ventures (CJVs), and wholly-owned foreign 
enterprises (WOFEs), which are also known as San-Zi-Qi-Ye (three types of foreign invested 
enterprises).
EJVs are the Chinese government's first choice of FDI form in the country, since the 
government believes this form of FDI, under supervision and monitoring of Chinese partners, 
can avoid domination of foreign sector enterprises by foreign investors, and the worries of 
western investors' transfer some undesirable western political and ideological trends along 
with the transfer of their technology to the country, ideas which are seen as harmful to China's 
socialist construction. Thus, the Law on EJVs was published in 1979, soon after the 
government's announcement of the open door policy, which is the first legal document 
governing FDI in China.
Interestingly, CJVs, another key form of FDI, was created by Guangdong province and 
developed in practice as the most attractive one, in the absence of the CJVs Law. This
contract based FDI form has important flexibilities which suit both the Chinese and foreign 
sides, especially in the initial years of China's open door policy, when both the Chinese side 
and foreign sides lacked experience of working together in China where legal systems were 
yet to be established. There are two key flexibilities of this form: (a) the investments 
contributed by each party to the ventures are not computed in shares, which means that the 
foreign party may gain a bigger proportion of profits against the lesser proportion of their 
investment; (b) for Chinese parties, they can make contributions to the ventures by providing 
the right to use a site, the right to exploit resources, plant and equipment, services of labour. 
In other words, the Chinese can become the partner of CJVs by contributing what they have. 
This provides a flexible way for the Chinese to learn western technology and managerial 
expertise from their foreign partners without investing money, which most of them lack. This 
is called "make do with whatever is available".
Most foreign investors initially preferred CJVs to EJVs, as they wanted to test the investment 
climate in China, as this form is chiefly project-specific and short-term in nature in 
comparison with longer-term and wide ranging equity from EJVs. However, as time passes, 
the disadvantages of CJVs surfaced, such as increased conflicts of each party's pursuit of 
short-term interests; since no laws relating to the CJVs were formed until 1988. CJVs are 
eventually taken over by EJVs since 1986 in terms of the growth rate of the annual actual FDI, 
as increasing numbers of foreign investors became confident and felt safe to invest in the 
longer-term in China, and the Laws on CJVs did not put CJVs on an equal footing with EJVs 
for gaining access to materials, financing and tax benefits.
As for WFOEs, they were permitted as one of the forms of FDI a year later (1980) than EJVs 
(1979), and were allowed to be set up in only four special economic zones (SEZs) until 1984, 
because they are solely operated by foreign investors, therefore they were thought to be 
beyond the control by the Chinese government. However, WFOEs have been encouraged by 
the government since 1986, when reductions in FDI occurred, and since 1992, when a 
growing number of large transnational enterprises (TNEs) have been contributing to China's 
inward FDI, and the government believes these firms transfer the most advanced technology. 
As a result, WOFEs have increased dramatically and they have overtaken CJVs in 1990, and 
have grown faster than the EJVs.
In conclusion, the concept of FDI in China has undergone a process of introduction, creation, 
and development. Accordingly, the process has gone with the three turning points of China's 
FDI development in practice. The stage of introduction of the FDI concept is from the end of 
1978 when the first turning point of China's FDI takes place. For the first time, permission 
was given to western FDI to enter China. At that time, because the term FDI was fairly new to 
the Chinese, the focus was on the introduction of western basic FDI concept and theories. 
From the theoretical perspective, western FDI concept was mainly introduced in terms of the 
Marxist approach, emphasising that western FDI was useful, and that FDI and China's 
socialist construction could coexist under socialist control. In terms of concept creation, 
China's FDI was created between late 1986 and 1995, when the second turning point of 
China's FDI development occurs. For the first time, the government started to promote FDI, 
rather than permitting it, as the government was eager to attract more FDI to China, and much 
more confident in dealing with FDI. In this period, especially from early 1990s, FDI began to 
play an increasingly important role in the Chinese economy, which led to China's FDI very 
topical not only in China, but also all over the world. In 1995, the book entitled Principles of 
China's Utilising Foreign Investment was published by the Chinese government, which 
systematically analysed China's inward FDI within a Marxist framework, but in a flexible 
way, leading to the formation of China's FDI concept. The stage of FDI concept development 
appears from 1995, when the third turning point of China's FDI development arises. The 
government started to adopt the approach of managing FDI, to replace the previous approach 
of promoting FDI, giving priority to FDI quality based on the national economic development 
strategy, and to treat foreign invested enterprises more equally based on the principles of "the 
National Treatment". One the one hand, China intends to control as well as to develop inward 
FDI in an independent way; on the other, the country will have to move closer to international 
practice, as it has been part of the international economic system (China became a member of 
WTO in December 2001).
The dissertation is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 will review and discuss in detail the world dominant concepts of FDI, including 
FDI theories and practice, then look at how FDI in China is interpreted and practiced by 
comparing it with the general concept of FDI. Three aspects of FDI will be compared, that is,
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What is FDI - a concept of FDI, Why FDI takes place - the theory of FDI, and How FDI takes 
place - the form of FDI.
Chapter 3 will look at the methodology issues, followed by Chapter 4, which defines the 
turning point which leads China's FDI to the different development period. This chapter will 
review existing study on the turning point. Three different criteria for defining the turning 
points are discussed, and one of them being selected for this thesis is established. That is, the 
turning points are determined by overall or general FDI related policy change, which has 
impact on every aspect of FDI activity. Three turning points are identified based on this 
criterion, and accordingly, three different FDI development periods are generated by the 
turning points with the same criterion.
Detailed evaluation of all three periods are presented in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 
respectively, which explores the evolution of China's approach to western FDI by explaining 
thoroughly why and how the fundamental changes in China's FDI policy take place, and what 
their impact is on the development of China's FDI. As pointed out in Chapter 7, since the 
third period of China's FDI development in 1995, the government has given special attention 
to environmental issues such as air pollution and water pollution, as many highly polluted 
FDI projects introduced to China are worsening already seriously damaged environment. The 
severe problem costs China heavily in terms of the sustainable growth in its economy. To deal 
with the problem, the government issued the "Catalogue" to encourage environmental 
protected FDI projects and restrict polluted FDI projects. This dissertation is ended with the 
conclusion and recommendations in Chapter 8, in which, China's experience and ideas of 
dealing with western inward FDI is summarised and the further research about China's FDI is 
suggested.
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CHAPTER 2
General Concept of FDI and China's FDI
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The explanations of FDI can be traced back to the early theories ranging from the Marxist 
Models to the Neoclassical Paradigm. "It was not until 1960 that anything approaching a 
separate theory of foreign direct investment was formulated" (Dunning, 1993, p. 4), although 
the activities of FDI has already existed since the nineteenth century.
FDI is a very new term in China and came into existence from the late 1970s when the 
country opened its door to the outside world and introduced FDI officially, although FDI 
came to China as early as the 1950s.
This chapter will evaluate the global general concept of FDI and China's FDI concept by 
considering: (1) what is FDI; (2) why FDI takes place; and (3) how FDI takes place.
Like many other issues in China, the concept of China's FDI and its operation in practice has 
clear Chinese characteristics.
The major features of China's conceptualisation of FDI are: (1) It is based on inward 
investment, rather than outward investment, which is the base of the general global concept of 
FDI; (2) China's concept of FDI is a combination of politics, economics, and FDI practice, 
and directed by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist approach, which will be discussed in detail later; 
(3) Most 'foreign' investment comes form Chinese origin companies in Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan, rather than third parties; (4) Investors are generally from capitalist economies; 
whilst China remains a socialist country, with the relationships therefore focusing on mutual 
economic benefits, rather than political advantage or common purpose; (5) China's concept 
of FDI was created by government officials or official scholars, rather than by independent
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scholars; (6) There are quite a few primary part of China's concept of FDI, such as coverage 
of FDI, is not clearly stated.
This chapter attempts to draw a general picture of China's treatment of FDI concept and to 
compare it with more generally accepted FDI theories.
Section 2 considers a definition of FDI, in which the development of a general global 
definition of FDI is briefly reviewed, and China's definition of FDI is introduced and 
examined. In Section 3, the global FDI theory is summarised and China's FDI theory is 
described and analysed. The global common FDI forms are outlined and China's FDI forms 
are compared and assessed in Section 4. The conclusions are given in Section 5.
2.2. WHAT IS FDI? - (A Definition) 
2.2.1. A World Perspective
FDI has never been named until 1960 when its special features were identified and it became 
a more important part of international business study. However, its conception, or its 
definition is still not clear enough although many of the studies on this issue have been done 
since then.
A) A Backward, As Well As A Forward Concept
FDI is greatly concerned with transnational Enterprises (TNEs), as they are the most 
important participants of FDI and made majority of FDI worldwide (Ge and Liang , 1994). 
Dunning (1981) proposes a 'broad definition' of TNEs as "firms that engage in foreign direct 
investment" (p.3).
However, although there have been hundreds of TNEs investing in the manufacturing sector 
since the nineteenth century, and international business activity can be traced back to the 
Middle Ages in Europe (Jones, 1993), until the 1960s, direct investment was usually 
considered as just one form of international capital movement (Ragazzi, 1984).
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The first person to give special considerations to direct investment was Steven Hymer. In his 
doctoral thesis (1960), Hymer argued that direct investment and portfolio investment "really 
are two different things" (p. 2). First, these two types of investment behave differently. For 
example, the pace of their growth is not the same: in the 1930s, portfolio investment dropped 
enormously, but FDI was just slightly decreased; in the postwar period, FDI expanded rapidly 
while portfolio investments had a little increase. Second, unlike portfolio investments, "direct 
investments are the capital movements associated with the international operations of firms" 
(p. 30). Hymer introduced a crucial factor in order to distinguish these two different 
investments, that is: control. He states, if the investor directly controls the foreign enterprise, 
his investment is called a direct investment. If he does not control, his investment is a 
portfolio investment. Control, Hymer believes, is connected with the equity of the firm, or 
based on the amount of equity in a local firm that a foreign investor holds.
Thus, according to Hymer, control and equity are the two key determinants in defining FDI. It 
is a fact that some questions relating to control and equity still remain unclear. However, to 
separate FDI from portfolio investment is Hymer's milestone contribution to FDI literature, 
which enabled later scholars to follow up and to develop the study of FDI.
B) An Ambiguous Definition
The existing definitions of FDI are ambiguous as revealed by the literature on the subject, 
including the work done by some influential FDI experts, such as Hymer. Some existing 
definitions proposed by several writers and organizations actually originate from Hymer's 
framework, as revealed by the following examples.
FDI is the amount invested by residents of a country in a foreign enterprise over 
which they have effective control. (Ragazzi, 1973)
Direct investment is a long-term equity investment in a foreign company that 
gives the investor managerial control over the company. (Griffiths, 1984)
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Direct investment refers to investment that is made to acquire a lasting interest in an 
enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, the investor's 
purpose being to have an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. 
(IMF, 1977)
It can be seen from these examples that the determinants of the definitions of FDI are those 
which have been identified by Hymer, namely, that FDI refers to: control and equity. These 
examples differ from Hymer's approach in that they attempt a definition of FDI.
However, there are some problems with all definitions of FDI. First, what is the extent of 
' control' required to decide whether an investment is a direct investment rather than any other 
form of investment? In fact, many countries and organizations define FDI differently. Japan 
claimed in 1978 that FDI requires that the foreign investors: (a), owns the whole stock or 
over 50 per cent of the stock of the Japanese companies; or (b). effectively control the 
Japanese companies by having more than half of the seats in the board of directors (Ge and 
Liang, 1994).
A different definition is given by the US government, which asserts that an investment is a 
FDI when the investors have more than 10 per cent of the ownership in the foreign 
enterprises (Chen, 1991). According to the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (1973), the criteria for inclusion in the FDI category are: (a) as a subsidiary, it 
should have at least "25 per cent control of the voting stock by the parent company"; and (b) 
as an associate, "as little as 10 per cent of the voting stock may be judged adequate to satisfy 
the criterion". In general, the understanding of what proportion of ownership giving the 
investor control varies from country to country, which leads to the fact that FDI is unlikely to 
be defined precisely (letto-Gillies, 1992). However, it tends to be accepted generally that an 
investment which amounts to at least 10 per cent control of voting voice is direct investment 
(Ge and Liang, 1995).
Secondly, with regard to equity, there is a difference between theory and practice. In theory, 
as mentioned earlier, equity is another basic determinant of FDI other than control, and 
requires that the investor has ownership rights or holds stock shares (or other equities) in a 
foreign company (Griffiths and Wale, 1984). In practice, some non-equity forms of
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investment, such as contractual joint ventures, are also recognized as FDI by the World Bank 
(Duan and Yang ,1993). Third, Casson (1985) asks: Does direct involvement mean that the 
investor has to be involved in day-to-day management, or holds a high enough position, say, 
senior manager level in an enterprise? If not, what is it, and why?
Therefore, as Hymer argues (1960), "control is not an easy thing to define", and it is hard to 
find "the dividing line between some control and no control" (p.l).
2.2.2. The Perspective from China
The term FDI was little known in China until late 1978 when China introduced its economic 
reforms. A growing number of foreign firms have participated in direct investment in China 
since then, particularly since the early 1990s. Consistently from 1993, China has been 
tremendously successful in introducing FDI and has become the second largest FDI recipient 
country, next only to the USA (Jiang, 2002). As a result, FDI has become an extremely 
important issue in the country. However, the concept of FDI in China is far from clear due to 
the following reasons: (a) FDI has only recently emerged in the country; and (b) China 
attempts to interpret FDI in its own way, in order to keep its explanation of FDI in tune with 
the political system of the country. The Government emphasizes that China is building up a 
socialist country with Chinese characteristics, while the FDI that China is introducing is 
basically from western capitalist countries. Therefore, it is understandable that the concept of 
FDI in China is interpreted with Chinese characteristics, and thus the concept of FDI based on 
this can be called "China's FDI".
A) Definition of FDI in China
There are three main ways of defining FDI in the country, which are based on the following 
approaches.
(A). The definition based on the well-known western model
Like the popular western definition of FDI, this type of definition is focused on either control,
or equity. It served as the introduction of the western FDI definition to the Chinese:
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FDI refers to investment that is made in foreign countries, where the investors involve 
the process of production or operation, as well as the control of the enterprise. 
(Li, 1995)
FDI is related to the investment, in which the investors are required to have a certain 
proportion of equity stake, so that they have the ownership in an enterprise and 
means of control over it. (Chen, 1991)
(B). The definition based on individual understanding
Some independent Chinese researchers have interpreted FDI - distinguishing it from other 
forms of investment - by defining the concept through its literal meaning:
The term 'direct' investment is used to distinguish from 'indirect' investment (such 
as portfolio investment). 'Indirect' investment is the one which takes place in the 
home country., while 'direct' investment appears in the foreign country (Duan and 
Yang, 1993).
Unlike 'indirect' foreign investment, 'direct' foreign investment implies that investors 
have to be 'directly' involved in the invested-project, namely, to participate in the 
activities of operation and management in this enterprise (Ge and Liang, 1994).
Obviously, these explanations are centered on the terms 'direct' and 'foreign', and are useful 
to identify the features as well as understand the concept of FDI. However, they do not seem 
to resolve other questions, including: (a) to what extent, does 'direct' involvement make an 
investment become FDI; or can an investment be defined as FDI if the investor crosses the 
boundaries and then 'directly' involves himself in business activities in a firm whatever the 
level of investment he has in that firm? As discussed earlier, it is generally recognised that 
an investor who has at least 10 per cent of ownership in a foreign company can be thought of 
as a direct investor; therefore, it is not direct investment if the investment does not meet this 
criterion even though the investor is the foreigner who directly makes the investment; and (b) 
in the case of China, why does the government require that foreign investor should have no
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less than 25 per cent of equity stake in a joint venture, since it is generally accepted in the 
world that it is an FDI when the foreign investor owns as little as 10 per cent of the 
ownership?
(C). The definition based on existing inward FDI practice in the country.
The common forms of China's inward FDI include: (a) foreign loans. These may be loans 
from foreign governments, financial institutions, and foreign banks; (b) equity joint ventures; 
(c) contractual joint ventures; (d) wholly foreign-owned enterprise; (e) compensation trade; 
(f) processing assembly.
All these forms are classified by the different levels of Chinese official statistical bureaus 
into three major types: 1) External Loans; 2) Foreign Direct Investment; 3) Other Foreign 
Investment (see details from Table 2.1).
As can be seen from this table, there is a clear distinction between different types of foreign 
capital, so that any particular inclusion can be seen under various forms of foreign capital, 
including FDI. As to the type of External Loans (also known as Foreign Loans), it would 
seem clear that all the forms in this type belong to portfolio investment, because they only 
involve capital movement. Similarly, the forms in the type of Foreign Direct Investment (a 
detailed discussion can be seen from Section 4) are considered to be a separate type because 
they involve capital movement, as well as control, management over a venture. In addition, 
the definition of FDI given by some official statistical organisations also uses the same 
approach: "FDI (in China) refers to those foreign enterprises, economic organisations or 
individuals who, according to the relevant Chinese laws and regulations, set up a wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise, Chinese-foreign equity joint ventures, Chinese-foreign contractual 
joint ventures, or joint explorations, including reinvestment with profits from existing FDI 
projects" (Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong, 1994, p. 178).
However, this distinction is not always used as a criterion to discuss the issue of FDI. From 
time to time, the investment under other foreign investment is treated as part of FDI by both 
Chinese and world official organisations, as can be seen from various published figures, 
although the World Bank Report (1988) refers to the collection and reporting of statistics
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describing foreign investment as "one of the less advanced aspects" (p.251) of the history of 
FDI in China (Pomfret, 1991). One possible reason is that this category is ambiguous or 
elastic. It is considered part of FDI in China because: (a) it does have some similar features 
to FDI, such as its involvement of
Table 2.1 Agreement of China's Utilization of Foreign Capital By Form
Amount in US$ 100 millions
Form
Total*
1. External Loans
- Loans from 
foreign govts
- Loans from 
intern, finan- 
cial institut- 
ions
- Loans on 
convertible 
currency from 
foreign banks
- Bonds and 
shares issued to 
foreign countries
2. Foreign Direct 
Investment
-Equity joint 
ventures 
- Contractual 
joint ventures
- Wholly 
foreign-owned 
ventures
- Joint exploia- 
tion
3.Other Foreign 
Investment
- Compensa- 
tion trade
- International 
leasing
- Processing 
assembly
1989
No. of Amount 
Projects
5905 114.79
130 51.89
121 14.71
9 8.56
17.25
1.41
5779 56.00
3659 26.59 
1179 10.83
931 16.54
10 2.04
6.94
4.75
0.72
1.47
1990
No. of Amount 
Projects
7371 120.86
98 50.99
82 7.19
16 18.93
16.53
0.03
7273 65.96
4091 27.04 
1317 12.54
1860 24.44
5 1.94
3.91
2.03
0.51
1.37
1991
No. of Amount 
Projects
13086 195.83
108 71.61
93 22.43
15 21.27
20.24
1.09
12978 119.77
8395 60.80 
1778 21.38
2795 36.67
10 0.92
4.45
2
0.30
1.48
* The figures in total agreement number do not include the project numbers of other foreign investment since 1985.
( Source: China Foreign Economic Statistics: 1979 -1991, complied by Department of Trade & Materials Supply of
State Statistical Bureau, China; published by China Statistical Information & Consultancy Service Centre, 1992 ).
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foreign assets like machinery, production materials, and technology; and (b) The Chinese 
government wants to show that it is successful in attracting large amounts of FDI to the 
country.
On other occasions, other foreign investment is not considered part of FDI because the 
investor is not required to control or own an enterprise. Hence, one must ascertain whether 
the figure of China's FDI includes this category or not when reading the publications and 
using data from them.
B) A Question Concerning the History of FDI in China
When did FDI start to emerge in China? This question relates to the basic concept and 
definition of FDI, and is therefore worth discussing.
Chinese officials and authors have continued to state the common view in the country that no 
FDI existed in China from 1949 (when new China was born) until the late 1970s when China 
started to carry out the "open door" policy (Hu and Ji, 1994; Fan, 1992; Liu, 1995). This 
means that the history of FDI in China started from the late 1970s.
At the same time, however, the Directory of China's Foreign Economic and Trade Policies 
acknowledges the fact that there were several joint ventures in existence before that time:
Five joint ventures were set up from 1950 to 1951 in the new China, between China and the 
Soviet Union and Poland. Four of these were run by China and the Soviet Union, and each side 
had 50 per cent of equity stake. These were the Chinese-Soviet Union (Xinjiang) Petroleum 
Company Ltd. (30 year duration agreement), Chinese-Soviet Union (Xinjiang) Rare Non-ferrous 
Metals Company Ltd. (30 year duration agreement), Chinese-Soviet Union Civil Aviation 
Company Ltd. (10 year duration agreement); and Chinese-Soviet Union (Dalian) Shipbuilding 
Company Ltd. (25 year duration agreement). All these ventures were terminated in October 
1954 before the venture expiration date. The fifth joint venture - the Chinese-Poland Shipping 
Company Ltd. was set up in 1951 and each shared half equity stake of the venture, and is still 
running because of its good performance' (p.863).
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In addition, the figures for FDI in China between 1949 and 1978 show that China introduced 
USD6.4 billion of FDI during that period (Duan and Yang, 1993). This phase is not 
recognised as a part of China's FDI history in China itself due to the following reasons: (a) 
FDI should be an investment made or organised by foreign (private) companies, not by 
governments. The joint ventures between China, the former Soviet Union, and Poland do not 
fall under FDI according to the definition, because they were actually trade cooperation 
between the two governments (Hu and Ji, 1993); (b) the term FDI was introduced to China 
after the country allowed western firms to set up joint ventures in China from the late 1970s, 
which led the Chinese to believe that FDI business persons are those who come from western 
capitalist countries, while neither the former Soviet Union nor Poland could be classified as 
'Western or capitalist nations', therefore, their investment can not be deemed as FDI.
In fact, the ventures between China and the Eastern European countries during the 1950s had 
all characteristics of the FDI definition discussed above, as: (a) they involved foreign 
investors; (b) they took the form of equity stake; (c) the foreign investors were able to 
effectively control the ventures by owning 50 per cent of the stake. Therefore, these ventures 
should be regarded as FDI, since the definition of FDI has nothing to do with the political 
belief of any nation, for as long as that nation has accepted overseas investment. This is 
irrespective of the fact of whether such an investment has involved the government or private 
enterprise. From this point of view, the history of China's FDI should start from 1951, much 
earlier than it is recognised in China, rather than from the late 1970s.
C) The Unique Phenomenon of China's FDI
Several previous studies have pointed out that overseas direct investment into China has been 
dominated by ethnic Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (Kaiser, Kirby and Ying, 
1996). This is one of the peculiar features of China's inward FDI (Liu, 1994). It can be seen 
from Table 2.2 that since 1979, investors from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (since 1985) 
have been playing a dominant role in China's FDI.
However, earlier research does not seem to refer to the question of why these investments are 
treated as foreign investment, rather than domestic ones, since they do not come from 
"foreign countries", but from places from called "regions" by the Chinese government itself.
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It is a fact that the people in these three "regions" are basically Chinese, and Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan are not recognised as independent countries by the international 
community. It would not be incorrect to suggest that the investments from Hong Kong and
Table 2.2 FDI by Country of Origin:
1979-1991
Leading Countries and Regions
Amount: US$ 100 millions
HK & Macao
US
Taiwan
Japan
German
Singapore
UK
Thailand
Australia
Canada
No. of 
projects
31545
1944
3609
1882
111
558
128
181
181
187
its percentage in 
national's total %
75.1
4.6
8.6
4.5
0.3
1.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
Agreed 
amount
325.68
37.91
29.86
28.54
10.85
8.99
4.18
2.98
2.64
2.5
Its percentage in 
national total %
62.2
7.2
5.7
5.5
2.1
1.7
0.8
0.6
0.5
0.5
( Source: China Investment Manual, 1994, published by the Publishing House of 
China's Finance & Economy )
Macao was regarded as FDI because these two regions used to be governed by Britain and 
Portugal respectively. What will happen to the classification of these investments now after 
China takes over the charge of Hong Kong and Macao in 1997 and 1999 respectively? The 
answer is given by Wu Yi, then Minister of China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations 
& Trade. She explained (1995), because of the different economic and political systems 
between mainland China and Hong Kong (as well as Macao), the nature of the economic 
relations between them will remain the same - both sides dealing with each other as foreign
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partners. This seems to be the approach the Chinese government is adopting, which is based 
on the theory of 'one country, two systems' adopted by Deng Xiaoping (i).
The relationship with Taiwan is somewhat different. Unlike Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan 
is governed by the Chinese themselves. In addition, both Beijing and Taiwan insist on a 'one 
China (China covers both Taiwan and mainland)' policy. Why, then, should investments 
from Taiwan be treated in the mainland as 'foreign" investments? The reason is the same as 
above: that the political and economic systems on the mainland and Taiwan are different; the 
former follows a socialist system, the latter adopts a capitalist approach, so, it is needed to be 
sorted out in a special way. Again by the formula of 'one country, two systems ', it makes no 
difference whether the mainland and Taiwan are governed separately or by one central 
government.
It is worth recapitulating, therefore, one of the key characteristics of China's FDI concept, 
that is, the major proportion of China's FDI is not from 'foreign"1 countries; but from some 
special 'regions". In addition, this characteristic of China's FDI is recognised by the world 
economic organisations because the figures of China's FDI produced by the Chinese 
government are accepted by them. This can be seen from any of these organisations' 
publications.
In addition, the Chinese government has recently realized that China should attract more FDI 
from western countries in order to improve the quality of FDI, as it has been disappointed 
with the level of technology it has acquired from these regions, most of these investment 
projects are small-scale and involve low level of technology and quick returns (Shapiro, et al, 
1991).
Concluding Remarks
The generally accepted definition of FDI centres on the extent of the investor's control over
(1): Deng Xiaoping, who was Chairman of the Central Advisor Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, formally 
proposed the strategy of "one country, two systems" when he met with the visiting British Minister, Margaret Thatcher, on 
September 24, 1982. The concept of this can be interpreted as meaning that while the socialist system will be maintained 
within the People's Republic of China, capitalism will continue to be practiced in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
One Country, Two Systems and Reunification of China. New Star Publisher, Beijing, P.R. China, 1991.
23
the foreign enterprise and the amount of equity the foreign investor has in the business.
Therefore, it provides a general criterion to distinguish direct investment from other types of 
investment. However, there are some FDI related practical problems that arise due to these 
general criteria. For instance, the world FDI statistics obtained from different countries 
receiving foreign investment are based on different criteria (for example, country A may 
consider it is FDI only when the foreign investor has no less than 20 per cent of ownership 
over an invested enterprise. Country B, however, accepts a lower criterion, say, no less than 
10 percent).
In the case of China, the definition is even more ambiguous. The definition given by some 
Chinese scholars is based on the well-known western model, or an interpretation of FDI's 
literal meaning, and it does not seem to reflect the FDI practice in China. The definition given 
by the Chinese government is, again, different from the western definition: (a) it is flexible. 
For example, in addition to foreign invested enterprises, the form of other foreign investment 
is sometimes included in FDI, which is not regarded as FDI by countries other than China 
(Chen and Raftery, 1994), and should be thought as one flexible type of trading (Yao, 1993); 
and (b) political belief is involved: the experience of joint ventures with several Eastern 
European socialist countries in the 1950s is not seen as FDI, which actually is FDI based on 
the generally accepted model of FDI.
With regard to the FDI from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, because most of China's FDI 
has come from there since 1979, and while these investor are all Chinese and these regions 
are not perceived as foreign countries, we must take into account the explanations of the 
Chinese government as to why their investments can be accepted as foreign investment even 
after Hong Kong and Macao handover in 1997 and 1999 respectively.
2.3. Why Does FDI Take Place? - (Theory of FDI) 
2.3.1. From the viewpoint of established FDI theories 
A. The Marxist
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As mentioned earlier, the relevant literature on FDI can be traced back to the Marxist theory, 
"partly because (the interpretations) were the first ones put forward, and partly because they 
relate to an early phase of foreign investment when colonialism and the securing of raw 
materials were still of paramount relevance" (letto-gillies, 1992, p. 41).
In general, Marxist explanations of the global spread of multinational enterprises are based on 
political analysis, such as social systems, class relations (Wiles, 1968). These Marxist 
scholars view the worldwide expansion of capitalist firms as a historical and natural process. 
This, therefore, leads the capitalist to 'forcing' new markets, enabling the educated middle 
and upper classes to gain their private interests (Hobson, 1988). The aim of capitalist states' 
'exploitation' of foreign markets, is to control them in the international capitalist system 
(Moran, 1973).
However, some classical writers discuss foreign investment using their imperialist model. 
Lenin (1996) perceived capitalist countries' investing in foreign markets as an inevitable 
tendency. An enormous "surplus of capital" arises when capitalism reaches the monopolistic 
stage; it is in the nature of the capitalism that "surplus capital will be utilized not for the 
purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean 
a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting 
capital abroad to the backward countries" (p. 49). In these backward countries, capital is 
scarce, costs of use of land and labour force are low and raw materials are cheap. As a result, 
colonization is needed, which leads to imperialism.
Bukharin (1972) deals with imperialism in a way similar to Lenin's. He explains it as the 
need of the increased monopolisation, and the need of the capitalist's further development. 
But the specific motivation for the capitalism that Bukharin identifies is different from 
Lenin's explanation of imperialism when he writes: "the motive power of world capitalism' is 
'the race for higher rates of profits" (p. 56).
Rosa Luxemburg (1971) explains the imperialism by describing the Accumulation of Capital 
In this book, she points out, the realisation of the surplus value is "a vital question of 
capitalist accumulation". In her view, there is a lack of effective demand for the full
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realisation of the surplus value in capitalist countries, because "the workers and capitalists 
themselves can not possibly realise that part of the surplus value which is to be capitalised. 
Therefore, the realisation of the surplus value for the purposes of accumulation is an 
impossible task for a society which consists solely of workers and capitalists" (p. 57). As a 
result, markets in non-capitalist societies are needed as they are able to absorb that part of 
the surplus value which contains either consumer goods or means of goods or both.
Some later Marxist approaches focus on the relations between developed countries and 
underdeveloped countries. Baran and Sweezy (1966a) describe a new dominant class among 
the owners and functionaries of big monopolistic corporations, who constitute the leading 
echelon of the ruling class, not the owners of bankers or financial institutions who played that 
role previously, because these large TNCs no longer need to rely on banks. They are able to 
expand themselves independently from one country to another. Regarding the purpose and 
nature of 'foreign investment', these authors state, "it seems, far from a means of developing 
underdeveloped countries, it is a most efficient device for transferring wealth from poorer to 
richer countries while at the same time enabling the richer to expand their control over the 
economies of the poorer" (p. 61).
A recent theory of decentralisation of production under centralised control is based on more 
technological considerations. Adam (1975) introduces a term 'world sourcing'. One of the 
factors generating the motive of production locations to be spread worldwide is the 
improvement in technology, including that in the personal communication, cost of 
transportation, and efficiency of production activities in foreign countries. Frobel, Heinricks 
and Kreye (1980) argue that this worldwide relocation leads to a 'new international division 
of labour', which is determined by 'cheap'-cost labour in the LDCs, division of the 
production process which enables unskilled labour force to be employed for 'partial 
operations', improvements in technology, etc. This new international division of labour leads 
capitalism to undermining the traditional bisection of the world into a few industrialised 
countries on one hand, and a great majority of developing countries integrated into the world 
economy solely as raw materials producers on the other.
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Some points in Marxist discourse continue to be significant. Some Marxist authors, for 
example, discuss foreign investment in terms of "Lenin's passage on the increased 
socialisation of production (as) very interesting and still applies today" (letto-gillies, 1992, p. 
52); Bukharin's (1972) work moves closer to the concept of direct investment than that of 
other classical Marxist authors as he refers to 'fixed capital', which was identified by the later 
economists as one of factors of direct investment, rather than indirect investment. The theory 
based on technological development explains why developed and developing countries tend 
to be connected closer.
However, because the position of Marxist authors is greatly affected by their sharp political 
beliefs, their attitude and their conclusion towards foreign investment is in general negative. 
In their view, it is not fair that those who benefit from foreign investment are a few capitalist 
nations or the bourgeoisie, and not the underdevelopment nations or the working class. This 
leads to aggravate the conflict and contradictions of capitalism, and results in the ultimate 
demise of capitalism.
With regard to the possibility of which Marxist interpretations mentioned above can be 
considered to be successful ones in explaining the determinants of worldwide direct or 
indirect foreign investment, it is hard to come up with a positive answer. Firstly, there is no 
link between the colony, imperialism, and foreign investment, i.e. the colonisation as a 
universal phenomenon no longer exists, while the TNCs and their international investments 
keep growing. They "have become central actors of the world economy and, in linking 
foreign direct investment, trade, technology and finance, they are the driving force of 
economic growth" (Sauvant and Dunning, 1993, p. x). Secondly, the concentration of 
Marxist authors is on investments in LDCs, while a very large proportion of FDI is made 
among the advanced industrialized countries (AICs) themselves, even though LDCs are 
greatly affected by TNCs' activities. Thirdly, there is the question of why socialist countries 
of Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam invited FDI from western capitalist countries, despite 
Marxist groups everywhere drawing a negative conclusion about it. Finally, why are some 
socialist countries engaged in outward investment in non-socialist countries (for example, 
China has outward FDI in several western countries).
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B. The Neoclassical Paradigm
It is worthwhile to briefly review these models because they "were dominant paradigms in 
international economics until the 1950s" (Dunning, 1993, p. 2). The following assumptions 
are essential for this trade theory: perfections in the markets, and in technology, and the need 
for certainty.
The determinants of capital investment, or portfolio investment are also discussed based on 
the same assumptions. Ohlin (1967) assumes that capital is usually immobile between two 
countries. The movement of capital takes place because there is an exogenous need such as 
the need of 'reparations or gifts', and the need of some country to 'borrow' and 'import' it. 
Nurkse (1972) presents a different explanation: capital movements are determined by an 
endogenous factor, that is, interest rate differentials. A differential in interest rates is derived 
from the relation of demand and supply conditions between different countries, and generates 
the 'profit motive' for the investors. Investing in the country with higher interest rates then 
follows. Analysing the relationship between international trade and international investment, 
Bhagwati and Brecher and Diaz Alejamdro (1973) concluded that foreign investment is 
motivated by trade tariffs because foreign capital receives the full (untaxed) value of its 
marginal product.
The Neoclassical approach has been strongly criticized since the 1960s, as many identify that 
the market is actually imperfect, rather than perfect (Hymer, 1960; Vernon 1966; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1993). Therefore, the theory with its unrealistic assumptions is not 
able to interpret the rapid growth of TNEs and cross-border investments.
C. Generally accepted theories of FDI
As pointed out earlier, economists have been trying to interpret FDI in one way or another 
since 1960. Consequently, various FDI theories have emerged. Among these theories, the 
more generally accepted ones include:
A) Theory of Monopolistic Advantages,
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B) Theory of Product Cycle,
C) Kiyoshi Kojima Thesis of Japanese Model of FDI,
D) The Internalisation Theory,
E) Eclectic Theory of International Production.
A) Theory of Monopolistic Advantages (Steven Hymer)
One assumption of Hymer's theory is that direct investment abroad involves "risk" and "high 
costs" compared with the local firm because of high costs of communication and of access to 
information, less favourable treatment from the "government control" of the host country, and 
the "additional cost" from exchange rate risks.
Why, then, do companies decide to engage in FDI, rather than consider expanding their 
markets via exporting or licensing?
Hymer explained this by introducing a new concept: the existence of market imperfections 
(Hymer's theory is also known as ' Market Imperfection Theory'). He holds that the model 
of market perfections is not "relevant". Cross-investment occurs just "because of difference in 
risk preferences". On the basis of market imperfections, certain "unequal" abilities or 
advantages are generated for some companies over others. These special advantages include 
the ability: (a) to obtain production factors at a lower cost than other companies; (b) to 
command "knowledge or control of a more efficient production function"; and (c) to "have 
better distribution facilities" and "a differentiated product". Once it secures these advantages, 
a firm's investment abroad "would be profitable", as the firm can then overcome its 
disadvantages, and compete against local firms.
Hymer's pioneering work has laid the foundation of the modern theory of FDI as his approach 
is a departure from the neoclassical approach or the perfect competition approach, and has led 
and is continuing to lead to follow ups (letto-Gillies, 1992), including Buckley and Casson's 
internalization (1976) and Dunning's eclectic paradigm (1977). Nevertheless, Hymer's model 
also leaves some questions unanswered. Firstly, it does not provide any explanations about 
why firms prefer FDI to exporting or licensing, since the firm's special advantage can be 
exploited by either FDI or exporting or licensing; Secondly, Hymer's theory lacks "a time
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dimension", for the advantages may exist during a certain period of time and then 
disinvestment may be required (Robock and Simmonds, 1989). Thirdly, in his model, Hymer 
addresses direct investments as being concerned with a certain industry in a particular 
country, which obviously does not reflect the fact that direct investment is a worldwide 
phenomenon (letto-Gillies, 1992). Finally, Hymer's theory does not explain why developing 
countries that have little advantages are able to engage in outward FDI.
B) Theory of Product Cycle (Raymond Vernon)
The theory of FDI is developed by Vernon (1966) when he uses his approach of product life 
cycle to explain FDI.
Vernon's theory assumes there are three stages in a product cycle: new product stage, 
maturing product stage, and standardised product stage. Changes in the stages of a product 
result in changes of the cost of production and changes of consumers and markets. 
Consequently, FDI is required.
According to Vernon, new products would originate first in the most advanced country (in his 
case the USA) because American consumers' average income is far higher than that in any 
other country, including many Western European countries. This enables American firms to 
"offer a new product responsive to want at a high level of income..." (p. 46). In the new 
product stage, the product is unstandardised, and the price elasticity of demand is 
comparatively low because of the "existence of monopoly". Initially, American firms are 
unlikely to produce the new product abroad because the demand from other countries 
(advanced European countries where consumers have a high income to afford the new 
product) can easily be met by exports.
In the maturing product stage, the product begins to be stardardised, and "has a high income 
elasticity of demand". This leads to the possibility of "economies of scale through mass 
production" and lower costs of production. Thus, overseas investment becomes inevitable due 
to "the locational force": (a) the demand, in time, in relatively advanced countries such as 
those of Western Europe will begin to grow rather rapidly because American producers' 
"labour-saving products" are "satisfactory substitutes for high-cost labour" in western
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Europe; and (b) compared to exporting, cross-border production would be more profitable for 
American companies because "the average cost" is lower than the "marginal production cost 
plus the transport cost of goods exported from the United States". In addition, western 
governments "begin thinking of ways and means to replace the imports", in order to generate 
employment or to promote growth or to balance their trade accounts. As a result, American 
firms would prefer to make an investment rather than export to these countries.
In the final stage, the product is so standardised that the production process tends to be much 
easier to follow. Therefore, the LDCs are the ideal production location as they offer 
"competitive advantages" such as low cost labour. In addition, these areas are willing to 
develop "import-replacing industries", which leads to "a threat of import restriction" to the 
resource country.
Vernon's model is quite interesting because it offers a number of insights into the process of 
global competition. Unlike Hymer's theory, Vernon's product life cycle model has a basis for 
analysis of a time dimension, which reveals the relationship of a certain phase of the product 
and direct overseas investment, and the motivations of the US enterprises' worldwide 
relocation. Like Hymer, Vernon also does not explain why US factories take the form of FDI, 
instead of licensing (Robock and Simmonds, 1989). To explain updated FDI events, there are 
some other difficulties with this theory, which include: (a) in addition to the US companies, 
European and Japanese firms, as well as some LDCs' companies, have also engaged in 
overseas direct investment since 1970 (Buckley, 1985; letto-Gillies, 1992); (b) it is not 
always the case that LDCs would like themselves to be merely sites for foreign investors to 
produce standardised products, because they too desire more advanced technology so as to 
catch up with the developed countries (Duan and Yang, 1993).
C) Kiyoshi Kojima Thesis of Japanese Model of FDI
The expansion of Japanese outward direct investment since 1970s cannot be explained by 
previous FDI theories because Japanese FDI is different from the American pattern (Wu, 
1990): (a) Japanese firms that are actively involved in overseas direct investment are those 
that have no monopolistic advantages in Japan. Instead, these firms are those that have "lost
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competitive power" in the country; (b) LDCs (in Latin America and Asia) are chiefly 
recipients of Japanese FDI; and (c) unlike American firms which "may invest in setting up 
wholly-owned subsidiaries" abroad, a new form of FDI, that is, joint venture, is preferred by 
Japanese investors.
According to Kojima (1982), Japanese industry invest abroad because: (a) on the one hand, 
this industry is becoming the investing country's comparatively disadvantaged industry; on 
the other hand, however, it "is potentially a comparatively advantaged industry in the host 
country"; and (b) the investing country can benefit from the recipient country's lower 
production costs, and the host country can benefit from the transfer of efficient technology 
and management from the source country. The products can be improved back to the home 
country; or exported to third markets. As a result, this reorganized international division of 
labour would be beneficial to both nations in terms of increase of production and 
consumption gains from trade. Also, this type of FDI helps "create and increase international 
trade" where little of it existed.
With regard to "big Japanese firms" which have "a strong comparative advantage", Kojima 
claims that the best way for them to expand in the overseas markets is to "continue to export", 
rather to involve themselves in FDI. He offers negative comments on the American model of 
FDI and describes it as "anti-trade-oriented DFI"(2) because American direct investment 
participants are the leading firms with monopolistic advantages. American FDI then leads to: 
(a) "the loss of international competitiveness"; (b) the loss of profit opportunities at home; 
and (c) "deterioration of balance of trade, unemployment, and inflation".
Kojima's model accurately presents the characteristics and motivations of Japanese FDI in the 
1970s with a new approach, that is, the macro-economic approach (3). It is "quite different
(2) As Kojima explains, American FDI is "anti-trade DPI", because it substitutes for and decreases international trade; while 
Japanese FDI is "trade-oriented", because it complements international trade. See K. Kojima, "Macroeconomic Versus 
International Business Approach to Direct Foreign Investment", Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, No. 23, 1982, pp. 1-19. 
Reprinted in J.H.Dunning (Ed), op, tit., p. 222.
(3) Kojima claims, "my approach is founded on the theory of international dividion of labour (called the macroeconomic 
approach), see Dunning, ibid, p. 219.
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from the existing body of theories" (4); inasmuch as it is an approach which attempts to 
establish "a theory that integrates international trade and direct foreign investment" and it also 
provides a two way analysis: (a) FDI behaviour is "strongly influenced by the macroeconomic 
factors of their (multinationals') own economy"; as well as (b) "by those of the host 
countries". The latter is largely ignored by the existing FDI theories other than Kojima's. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that this is why Kojima's approach is considered as one 
of the more general theories of FDI. However, Kojima's theory seems to lose its validity 
when Japanese industry with monopolistic advantages undertakes FDI (Buckley, 1985). In 
addition, the main problem with this model is that it has "no real supporting empirical 
evidence presented for testing of hypotheses" (Geroki, 1978).
D) The Internalisation Theory
Buckley and Casson (1976) suggest that, in order to explain or predict the post-war growth of 
MNEs, there is a need to develop a new theory on "a comprehensive theoretical basis", due to 
the "outdatedness" of previous studies or "the orthodox theories of production and trade". 
They infer from their 'internalisation' theory that FDI is essential. Internalisation refers to a 
firm that attempts to create internal markets for transactions with its branches or subsidiaries 
due to the difficulties and low efficiency of external markets.
Like Hymer, the internalisation approach is based on the postulate of market imperfections, 
but uses it in a different way (Hymer uses it for explaining the existent conditions of a firm's 
monopolistic advantages and the incentive for a firm's involvement in FDI; internalisation 
theorists rely on it for interpreting the necessity of internalisation). The theory then focuses 
on analysis of intermediate products rather than finished products.
Due to market imperfections, many intermediate products (such as raw materials and semi-
(4) These existing theories are called by Kojima as the "international business approach" such as Hymer's approach, as they 
are presented basically within the managerial economics of international administration; see Dunning, ibid., p.219.
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finished products) and particularly knowledge based products (such as know-how and 
management skills) are difficult to transact into external markets because: (a) the relationship 
between sellers and users is unlikely to be certain or reliable; and (b) the transaction cost is 
relatively high. Hence, the benefit to the firm can be generated from internal markets between 
the firm and its branches by internalisation because internalisation enables the firm: (a) to 
maintain stable and reliable relations; (b) to minimise the transaction costs; and (c) to 
improve its efficiency via transfer pricing.
FDI occurs when the firm extends its internalisation across national boundaries. The 
internalisation theory is seen by its authors as "a long theory, and systematically develops the 
theory" (letto-Gillies, 1992, p. 115) after their attempts at integration of the various strands of 
theory of the multinational firm. Indeed, this theory provides an explanation of: (a) how the 
advantages are generated, and (b) why firms invest in these advantages rather than in other 
types of assets (Buckley, 1985).
It is generally agreed that this theory is very successful since it systematically develops the 
theory of international production (letto-Gillies, 1993; Taggart and McDermott, 1993). Its 
major drawbacks are: (a) the determinants and importance of the firm's involvement in 
multinational activities have not been sufficiently analysed, as internalization is seen to be the 
by-product of the search for minimum cost production site and the internalisation of the 
markets (Kogut, 1983); and (b) little explanation of why a particular FDI location is selected. 
Such an explanation is needed because locational decisions play a strategic role and "are more 
likely to be prominent" elements in a firm's decision on international production (letto- 
Gillies, 1992).
E) Dunning's Eclectic Approach
In his search for an eclectic theory of FDI, Dunning briefly reviewed previous studies of the 
industrial organisation approach (such as Hymer's theory), and the location approach (such as 
Frank Southard's work on American industry in Europe) (5). In Dunning's view (1988), the
(5) This book, American Industry in Europe was published in 1931 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
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first approach explains "why" international production occurs by "identifying the 
characteristics of MNEs"; and the second approach answers the question of "where" the 
investment location is by analysing "the main factor leading to US investment in Europe and 
Canada". However, neither of them is fully satisfactory because they were put forward 
independent of each other. It is Vernon's product life cycle theory that covers both "why" and 
"where", and it "treated trade and investment as part of the same process of exploiting foreign 
markets" (p. 186).
Because "the same variables were being increasingly used to explain both trade and non-trade 
investment", it is necessary to formulate a single theory which can explain both foreign 
investment and foreign trade, "synthesise trade and investment theory", as no attempt 
(including Vernon's) was made until 1972 when Dunning took the initiative and wrote a 
paper entitled "the Location of International Firms in an Enlarged EEC" (6). His further efforts 
led to an eclectic paradigm based on three determinants: (a) Ownership advantages; (b) 
Location advantages; and (c) Internalisation advantages (the OLI model).
Ownership advantages consist of: (a) benefits the firm can obtain from its size, monopoly 
power, and better resource capacity and usage; (b) benefits derived from the enterprise's 
ability of operation and management (such as know-how, organizational and marketing 
systems).
There are two types of location advantages. The first type accrues from 'attractions' - special 
location advantages provided by the host country, such as cheaper labour forces, market for 
the products and the government's preferential policies. The second one is generated from 
'limitations' at home - the investors are forced to decide on direct investment abroad because 
they suffer from disadvantages in their own countries such as a small market for their 
products, lack of raw materials, higher production costs, higher transportation costs of 
exports and host country's protectionism.
(6) This paper was published by Manchester Statistical Society in 1972, and "suggested that only by considering trade and 
foreign production as alternative forms of international involvement in terms of ownership and location endowments could 
the economic implications of the UK joining the EEC be properly evaluated.
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Internalisation advantages refer to the benefits that the firm can secure by using its ownership 
advantages internally - between the parent company and its subsidiaries.
Thus, Dunning believes that OLI model covers three major aspects of FDI activities: O deals 
with the "how" of MNEs' activity; L is concerned with the "where" of production; and / 
explains the "how" of involvement.
Further, according to Dunning, the importance of the role played by O, L and / in his model is 
different, which determines the firm's choice of international trade or direct production 
abroad. Of the three advantages, ownership advantages are essential. An enterprise is unable 
to engage in FDI without any ownership advantages. If, however, a firm has only ownership 
advantages without the other two, it will benefit from licensing rather than FDI. If a factory 
has advantages of ownership and internalization but not location advantages, it will prefer to 
sell its products by exporting. FDI occurs only when a firm has all these three types of 
advantages. The combination of OLI not only makes the firm's FDI possible, but it also 
decides the firm's selection of FDI location or destination, that is, "countries with low labour 
costs and/or natural resources tend to have an above average inward investment because of 
their locational attractions, while rich industrialized countries have an above average outward 
direct investment, because their factor endowments favour mobile ownership advantages" 
(1980, p. 288).
Dunning's OLI model is so successful that it is widely used in FDI research in the world, 
including international business conference papers, dissertations, postgraduate theses, 
relevant publications, and university textbooks (Ethier, 1986). Nevertheless, it is doubtful, 
when Dunning claims, "all forms of international production can be explained" by his eclectic 
paradigm, for a single theory of FDI is unlikely to cover all the characteristics of FDI (Grosse 
and Kujawa, 1992). For example, this model can explain neither the case of some developed 
countries that are heavily involved in both inward and outward FDI, nor the fact that it is the 
developed countries, not the developing countries which have the largest share of inward FDI 
(letto-Gillies, 1992). In addition, the macro-economic issues of FDI are largely ignored and 
there is no thorough integration of some macro-economic issues and the theory of FDI. These 
macro-economic issues or effects may cover the political complexities in the MNEs's 
activities. Moreover, it is arguable that if ownership advantages play a necessary role in
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determining the firm's investment, as internalisation explains why firms exist in the absence 
of such advantages (Buckley, 1985) and firms in some developing countries without 
ownership advantages actively accept FDI.
2.3.2. From the Viewpoint of China's FDI Theory
The study of FDI in China began in the late 1970s as a result of the country's open door 
policy and inviting western FDI to set up ventures in the country. Accordingly, research on 
FDI, especially on China's inward FDI became an important issue in China.
Some independent Chinese scholars, particularly those who are based in western countries, 
have tried to interpret western FDI in China in the light of the existing well-known FDI 
theories, of which the more popular one is Dunning's eclectic paradigm. Others have used 
Dunning's framework to test FDI cases in China, such as Zheng (see Box 1):
Boxl 
Stylised Fact about FDI Theory and the Case of China's Inward FDI
What must LDCs do to attract manufacturing FDI? Dunning suggests that multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) will only invest in a foreign location if the latter offers certain location-specific advantages 
(LSAs) in terms of resources and facilities which make it possible for the MNEs to better explore their 
firm-specific ownership advantages. In this context, market growth, availability of material supplies, 
physical infrastructure, and efficient administration are among the most frequently cited LSAs for host 
LDCs.
The question how these and other LSAs can be generated, however, has received little attention. This 
paper documents and interprets the case of Guangdong province in south China, where 15 years ago a 
programme was launched to implement the central government's policy of encouraging direct foreign 
investment to develop the province's economy. The policy has been regarded as a relative success among 
the many fields that the Chinese economic reforms have affected, and in comparison with similar policies 
in other LDCs.
Source: Zhang, 1995.
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Other authors have attempted to modify Dunning's model and view FDI in China as a special 
one. For example, Chen (1994) points out that FDI in China implies that, in absence of 
location-specific advantages, ownership advantages cannot be explained (see Box 2):
Box 2 
Stylised Fact about FDI Theory and the Case of China's inward FDI
We have shown above that the theoretical literature on the multinational enterprise emphasises three 
elements in the decision of a firm to invest abroad. These are the ownership-specific advantages it 
possesses, the location-specific advantages it seeks abroad and its ability to internalise operations 
(Dunning, 1981; Hood, 1979).
It is obvious that foreign firms investing in China possess ownership-specific advantages, including 
managerial and technical know-how, and marketing skills. They are also able to internalize 
operations. In the absence of import restrictions in China, exporting may be the best method for 
foreign firms to exploit the Chinese market. However, shortages of foreign exchange constrain 
imports in China. In technology licensing arrangements, the Chinese ability to absorb the technology 
licensed by foreign firms is the main problem existing with licensing agreements.
The principal reason for direct investment as opposed to other forms of foreign participation in 
China appears to be the location-specific advantages provided by China. The ownership-specific 
advantages possessed by Foreign firms represent a necessary by only a partial reason for FDI (Hood, 
1979). In the absence of location-specific advantages, ownership-specific advantages can not be 
exploited. The decision for foreign firms to locate their production process in China rather than 
exporting or licensing is determined by the Chinese location-specific advantages. The Chinese 
location-specific advantages are the huge potential domestic market, cheap labour and land, and the 
endowment of certain raw materials including coal and oil. It is direct investment that provides an 
opportunity for foreign firms to exploit their ownership-specific advantages and the Chinese 
location-specific advantages.
Source: Chen, 1994.
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Liu argues, "the peculiar features of China's inward FDI" have challenged the dominant FDI 
approaches, including Dunning's eclectic paradigm, as they do not readily and satisfactorily 
explain some of these peculiar features. Therefore, an extended analytical framework based 
on the existing dominant FDI theories is required (see Box 3).
Box 3 
Stylised Fact about FDI Theory and the Case of China's Inward FDI
The first dominant theory on FDI determinants is the transaction cost approach, such as Buckley and 
Casson's internalisation theory. The second dominant theory is Dunning's eclectic paradigm. 
Dunning's main contribution to the theories of FDI is that he draws on several important approaches to 
set up his own "general" paradigm.
Some problems with these two approaches arise when looking at some peculiar features of China's 
inward FDI:
(1) These approaches suggest that: firms which launch FDI take the initiative in the whole process. In the 
case of the eclectic paradigm, firms with specific advantages perceive it profitable to internalise their 
use of these advantages. The transaction-cost or internalisation approach assumes that firms with the 
sole purpose of profit maximisation have an incentive to bypass the imperfect for intermediate 
products. Therefore, the two approaches are of two-pole analysis type: the investing firm internalises 
some advantage by looking for and investing in a good location. But the fact of China's inward FDI 
shows that the Chinese party often behaves as the initiator. The fieldwork conducted by the present 
author indicates that a particular FDI project could be originated by the Chinese government, Chinese 
establishments registered abroad, local Chinese firms, or individual Chinese.
(2) Much of the literature on the traditional transaction-cost approach predicts that, if there is no foreign 
restriction, foreign business will generally prefer wholly foreign-owned enterprises to joint ventures, 
because the former entry mode involves lower transaction costs. Again, China's inward FDI behaves 
differently. Between 1979 - 1989, wholly foreign-owned enterprises accounted for merely 7 per cent 
of the total. Joint ventures, either equity or contractual are so popular in China that they have become 
the basic entry mode.
Thus, a FDI project usually involves three poles: Foreign firms, host environment, and local firms; 
and in some cases, a local firm can be very enthusiastic about inviting the FDI.
Source: Liu, 1994.
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Dunning himself (1993) is aware that some relevant issues including China's inward FDI 
"remain unresolved" when he focuses his attention on "the opening up of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the People's Republic of China to FDI" (p. 9). However, to resolve this issue, 
Dunning considers this only needs "minor modifications" to either the partial FDI theories or 
the general paradigms. What sort of modifications is needed? Be these minor or major? 
Dunning neither specifies nor makes the modifications. Nevertheless, we have seen 
modifications done by some overseas Chinese scholars (Box 2 and 3). We also need to 
examine the issues taken into consideration by the Chinese government when inviting 
western FDI to the country.
Why does FDI take place in China? There have been many discussions on this issue in 
China. However, a recently published book (1995) entitled Principle of China's Utilising 
Foreign Investment (PCUFI) answers this question rather systematically. A typical picture of 
China's FDI theory can be obtained from this book.
In general, China's FDI theory is based on the Marxist approach, that is, an analysis of 
political systems and class relations between the investing country and the host. PCUFI 
claims that direct investment from western countries is thought by the Chinese to be capitalist 
in nature and thus opposed to socialism. While China encourages FDI, it should always 
monitor the behaviour of foreign investors, because "the basic aim of western investors is to 
reach profit levels that may not be achieved in the investors' own countries" (p.53), and 
"western investors exploit developing countries via FDI, which is the price developing 
countries have to pay" (p.28). What is the reason then for China to permit capitalist FDI to 
enter the country, rather than to keep it away?
Firstly, according to PCUFI, this is because the Chinese government is confident FDI will not 
be harmful to China's "socialist construction". Although an increasing amount of FDI is 
pouring into China, the country's economy is dominated by the "socialist elements". Take 
Shenzhen for example (one of the five Chinese SEZs), where the proportion of FDI in the 
local economy is much higher than in any other area of China. The public ownership system 
is still the dominant element, because FDI accounts only for one quarter of its economy. 
Hence invested enterprises are well monitored under China's political and economic 
requirements. Therefore, there is no need for concern about western FDI in China.
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Secondly, introducing FDI to China is regarded by these authors as a deal between the 
Chinese government and the investors, while the Chinese side is perceived to be the winner. 
On the one hand, foreign investors are keen to make direct investments in China because the 
country has something which can 'be taken advantage of by them: (a) China is the world's 
biggest potential market with over 1.2 billion people, which enables western investors to sell 
their products in this attractive market; (b) China has abundant cheap labour and is rich in 
natural resources, which are the major factors for foreign enterprises to locate FDI there; and 
(c) in the final analysis, because of the nature of capitalism, China has to allow western 
investors to 'exploit' the country, in order to receive FDI. On the other hand, western 
investors are also "taken advantage of by the Chinese government, because the country can 
benefit from western advanced technology and management skills, as well as taxation and 
employment through FDI. "Consequently, socialist country and its people will benefit more 
than capitalist investors" (p.23), as western FDI is seen as a major means of enabling the 
country to improve its productive forces, and eventually to strengthen the socialist system.
Unlike traditional Marxist interpretations which see foreign investment to be unfair as it helps 
transfer wealth from poorer to richer countries, the Chinese Marxist approach outlined above 
takes a positive view. FDI in China is considered as a more efficient way to "catch up" with 
advanced capitalism, for socialism needs to prove that it is superior to and grows faster than 
capitalism. As Deng Xiaoping said, "the central task for socialism is to expand the social 
productive forces. To accomplish this task, we should take advantage of any means, including 
the use of foreign investment and introduction of advanced technology" (p.21).
More positively, PCUFI concludes that China's introduction of FDI is based on a long-term 
strategy, rather than a short-term plan, as: (a) China has learned a big lesson from the 
adoption of the "close door" policy from 1949 to 1978, which is the major reason why China 
remained backward for such a long time; (b) China's "open door" policy is a reflection of the 
new international climate - the world of today is an open world, and open world leads to a 
new international division of labour, which transforms every single national economy into 
one interrelated economy. Therefore, "it is impossible for a single nation to become an 
advanced country without opening its doors to the outside world" (p.25), and China's 
"utilising FDI has not only become an inevitable trend, but also a long-term policy" (p.26).
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With regard to the well-known FDI theory, this book suggests that it is useful for China to 
know the intentions of foreign investors in China. This helps China to deal with different 
foreign investors in different ways. The comments on prevalent FDI theories made by these 
Chinese official authors are as follows:
If the investor is a transnational enterprise with monopolistic advantages, the recipient 
country should fully make use of the enterprise, in order to improve the host country's 
economy. Meanwhile, the country should take some measures to restrict TNEs' 
monopoly activities, in order to protect the host country's domestic industry - (learn from 
Hymer's FDI theory).
If the firms aim to transfer their traditional/declining industry or sector to the host 
country, the local government should make a careful analysis in order to find out if the 
project of investment is still useful in terms of the domestic industrial development plan, 
and reject the project which contains low-technology or may cause environmental 
problems such as environmental pollution - (learn from Kiyoshi Kojima's FDI theory).
The same product at the same time could be in a different stage in terms of the product 
cycle, because each country is at different levels of economic and technological 
standards. When a product is in the maturing stage in the developed country, it is 
possibly in the new stage in the developing country. It is therefore worthwhile for the 
developing country to introduce the product and the technique of its production, and 
then by adding other advantages the host country has, such as location advantages, a new 
and promising product and industry will emerge in the recipient country - (learn from 
Vernon's FDI theory).
Both foreign investors and Chinese partners should be able to reveal their advantages and 
contribute them to the new firm. Foreign investors should provide capital, technology, 
and management skills to the host country; while the host country should make great 
efforts to offer special and attractive locations to the foreign investors - (learn from 
Dunning's FDI theory).
The book presents several characteristics of China's FDI theories including:
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1. China's attitude towards FDI is greatly affected by the Marxist approach. It would be a 
mistake to ignore this basic point. Fundamentally speaking, western FDI is explained in 
China in terms of its political character.
2. Instead of rejecting FDI, it is thought to have a positive impact on socialist construction. 
Therefore, China opened its door and welcomed FDI. However, the government tries to take a 
decisive position towards FDI, as President Jiang Zeming states: "We must gain the initiative 
in FDI; otherwise, FDI may go wrong" (p.3). This explains why the Chinese are keen to 
attract FDI by organising local fairs, even by going abroad, as well as by opening new areas 
(in terms of regions and industries).
3. Unlike western FDI theories, China's FDI theory embodies official policy. It is created, 
interpreted and dominated by the Chinese authorities, rather than by economists. Also, this 
official theory directs FDI practice in China. This helps us to understand the way China deals 
with FDI and the pattern of China's FDI development. But can China's FDI theory be 
considered as one of the general theory for explaining FDI activities worldwide? Not quite 
because these are some major limits of the approach:
(a) Based on how a FDI recipient country, or a developing country considering 
inward FDI, this theory pays no attention to other important FDI movements, 
such as FDI between developed countries. There is limited reference to well- 
known western FDI theories, but it is only used to discover the motivations of 
the MNEs, in order to help the Chinese government to determine the 
countermeasures to deal with them in advance.
(b) The Marxist approach which is used as the framework by the Chinese is not 
generally accepted by the rest of world except perhaps by a few other socialist 
countries such as Vietnam and Cuba.
(c) All the Chinese analysis is focused on the macro level, such as the political 
relationship between socialist recipient countries and capitalist investors, the 
strategy of the host country vis-a-vis the investing countries. Micro analysis from 
a business angle such as analysis of concrete motivations of both foreign 
companies and Chinese partners (in the case of joint ventures) to set up a FDI 
project is largely ignored.
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Therefore, it is fair to conclude that China's FDI theory can be regarded only as a theory 
explaining FDI in China from the point of view of Chinese officials, or it can at best be 
regarded as a candidate for a partial FDI theory with a modern Marxist approach, as it directs 
China's FDI practice. It may also represent some of the.socialist countries' position towards 
FDI.
We shall use Dunning's eclectic theory to see what "modifications" need to be made so as to 
allow his general FDI theory to satisfactorily explain China's FDI after its theory has been 
discussed. But unlike China's FDI theory, which requires further analysis on micro issues, 
Dunning's approach lacks macro analysis.
Firstly, as Liu points out, it is not always the case that investing firms take the initiative, and 
it is true that the Chinese side often behaves as the initiator for reasons discussed earlier. 
More importantly, the Chinese government has never given up gaining the initiative for FDI, 
which means it is China, not the western investors, which decides why FDI is needed for the 
country, what kind of FDI it prefers, and where the FDI should be distributed (industrial 
areas) and located (locational areas),
Secondly, as Kojima (1982) suggests, an FDI model should pay attention to "macro-economic 
contribution of FDI", to "increased employment, transfer of technology, orderly 
industrialisation, growth of GNP, and balance of payments in both investing and host 
countries" (p. 230). China's FDI theory implies that the strategic reasons for the country to 
introduce FDI include: (a) overcoming a shortage of funds; (b) gaining access to the 
international market; and (c) raising the tax revenue for the Chinese government.
Finally, China's FDI theory is a special one which sees FDI from the viewpoint of a recipient 
country. The global dominant FDI theories are based on the analysis of the motives of 
investors. It is therefore worthwhile for Dunning's general FDI theory to consider FDI from a 
different angle, in order to enable his approach to explain both outward FDI and inward FDI.
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2.4. How does FDI take place? - (The Forms of FDI)
In addition to the questions of what FDI is and why FDI takes place, how FDI takes place is 
another significant issue, which may cover several aspects, such as how overseas investors 
use their ownership advantages - by internalisation. However, the focus of the discussion 
here will be on the different forms of FDI; in other words, the modes of the firms' 
involvement in international production.
2.4.1. The Worldwide Principal Forms of FDI
FDI is usually divided into two major forms - traditional forms and new forms - in terms of 
the development of international business (Buckley, 1985; letto-Gillies, 1992).
A wholly-owned foreign subsidiary (WOFS) is considered to be the traditional form of FDI, 
in which a parent company has 100 per cent ownership. This traditional type is based on the 
belief that no outside entity should have an impact on corporation management (Crinkota, 
Ronkainen, 1990). This enables the head office to effectively control its subsidiary, to 
transfer its advantages (such as capital, technology, and skills) through the internal market, so 
as to avoid market uncertainties, to reduce external interference, and to undertake long-term 
planning (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Buckley, 1983).
New forms of FDI include equity joint ventures (EJVs) and 'fade-out' agreement, as both the 
forms require that foreign investors acquire 'equity stake' and 'control'.
The term (equity) joint venture has been defined in various ways. At times it is taken to mean 
any joint relationships in a limited time. Friedmann and Kalmanoff state (1986), a joint 
venture is 'a type of association which implies collaboration for more than a very transitory 
period'. It is sometimes defined as a commitment for more than a very short duration, of 
funds, facilities and services, by two or more legally separate interests to an enterprise for 
their mutual benefits (Tomlison, 1970). Having identified four properties of joint ventures, 
Sukijasovic (1970) defines it as a community of interests involving doing business in
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common, the sharing of profits, the sharing of business risks and losses and longevity of 
cooperation.
Joint ventures may be undertaken by two or more different foreign firms without any local 
partners (Grimade, 1989). They are, however, most likely to be jointly set up by foreign firms 
and local firms, which is particularly the case in the developing countries. Joint ventures can 
also take different ownership patterns. For example, one of the partners may hold a majority 
share, a minority share, or an equal share in ownership. The extent of each partner's control 
over the equity joint venture then depends on the percentage of the equity stake of each.
As one of the new forms of FDI, EJVs have been emerging increasingly for several reasons:
(1) As a matter of necessity: (a) a single firm is unlikely to be able to engage in a large, 
capital intensive, long lasting investment or it may be unwilling to take the risks entailed in 
this kind of investment. Partners for joint ventures are therefore required in order to spread 
the risks. The exploration of resources deposits is an example of this kind of investment; 
and (b) foreign investors acquire important knowledge of the local market when transferring 
their knowledge to the host country (Dunning and Zheng, 1991) because by jointly setting up 
an EJV with local partners, foreign investors can easily acquire the relevant knowledge from 
their local partners.
(2) As a condition of entering a local market. The developing countries favour the EJVs 
because they believe that they can successfully learn the foreigner partner's skills if they 
become partners in the venture. Because of this, they often include local ownership 
participation as a condition for setting up EJVs with foreign investors.
Regarding WOFS and JVs, some scholars believe that WOFS is the "first best" form due to 
its importance for foreign investors in terms of outright control of production (Casson, 1987). 
In practice, however, there is an increasing recognition of the fact that JVs often play the 
"first best" role in an investing firm's strategy (Dunning and Cantwell, 1982; Killing, 1983; 
Beamish, 1984; Harrigan, 1985; Hladik, 1985), and there is a very strong tendency that more 
and more TNEs will take the form of JVs (Buckley, 1985).
46
'Fade-out' agreements - a new form of FDI - are primarily used in the Latin American 
countries. They are the host country's 'planned divestment' agreement which involves MNEs 
in liquidating the investment and selling the stake to local interests, usually the governments 
(Hirshman, 1972). These agreements are based on fixed term (normally between 5 and 10 
years) in order to gradually reduce tension in economies where a high degree of foreign 
penetration is viewed as a political problem (Buckley, 1985).
Contractual joint ventures (CJVs) have also emerged as a new form of foreign investment, 
Wright (1981, p. 500) defines it as
'a risk-sharing venture in which no joint enterprise with a separate personality is formed. It is 
partnership in which two or more companies (or a company and a governmental agency) share 
the cost of an investment, the risk and the long-term profits. The contractual joint venture may 
be formed for a particular project of limited duration, or for a long-term cooperative effort, and 
the contractual relationship may terminate once the project is complete'.
However, as already noted, the status of CJVs - if they belong to FDI or a form of other 
investment - still remains uncertain because they are sometimes considered to be FDI by 
international organisations (such as the World Bank), as well as by some countries (such as 
China), and at other times are not regarded as FDI by theorists in terms of the globally 
accepted concept of FDI. The reason for accepting CJV as a part of FDI in China may be that 
CJVs and EJVs have much in common (Lin, 1987). For example, both of them require their 
partnerships to involve joint management, and joint operation, and to share the cost of an 
investment, the risks and the profits. The major reason cited for not accepting a CJV as a FDI 
is that, unlike EJV, WFOE, and 'fade-out' agreements, CJV involves no equity stake. CJVs 
are discussed here as they are regarded as one of the major forms of FDI both by China and 
world organizations.
2.4.2. The Forms of FDI in China
As shown in Table 2.1, four FDI categories are recognised in China: (a) EJVs; (b) CJVs; (c)
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WFOEs; and (d) joint exploration (7). Of these four forms, joint exploration plays only a 
minor role in China's inward FDI, usually less than 1 per cent in terms of the annual total FDI 
value, and so is excluded in this study. The discussion will therefore centre on the key FDI 
forms in China, that is, EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs which are also known as San-Zi-Qi-Ye (three 
types of foreign funded enterprises).
A) Equity Joint Ventures
Unlike a global definition of JVs, which also includes the category of two or more than two 
different investors investing in a third country without a local partner, the Chinese definitions 
of JVs refer only to two groups of partners: the Chinese partner on the one side, and the 
foreign partner on the other. This is specifically termed as Sino-foreign joint ventures.
In order to avoid domination of foreign sector enterprises by western investors, EJVs were the 
Chinese government's first choice of FDI form in China, since the government believed that 
western investors might transfer some undesirable western political and ideological trends 
along with the transfer of their technology to the country, ideas which are seen as harmful to 
China's socialist construction (Casson and Zheng, 1993; Chen and Raftery, 1994). EJVs also 
offer a way for the Chinese to share the "control" over the venture with foreigners, and thus 
keep a watch on their western partners' behaviour. In addition, Chinese officials usually try to 
secure a dominant position for the Chinese partners by ensuring that the Chinese side holds a 
majority or at least a fifty-fifty ownership of the EJVs, although, in theory, the foreign side 
can hold up to 99 per cent of the equity stake in the venture (Pearson, 1991).
Furthermore, it was required by the Joint Venture Law (1979) that "the Chairman of the board 
should be appointed from the Chinese side", whatever the proportion of equity stake the
(7) Joint Exploration is a type of Sino-foreign cooperation in the exploration and development of offshore oil and gas 
resources. Under this type of arrangement, foreign investors agree to launch exploration projects at their own 
financial risks. Once petroleum is discovered, both parties make investments to develop the find jointly.
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Chinese partner had in an EJV; the Chinese described the Chairman as the legal 
representative of the EJV and the general manager as the person who implemented the 
decisions of the board and administrated the day-to-day operations of the enterprise (Ho and 
Huenemenn, 1984). That appeared to be unreasonable, as in most EJVs outside of China, 
control over decision making in an EJV is directly tied to the division of ownership between 
partners, namely, the partner with majority ownership has the majority of votes on the board 
of directors (Lin, 1987, 1995).
Finally, EJVs are believed to be the best means to introduce western advanced technology and 
management skills because it is based on long-term co-operation (usually between 15-30 
years), and requires that 'partners shall share the profits, risks, and losses in proportion to 
their respective contribution' (Chu and Dong, 1984). This means that the foreign investors 
not only have to invest their funds, advanced technology, and best knowledge, but also have 
to contribute their loyalty to the ventures in order to make the co-operation profitable; the 
Chinese partners can thus acquire advanced western technology since they jointly operate the 
ventures with western investors.
The geographical location of an EJV was also one of the careful political considerations of 
the Chinese government. Until 1984, only limited areas such as SEZs were selected for EJVs, 
as the government wanted to gain some experience before allowing other areas to establish 
EJVs.
Foreign investors on their part chose EJVs in the early years of China's reform for several 
reasons:
1. Other forms of FDI such as WFOEs were not permitted in China until much later;
2. They needed the help of their Chinese partners to overcome specific obstacles to 
operating within the country, for the business environment is not only different 
from that in developed countries, but also from that in many other developing 
countries. This included differences in political and economic systems, as well as 
differences in management system and governmental administrative procedures 
(Chen and Raftery, 1994).
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It is unfortunate that EJVs have not grown as rapidly as the government expected because 
some requirements of the China's joint venture law did not follow the international practice, 
to which western investors were accustomed (Li, 1990). Secondly, the regulations to 
implement EJV law were not immediately issued until late 1983, "leaving potential investors 
somewhat uneasy about what the law actually required or permitted" (Shapiro, et al, 1991). 
As a result, a very flexible form of FDI, CJVs, took the lead in China's FDI development 
until 1986.
B) Contractual Joint Ventures (also known as Cooperative Enterprises)
For reasons analysed above, CJVs may be described as a quasi-form of FDI. In China that 
particular model of CJVs was developed by the Guangdong provincial government, which is 
the first area in China to practice an 'open door' policy. It has more than 70 per cent of total 
CJVs in China (Lin, 1987).
As the most attractive form of China's FDI, CJV have the following features:
1. The Chinese investors make their contribution in a rather flexible way - by 
providing the right to use a site, the right to exploit resources, plant and equipment, 
and services of labour as a condition of co-operation with foreign investors. They do 
not necessarily contribute cash. Foreign investors make an investment by providing 
capital, technology, equipment and materials as the conditions of co-operation with 
the Chinese side.
2. The investments contributed by each party to the ventures are not computed in 
shares. Input in kind, rights or interests need not be converted into cash or counted in 
terms of the ratio of investment. The portion of investment contributed by each party 
to the enterprise is not stipulated either.
3. The responsibilities, rights and obligations of each party to the CJVs, 
including investment, co-operative conditions, distribution of profits, share of risks
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and losses, are stipulated by a contract after consultations and negotiation with each 
party to the venture.
4. The contract signed by most cooperative enterprises stipulates that the foreign 
partner shall first retrieve investment upon the expiration on the terms of the venture. 
Therefore, the contract, generally speaking, also stipulates that all assets shall be 
owned gratuitously by the Chinese partner.
5. The first type of CJV (also called 'pure form') is more flexible than the second 
type (Burn, 1994). Each party to this type of venture co-operates as a separate legal 
entity and bears its own liabilities. The second type has a feature of EJVs: the parties 
form a limited-liability entity with legal-person status, which means that participants 
of the CJVs rely on each other much more than the first type, but more flexibly than in 
the EJVs, because foreign investors still enjoy other factors of flexibility than a CJV 
offers. This includes the ability to repatriate his original investment prior to the 
expiration of the ventures, and to distribute profits disproportionately to the value of 
his capital contribution. Most CJVs in China belong to the second type.
With such flexibility, CJVs certainly suit both Chinese partners and foreign investors. For 
Chinese partners, it is a way to learn western technology managerial expertise from their 
foreign partners without investing money, as most of them lack it. Therefore, the Chinese can 
become the partners of CJVs by contributing what they have - normally the right to use a site, 
plant and the services of labour. This is called "make do with whatever is available" (Lin, 
1987).
Most foreign partners initially preferred CJVs to EJVs as they were concerned about the 
uncertainty of investing in China immediately after it launched its open door policy. The 
CJVs provided a way for them to test the investment climate in China, since this form is 
project specific and short-term in nature in comparison with long-term and wide ranging 
equity form of the EJVs. This feature of the CJVs is found attractive by many foreign 
investors, particularly those from Hong Kong, whose businesses are mainly small and 
medium sized and are labour intensive. Thus, many small sized, short-term, and quick returns 
projects were set up via the CJVs route. However, as time passed, some disadvantages of
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Chinese-foreign co-operative enterprises surfaced, such as increased conflicts because of 
each party's pursuit of short-term interests, for no laws relating to CJVs were formed until 
1988. Meanwhile, an increasing number of foreign investors realised that China was fairly 
safe for long-term investment. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit, China was 
generally assessed to be a less risky political and economic environment (The Economist, 21 
May 1994). In addition, the Regulations and the Laws of the Chinese-Foreign Co-operative 
Enterprises which were issued later were marked by Chinese characteristics. The CJVs were 
not put on an equal footing with the EJVs for gaining access to materials, financing and tax 
benefits. The Regulation for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures were earlier issued in 1983; they were 
chiefly based on international practice which was easier for foreign investors to get 
accustomed to. Consequently, Chinese-foreign cooperative enterprises have been overtaken 
by Chinese-foreign Joint Ventures since 1986 in terms of the growth rate of the annually 
actual foreign investment (see Table 2.3):
Table 2.3 Annually Actual Foreign Investment to Foreign-Invested Enterprises
US$ 100 millions
Foreign-invested
Enterprises
EJVs
CJVs
WFOEs
1979-82
0.98
5.32
0.40
1983
0.74
2.27
0.43
1984
2.55
4.65
0.15
1985
5.82
5.85
0.13
1986
8.05
7.94
0.16
1987
14.86
6.20
0.25
1988
19.75
7.80
2.26
1989
20.37
7.52
3.71
1990
18.86
6.74
6.83
1991
22.99
7.63
11.35
(Source: China Foreign Economic Statistics, 1992, Beijing)
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C) Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
As the name suggests, WFOEs are set up and operated solely by foreign investors. They were 
closely watched by the Chinese government. Firstly, they were permitted to become one of 
the forms of FDI one year later (1980) than were joint ventures (1979), and were allowed to 
be set up in only four SEZs until 1984, because an WFOE is thought to be beyond the control 
of the Chinese partner. Secondly, they had to prove that they were investing advanced 
machinery and technology or had the ability to export all or a large portion of the production. 
Thirdly, unlike joint ventures, they were not allowed to be involved in areas like publishing 
and retailing. However, WFOEs have been encouraged by the Government since 1986, when 
reductions in FDI occurred (Casson and Zheng, 1991), and since 1992, when a growing 
number of large sized MNEs have been contributing to China's inward FDI. Many of them 
prefer to set up WFOEs; this, the Chinese government believes, is a good opportunity to 
improve its inward FDI because these firms transfer the most advanced technology (Chen and 
Raftery, 1994). As a result, WFOEs have increased dramatically and they have overtaken 
CJVs since 1990, and have grown faster than the EJVs (see Table 2.3). All this differs from 
the worldwide tendency mentioned which is that the EJVs are growing faster than the 
WFOEs.
2. 5. Conclusion
The concept of FDI in China has undergone a process of introduction, creation and 
development.
The stage of introduction of the FDI concept is from late 1978 until the early 1980s following 
the permission given to western FDI to enter China. Because the term FDI was new to the 
Chinese at that time, the focus was on the introduction of western or worldwide basic FDI 
concept and theory, which can be seen from a lot of relevant Chinese publications. From the 
theoretical perspective, western FDI concept was mainly introduced in terms of the Marxist 
approach, but there was no systematic Chinese official FDI theory available; in actual 
practice, western FDI activities were very carefully dealt with, being limited to a few regions 
(such as SEZs, and some major coastal cities), and in the forms of EJVs and CJVs.
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In terms of concept creation, China's FDI interpretation was created between late 1980s and 
1995 when FDI began to play an increasingly important role in the Chinese economy. This 
period also saw China's FDI becoming very topical not only in China but also all over the 
world. In 1995, the book, Principles of China's Utilising Foreign Investment was published 
by the Chinese government, which systematically analysed China's inward FDI within a 
Marxist framework, but in a flexible way, leading to the formation of China's own FDI 
concept.
The stage of FDI concept development appears from 1995 onwards, because FDI has been 
dramatically growing since the early 1990s. An increasing number of industries are being 
thrown open to FDI, such as retailing, insurance and banking. New forms of FDI like EOT 
(Built, Operation, Transfer) and holding co-operation came into existence. In addition, new 
FDI policies were issued in 1995 and 1996 respectively, aiming to balance its introduction of 
FDI between its quantity and quality based on the national long-term economic development 
strategy, and to balance its FDI policy between the governmental requirements and the 
requirements of international organizations, such as World Trade Organisation. In other 
words, on the one hand, China intends to control as well as to develop inward FDI in an 
independent way; on the other, the country will have to move closer to international practice, 
as it was seeking and now is a member of WTO. We will see continuous changes in the 
Chinese concept of foreign direct investment.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology Issues
3.1. Rationale for the study
It has been many years since China introduced its "open door" policy in late 1978, thereby 
allowing direct inward investment from Western economies. During the whole period, the 
development of history of China's foreign direct investment (FDI) has undergone several 
significant changes as a result of the changes to or adjustments of China's policies, 
particularly with regard to FDI (Brecher, 1995).
A number of previous studies have investigated these changes. Some of the work has 
suggested that the history of inward China's FDI development can be divided into several 
periods in terms of significant changes. These changes have been described variously as 
"stage", "phase", etc., implying that the situation with regard to FDI into China has changed 
over time (Fan, 1992; Hou, 1993; Huand Ji, 1994).
However, this research has given no special attention to analysing the changes. Many 
questions therefore remain unanswered. For example, what criteria are applied in defining 
terms such as "stage" or "phase"? What are the causes and effects of China's policy changes? 
And importantly, what is the significance of looking at this issue?
It is to answer these kinds of questions that the current research study has been undertaken. It 
is hoped that, as a result, the study will lead to a greater understanding of the whole concept 
of China's FDI policies and that, in particular, it will lead to benefits for a number of key 
stakeholders:
(1) for FDI participants, including foreign investors and Chinese partners, how to assess, 
anticipate and adapt to China's particular FDI environment; and
(2) for FDI decision makers within China, including Chinese central and local 
governments, the gaining of an in-depth comprehension of the actual effects, both 
positive and negative, arising from the changes of FDI policies.
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3.2. Research approach
In this study, the author attempts to use the world-wide accepted FDI concept as a framework 
to explain, analyse and compare it with FDI in China. According to this framework, the 
author found that FDI in China has many of its own characteristics in terms of its definition, 
theory, and form. As a developing as well as a socialist country, China needs to introduce 
FDI as a means of improving its economy. However, it also wishes to maintain control over 
FDI under its socialist principle (Pearson, 1991). As a result, FDI is treated in China as both a 
political and economic deal with Western investors. The definition and theory of FDI are 
directed by Marxism but with Chinese characteristics. As such, the pattern, form and 
development of FDI in China are controlled by the Chinese government. However, from time 
to time - particularly in the 1990s - China seems to have been forced to follow international 
practice in order either to meet the requirements imposed for membership of international 
organisations such as the WTO, or to introduce more FDI.
With regard to the level of the study of China's FDI, a research review has shown that the 
majority of publications focus on the micro level, namely, on the level of foreign-invested 
enterprises. Of these publications, the majority have examined such issues as how to set up a 
foreign-invested venture and the motivation of foreign investors' involvement in FDI in 
China. Conversely, less attention has been paid to analysing the problems of performance and 
management of such ventures (Kaiser, Kirby and Fan, 1996). Research at the macro level - 
both nationally and locally - has not received proper attention, therefore some questions are 
largely ignored. For example: why and how has China introduced change to its FDI policy; 
and the extent to which these changes have impacted on foreign invested enterprises and on 
FDI development in China as a whole, and particularly what kind of lessons can be learned 
from these changes. Research connected to both micro and macro levels is hardly seen, since 
the above questions need to be answered from all levels.
This research, therefore, will adopt a combined approach - both micro and macro, and the 
questions will be analysed at three levels - national, local, and company levels. Overall 
responsibility for policy rests with the Chinese Central Government, which in turn has a direct 
impact on local government, as well as on foreign investors and foreign investing companies. 
This covers areas of policy such as when and where FDI is allowed to be introduced, and
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what kind of FDI projects is encouraged or discouraged in certain period of time and in 
particular regions. Chinese local governments are allowed to issue local policy according to 
the principle of the Central Government policy and particular local circumstances, which 
makes FDI local conditions and environments different from one region to another.
In addition, different regions may be given different policies by the Central Government. 
Examples include Shenzhen and - currently - Shanghai, which have received the most 
favourable treatment and which at times has led to regional conflicts and disputes. Also, 
foreign investing companies are influenced by both central and local government-related 
policy and its change. This has a direct bearing on whether they decide to remain in a 
particular location or move to another one in terms of different local FDI policies, and 
whether, indeed, to invest in China or withdraw their investments there in response to 
changes in the Central Government policy (Pang, 2003).
In the final analysis, the response from local government on the Central Government policy 
will influence the Central Government to rethink whether it will retain the policy or change it. 
Also, an assessment by companies themselves of the national and local government policy 
will have a reciprocal influence on those same organs of government in respect of their FDI 
policies.
By addressing these issues at the three levels described above, the study will enable the author 
to analyse and answer these questions thoroughly and systematically. However, the research 
focus will be on the central level, since the author attempts to conclude these questions in 
China as a whole, and to draw some lessons from the Chinese government's policy changes 
and formulate and anticipate China's FDI policy change for people at all levels.
3.3. Research methods
Western FDI is a new issue in China in terms of its theory and practice. China's FDI policy 
making and its changes, on the one hand, reflect what kind of theory the government adopts; 
and on the other, produce an impact on FDI practice in China. Therefore, this study needs to 
cover both theoretical and practical analysis of China's FDI,
The research methods selected for and applied to this study include a review of published 
materials, mail survey, face-to-face interviews, and case study. A review of published
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materials helped build up a general picture of the Western FDI theory and practice, which 
was used as a framework to see how western FDI was regarded in China, including the 
theoretical explanation and practice, and also embracing FDI policies and changes of the 
Chinese government.
In order to analyse FDI practice in China, investigation and field study had to be carried out. 
The result of this research can provide FDI researchers and FDI practitioners with first-hand 
data and evidence. It also enables the author to supplement quantitative analysis and, more 
importantly, will support answers to the research questions raised by the author.
The research methods selected and applied were: mail survey, face-to-face interview, and case 
study.
  Mail survey is more efficient and economical than observation and has a good coverage 
(Emory, 1985); but unlike interview, it is difficult to probe for additional information or 
clarification of an answer (Zikmund, 1997).
  Face-to-face interview usually enables the interviewer to ask some questions in detail and 
trace the answer to a question (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The disadvantages of the 
interview are that: (a) It is generally more expensive than mail survey (Zikmund, 1997), 
particularly when extensice travel is required; and (b) Face-to-face interview is more 
difficult to conduct than mail survey, as willingness to participate in a face-to-face 
interview is influenced by some cultures (Zikmund, 1997). In the case of China, 
undertaking an interview seems to be more difficult than in many other countries because 
of its different business and political culture.
  The samples of case study are selected from the author's interview and survey, which 
reflect some representative problems existing between different companies and different 
regions.
In short, reviewing published materials more or less helps the author to draw an overall 
picture of China's FDI in terms of its theory and practice, while field work enables the author 
to gain updated first-hand data and to explore some questions other researchers may not able 
to. This is because differences in culture, languages and political beliefs between western 
countries and China means that it is difficult for western researchers to do field work on 
China's FDI in China; and also because of media control in China by the government, some
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results of field work carried out by researchers - including western and Chinese - are not easy 
to be published in China.
However, because the author is Chinese, it has been relatively easy to undertake fieldwork in 
China; and because the author is studying in a western country, it is not difficult to review the 
result of the field work done by other people from western publications, research seminars, 
etc., and to do research independently, including raising any questions the author may have, 
discussing them, and getting research results published by western journals.
The following gives details relating to how the research methods were employed in 
undertaking the study, and may also suggest the specific characteristics of the research 
methods used in carrying out the research programme.
A. Published Materials
Published materials investigated for this study included academic articles, research reports, 
statistical figures, documentation materials, etc. These materials were divided into two 
groups: published materials in China, most of which were written in Chinese; and overseas 
publications written in English.
It is a fact that the viewpoints from Chinese publications in the subjects of social sciences 
have to be in line with the country's socialist principle (i) , including the issue of China's 
FDI. This leads to the problems of availability and reliability of the materials, because of 
media control. For example, news, reports and articles in People's Daily - a newspaper of the 
Central Communist Party of China - must be agreed politically by the editors before being 
published. Accordingly, all other Chinese national and local papers have to follow the tune 
set by People's Daily. This kind of media control leads to the problems of availability and 
reliability of the materials needed for the study, which had to be undertaken based on 
available source of information and reliable evidence.
(1) In China, required by the constitution of the country, everyone, especially those whose work in the areas of social 
sciences have to follow the so-called "four cardinal principles", which "means to keep to the socialist road and uphold the 
people's democratic dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought. - 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (1993), New Star Publishers, Beijing, China.
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The available publications in China relating to China's political and economic policies were 
generally supportive of the Government's position (Pearson, 1991). Articles written by 
government officials or official researchers focused on positive aspects of political and 
economic issues in China, and tended to tell readers how good things were in China, and how 
proper the Chinese government policies were. Some articles written by individual researchers 
may contain some of the author's own viewpoints and explore some of the problems of the 
Government policies. Nevertheless, these authors were not allowed to go as far as challenging 
the government position, and they had to primarily support the government policy and follow 
official rationale. Otherwise, these articles were not allowed to be published.
Negative aspects - including some important problems - usually remained hidden, and 
ordinary people were unlikely to know them (2). It was therefore difficult for the author, who 
worked as an independent researcher, to collect published materials which gave both positive 
and negative information in order to draw a true picture of China's FDI, since " Chinese press 
and journal articles reflected less opposition to and problems with negative effects of foreign 
investment than in fact may have existed " (Pearson, 1991). More importantly, the 
government's positive approach most likely led it to releasing false information to the public 
in order to meet its need of positive propaganda.
Because all figures relating to local and national economy were worked out, issued and 
published by government bodies, rather than by independent organisations, logically, it is easy 
for the Chinese governments or authorities to report the figures. For example, some local 
governments tended to give inflated FDI figures to the Central Government, especially when 
they had difficulty in attracting the planned target number of FDI, as higher figures of FDI 
introduction mean better performance of the local governments to attract FDI to their areas. 
These figures therefore gave a wrong indication that the governments had met the target
(2) The negative aspects of China's issues, especially some serious problems the government may have were 
usually published in an internal newsletter called "Internal Reference", which was allowed to be read by 
government officials. Different levels of officials read different levels of the newsletter, eg. highly ranked 
officials can read higher confidential newsletter).
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which may be set by the Central Government or by themselves (3).
In order to resolve the problems of availability and reliability of China's published materials, 
and carry on the study properly, it became necessary for the author to take some effective 
measures. Theses measures included: (a) review of overseas related publications; and (b) 
use of the author's contacts in China to make some Chinese publications available, such as 
"internal reference"; and to build up a base on which the author was able to find out the true 
story in China.
As mentioned above, Chinese-published materials usually adopted a positive approach in 
order to protect the government policy and position, which did not give a whole picture of 
China's FDI. In contrast, overseas publications about China's FDI tended to identify and 
analyse the problems existing in China. This helped the author to conduct the study more 
comprehensively.
The author has various useful contacts in China's local and central government bodies, 
research institutions, and foreign investing companies after having worked there for many 
years. This enabled the author to gain valuable publications from time to time. These 
included internal FDI news and reports, FDI problems and analysis of them, the debates about 
China's government FDI policy and position, and un-inflated FDI figures. The author's 
China-based connections ensured that the necessary information reached the author in a 
timely manner. Some connections were also able on occasions to recommend new or good 
sources of information not otherwise available to the author outside China. This provided a 
good source of information on FDI in China and helped the author draw a real picture of 
China's FDI.
It is fortunate that the availability and reliability of Chinese publications has been improving 
in recent years, following the country's opening of its doors more widely to the outside world.
(3) For example, in middle 2004, the author conducted field work in China. When he collected the annual statistical FDI 
figures (not yet published at that time) from a good friend who was a key person in a provincial foreign investment 
services centre, his friend asked him to note that the figures were inflated because his province had not met the target set 
by the Central Government.
61
For instance, statistical data published by the China State Statistical Bureau and MOFETR 
(Ministry of Foreign Economic and Trade Relations) is regarded as increasingly trustful and 
reliable by western researchers and international bodies, and widely used by them as sources 
of information (Pearson, 1991).
B. Mail survey and interview
Research data through questionnaire is primary data, and therefore primary data collection 
methods are required to be employed. In the case of the study (business research), surveying 
and interviewing are more appropriate and popular methods employed in business research 
(Zikmund, 1997).
Surveying was carried out by designing a questionnaire and sending it by mail. Research 
questions included were relatively general and basic and were designed to have adequate 
coverage of the topic. Interviewing was considered as the second stage of data collection, 
following up the results of the mail survey, in order to deepen the research. More detailed 
and specific questions were discussed at interview.
1. Surveys
(a) Main features
  
Advantages
As mentioned earlier, surveys are more efficient than observation and more economical 
than interview. The on-going study needs to be completed in a limited time. Mail- 
survey makes information possible to be gathered by a few well-chosen questions which 
would take much more time and effort to gather by observation. In addition, using the 
mail as a medium of communication, it can unlimitedly expand geographic coverage at 
a typically lower cost than interview.
  
Disadvantages
There are two major weaknesses of mail survey. One is the difficulty of securing the 
quality of information; the other is the poor percentage of mail return (Emory, 1985).
(b) Survey design : some measures were taken in order to improve the quality of 
information and mail-survey returns
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The mail questionnaire was designed and revised several times in order to make it as 
simple, clear, and easy to answer as possible, as it is generally believed that respondents 
are unlikely to co-operate with a long and / or complex mail questionnaire. In the 
questionnaire, the respondents needed to tick an appropriate answer(s). If they wished, 
they had the opportunity to add some comments to offer more detailed information.
The questionnaire was designed in two versions, one in Chinese (for Chinese partners 
of joint ventures), and the other in English (for foreign partners of the ventures and 
foreign managers or representatives in wholly foreign owned enterprises).
Some incentive was provided to the respondents in order to raise the mail return 
percentage:
(1) Postage-paid self-addressed envelopes were enclosed with the original 
questionnaire; (2) A special way to send and collect the questionnaire. Because the 
study was carried out by the author based in the UK, while the survey was conducted in 
China, it would have been extremely expensive sending and returning the questionnaire 
internationally, as international postage is very expensive. Also, it is difficult for people 
in China to return post to a Western country, especially when the post carries comments 
on Chinese government policy. It is then better and perhaps necessary to obtain 
assistance in China, that is, by sending and receiving the questionnaire in China. By 
doing so, the cost of the postage can be largely reduced as China's local postage is very 
cheap, and the author can review the results of the questionnaire in China just before 
undertaking the interview in China; and worry of the respondents about their mail being 
intercepted by the government is removed. Because of the huge size of the country, two 
bases were built up to do this, one is based in Shanghai with responsibility held by a 
Chinese adviser, dealing with the respondents in the North and East parts of China; the 
second is in Guangzhou where the author's former colleague in a Chinese university is 
in charge or contacting the respondents in South and West parts of China.
Special access to respondents was considered, since it is extremely important to seek 
assistance and get things done in China by having special relationships with people 
concerned. Therefore, most questionnaire were planned to be sent to companies with 
which the author has contacts and /or with whom his colleagues have contacts. A high 
returned percentage was then expected.
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  With regard to the content of the questionnaire, the questionnaire was divided into two 
parts: the questions in the first part were general, relating to the background information 
about a venture, which may help create a case study at a later stage of the study. The 
second part questions gave a focus on the government FDI policies, which were most 
relevant to the research. In addition, difficult questions relating to China's policy issues 
were avoided, since political trouble could have been caused to the respondents if they 
answered the questions as such. Therefore, all the questions were carefully-planned, 
but relevant to the research questions.
  The approach employed in the questionnaire: There is only limited exploration. An 
exploratory investigation was planned to be taken until respondents indicated that they 
were interested in discussing some of the questions and until the stage of face-to-face 
interview started when the author would be able to ask the questions in detail based on 
the results of the mail-survey.
  The same approach would also be employed to determine the degree of question and 
response-structure. In the mail-survey, most of the questions and the responses would 
be the structured questions. In the interview, they change to a combination of semi- 
structured and unstructured. But in the final project they would be largely structured.
Other practical issues of the questionnaire
The practical issues which were taken into account clearly and carefully prior to mail- 
survey action include:
  Number of firms involved
What is the appropriate number of firms to which the questionnaire would be sent? Two 
factors could decide this. One is the budget (envelopes, postage, and cost of labour - 
paying people for their assistance in the sending and collecting of the questionnaire), 
this allowed a maximum of 200 copies of the questionnaire to be sent out. The other is 
how many returned and completed questionnaires will be needed to make sense of the 
study. According to the usual return percentage and the author's expectation for the 
return percentage, around a 30 per cent response rate in 200 copies would be reasonable 
to provide data to support the research project. Therefore 200 copies were sent out to 
foreign invested firms in China.
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  Selection of respondents
(1) Which side should be selected to contact? Foreign partners or Chinese partners? It is 
easy to decide who should be contacted for wholly foreign owned enterprises, as the 
author simply sends the questionnaire to the foreign managers or their representatives; 
whilst for the joint ventures, it needs to decide whether to contact one side or both. It 
was decided to contact both sides as (1) this will make them feel that they have been 
equally treated; and (2) this enables the author to collect the viewpoints for the 
questions from both the Chinese and the foreign sides, which is required by the research 
project.
(2) Both the Chinese and English versions were designed with the Chinese partners being 
sent the Chinese version and Foreign side receiving an English copy, making them easy 
to read and complete.
(3) Senior staff (chief executive, general manager, chief representative) of the enterprises 
will be contacted, as it is believed they are in the position to understand the questions 
thoroughly and complete the questions confidently.
  Type of firms
Major forms of foreign invested companies in China are: equity Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures, non-equity Chinese-foreign joint ventures (also known as Co-operative 
Chinese-foreign ventures), and wholly foreign owned ventures. The survey will focus 
on the first type, as this type is the most popular in China, and also good for the author 
to gain the information from both Chinese and foreign parties relating to their co- 
operation.
  Size of the firms:
The focus of the survey will be on large and medium sized ventures, including some 
world best-known multinational firms. These firms are more representative of FDI 
situations in China and more welcome by the Chinese government, as they are believed 
to bring more investment, advanced technology, and management expertise for China, 
which are badly needed by the country.
  Nature of firm's business:
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Different kinds of ventures will be selected for the survey in terms of their nature of 
business, ranging from manufacturing to banking and other service industries. More 
attention will be given however to manufacturing as most FDI in China is in this area, 
and FDI in service industry cannot be ignored as it represents a new milestone of 
China's FDI development.
  Country of origin:
All major Western countries are involved in FDI in China, including the UK, the USA, 
Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and so on. FDI from Hong Kong has consistently 
accounted for a large proportion in total China's inward FDI. In the mail-survey, the 
companies to which the questionnaire will be sent include investors from different 
countries and regions in order to gather information from different kinds of investors. 
However, the focus will be on British investors, as it is easy for the author to contact 
their UK head offices to gather further information when necessary, also the UK 
investment in China has been growing quickly compared to other European countries.
  Location of firms
The majority of foreign invested firms are located in South China and coastal regions, 
such as Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Shanghai, as a result of the Chinese government's 
strategic design for the FDI development pattern in China. Logically, more 
questionnaires will be sent to the firms in these areas. Few copies will be sent to the 
firms situated in Western and Central parts of China where are relatively poor, as it is 
necessary to know how FDI is working there when the Central Government is intending 
to make these areas into new development areas by offering incentives to local 
governments and foreign investors.
(C) Survey results:
Some 59 copies were finally received, of which 41 were completed, the valid copies therefore 
made 20.5 per cent (41/200) of respond percentage, and was not as good as the expected 
(percentage of around 30 per cent). This response percentage of mail-survey suggests that 
conducting a survey research may be costly in China, at least not as cheap as the usual 
practice, or not as cheap as surveys conducted in many western countries.
66
The following are probably some reasons why the response percentage of mail-survey was 
poor:
  
Chinese partners normally have little interest in public affairs, and tend not to let others 
know their internal affairs, although the author had already pointed out in the head letter 
that "the reply would be strictly confidential". This would have been influenced by the 
Chinese tradition that "I only clean up the snow in front of my house, and it is not my 
business to clean up the frost above my neighbour's roof.
Two examples give evidence of the poor response percentage of the mail-survey, and 
difficulties of carrying out a survey in China, (a) A Shanghai consultant company sent 
700 copies of the questionnaire to locally targeted potential respondents. In order to 
increase the return rate, the company promised to provide gifts for the people who 
returned the questionnaire. In the required time, only 4 copies of the completed 
questionnaire were returned. The response percentage was poor as less than 1 per cent; 
and (b) A special method was used when a company conducted a survey. They hired 
university students to take copies of the questionnaire with them, together with certain 
amount of money. The students then went to the companies, and contacted managers, 
who got paid as soon as they completed their questions. This proved to be an efficient 
way of carrying out a questionnaire survey in China.
  
Some foreign managers in wholly owned enterprises and foreign partners in joint 
ventures did not wish to disclose the situations of their companies to others. Some 
uncompleted copies of questionnaire were returned with a note stating their apologies to 
the author, such as "too busy to help". A note, as a response to the author's survey, 
from a foreign manager of DuPont China may represent similar thinking of these 
companies: "I regret that our company policy does not allow us to respond to 
unsolicited questionnaires such as yours". Some companies simply returned the 
original copies of questionnaire without any excuse.
  
The mailing list of the foreign invested companies in the business directory was not 
sufficiently reliable.
About 100 copies of the questionnaire (which accounted for 50 per cent of all copies, 
i.e., another 100 copies arranged through the author's personal links in the country) 
were added to the mailing list The problems came from a booklet called Foreign
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Businesses in China, in which a number of China's foreign invested companies were 
listed, but with many of the addresses outdated. Around 24 copies (12 per cent) 
returned without reception from the addresses listed in the Directory. Two reasons 
given by the postal authorities were: no such company at that address, and the company 
has moved. A lesson the author learned from this was to make a telephone call to 
confirm that there is a company in the listed address before the questionnaire is posted.
It is fortunate that the author had more or less anticipated the difficulties in doing the survey 
in China, and had taken some effective measures, and therefore did not suffer a serious 
problem. In the valid returned questionnaires (41 copies), about 80 per cent (32 copies) of 
completed questionnaires came back from companies in which the author or author's Chinese 
colleagues and friends had good contacts. However, it should be noted that some of these 
respondents from these companies responded to the questionnaire not because they were 
eager to do so, just because they had to do so, in order to give you a face. This is why the 
author still needed to remind them to complete and return the copy from time to time.
Of 41 valid responses, 84 per cent (34 responses) were from Chinese-foreign joint ventures, 
the respondents varied from the general manager, chief representative, financial manager, 
marketing manager, and operation manager. 29 companies are large and medium sized, and 
the rest of them are small-sized companies from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. 37 
companies are manufacturers, ranging from chemistry, communications, banking facilities, 
construction, foods, and clothing; and 4 companies are involved in banking (2), insurance (1), 
and legal services (1). 32 companies are in south China, and large cities in the coastal area - 
Guangdong and Shanghai, 9 companies are located in Guangxi, Beijing, Fujian, and Sichuan 
respectively. There were more responses from British (7) and American (14) invested 
companies than other companies. The results of the questionnaire survey suggest that the data 
from these sources will be satisfied with the research project, as it provides the most relevant 
information to the study.
A crucial question about the result of the questionnaire survey is whether or not the 41 valid 
responses are sufficient for supporting the research analysis, since the first hand data and its 
analysis plays an important role in a PhD thesis, and serves as a means to give conclusive 
evidence for a new theory. According to some researchers, the relative number of 20 per cent
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of valid questionnaire responses against 200 copies is not poor (Hussey and Hussey, 1997), 
and the questionnaire survey proved to be an effective tool for examining the problem at 
hand. However, it is only one of the quantitative methods to supplement the quantitative 
analysis (Wang, 1995).
The methods employed to analyse the questionnaire result include: (a) coding the data; (b) 
grouping the codes into small categories; and (c) using two qualitative analysis methods : 
Cross tabulations, and Charts and Graphs.
A follow-up study of the questionnaire survey was carried out when necessary in order to 
correct the bias that occurred in the initial survey. The study was concentrated on those who 
completed the questionnaire and whom the author interviewed.
2. Interviews
Following the questionnaire survey, a face-to-face interview was carried out. As mentioned 
earlier, the author attempted to get more detailed information from the interview which was 
based on the survey. Therefore, some interviewees were selected from the people who had 
been involved in the author's questionnaire survey.
The author anticipated that the face-to-face interview could be much more difficult to arrange 
than the questionnaire survey, as it could concern interviewees to spend around an hour, 
which is seen as a very big favour in the country, and which is unlikely to make things 
happen, and get things done without relations with the people concerned, whether it is a 
minor or major issue. Results from the returned questionnaire indicated that only four of the 
respondents stated it was possible for the author to interview them. The author then tried to 
find other companies and organisations with which the author had personal contacts. The 
author also sought help from friends, former colleagues in China, who have links in targeted 
interviewees. Finally, twenty-eight interviews were arranged in China.
However, because the Chinese government and Chinese partners tend to control the ventures 
politically, they are strict as to the people who intend to talk to the foreign partners; this 
resulted in the author failing to arrange interviews with foreign partners, which is necessary 
for the research. When the author tried to arrange interviews in Chinese-foreign joint 
ventures after the author met with Chinese partners, the Chinese political head of the 
companies was extremely concerned about that. The author of this research understood it was
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time to leave. Interviews with foreign investors were rearranged in companies' UK head 
offices after the author returned to the country.
The twenty-eight interviews were conducted in four provinces: (a) Guangdong - located in the 
southern part of the country, China's first region to open for FDI, and which has attracted 
more FDI than any other regions of China; (b) Shanghai - China's largest city located in the 
south-east of the country, its introduction of FDI has been the fastest growing in the country 
in recent years, and has received more FDI from the world largest companies than any other 
regions of the country; (c) Beijing - capital city, China's political and information centre; and 
(d) Guangxi - next to Guangdong, one of the poorest regions in the country, which is a good 
example to demonstrate if the recent government policy of encouraging FDI to this kind of 
region is effective.
Two methods were employed in the interview. One was semi-structured (questions asked 
referred to the essential information about the company, together with some specific 
comments from the interviewed companies on China's FDI related policies), the other was 
unstructured (open-ended discussions with the companies interviewed about FDI related 
policies of local governments and the central government, etc). In general, each interview 
took an hour. In the first half an hour, for the semi-structured interview, the questions asked 
were based on the questionnaire, in the second half hour, the author tried to let the 
interviewees give information and their own viewpoints of and comments on the Chinese 
government FDI or FDI related policy, and on the events and situations of China's FDI.
The interview seemed to be more successful than the questionnaire survey, as (a) the 
interviewees tended to tell the author the truth about FDI in China and in their companies, 
which provided the author with valuable information and enabled the author to draw a real 
picture of China's FDI; (b) some detailed answers to and information on research questions 
were given, which helped the author to deepen the research programme; and (c) information 
from some companies and regions gave excellent sources of examples for the case study of 
the research programme.
Unlike the questionnaire survey, the interviews were carried out not only in the foreign 
invested companies, but also in the central and local government bodies, and research centres 
and universities. Therefore, the interviewees were different groups of people, including 
company managers, governments officials, and researchers. The author managed to interview
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an official from the Central government and a senior researcher from its research centre, from 
whom an overall situation of China's FDI was introduced. The outcome of interviewing 
researchers added the author's understanding of China's FDI issues. The evidence and 
examples given by company managers strongly supported some points the author made in the 
work.
From the interviews, various printed materials were also provided by the interviewees, 
including annual reports of companies, special government reports of China's and local FDI 
performance, and some articles and research papers written by interviewees.
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CHAPTER 4
Defining the Turning Points of China's FDI Development
4.1 Introduction
One of the fundamental features of China's FDI development is the country's continually 
changing policy environment (Mark and Zheng, 1991). As many authors already identified 
and described, major policy changes led to several important periods - or phases - in the 
process during the late 1970s and the middle 1990s. These can be regarded as turning 
points.
Much has been written about the turning points of China's FDI development. However, an 
in-depth or theoretical analysis of this topic is rarely to be seen. For example, in order to 
reflect the effects of dramatic changes in China's FDI policies, much existing research has 
usually paid attention primarily to how much more or less FDI inflows into China due to 
those changes. In addition, many researchers have paid only partial attention to this issue, 
regarding the turning points of China's FDI development as only a part or a minor part of 
their research. Moreover, little research has been done about why and how the turning 
points take place, and how they affect the further development of China's FDI. Finally, four 
important aspects have been ignored when the turning points of China's FDI were 
discussed: (a) The turning point of China's FDI is not clearly defined; (b) The relationship 
between one turning point and the next is not well explained; (c) Overall and fundamental 
changes in China's FDI policy leading to changes in every aspect of China's FDI is not 
comprehensively and systematically identified and analysed, as much existing research is 
either centred on continued changes in a single FDI policy (e.g. China's foreign exchange 
policy), or only focused on one overall and fundamental change of China's FDI policy (e.g. 
China's permitting western FDI to China by announcing an open door policy); and (d) The 
explanation of the relationship between the movement of the turning points and the 
development of China's FDI theory and practice is not given, since a change of FDI policy 
in the country, to a great extent, is a result of Chinese leadership's understanding and 
explanation of FDI.
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It is becoming more and more important to pay greater attention to the above issues since: 
(a) China has many years of FDI experience and has undergone several dramatic FDI policy 
changes since it opened its doors to the outside world. This experience contains important 
theoretical as well as practical implications for FDI participants and for FDI further 
development in the country; (b) as a socialist country as well as a developing country, 
China's experience in developing its FDI has been different from many other countries'; and 
(c) China has consistently become the second largest FDI recipient nation (next only to the 
US) since 1993, although this has been accompanied by changes in FDI policies in the 
country.
The research the author is undertaking attempts to give emphasis on the above issues by 
defining, identifying, describing and analysing those FDI turning points. The research 
questions relating to this research topic will include:
+ How and what turning points are defined in this research?
+ When, why and how did these turning points take place?
^ What are the impacts of these turning points on China's FDI development?
^ What are the characteristics of these turning points?
+ What is the relationship between the movements of FDI turning points and the
development of China's FDI theory and practice? 
+ And what kind of lessons can be drawn from these turning points for China's FDI
participants and the rest of the world?
In this chapter, the main existing definitions of turning points will be reviewed, these being 
based on the three different existing criteria. The application of different criteria to each 
turning point means that each is classified differently. That does not mean the criteria are not 
"right" or "wrong", but simply that they are selected or decided according to different 
purposes or policy initiatives. Following this review, a definition of the term "turning point" 
will be suggested in the context of this dissertation and in line with its research aims. Finally, 
the turning points evaluated in detail in the next three chapters will be established according 
to the author's own definition.
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4.2 Definition of the turning point
In the first part of this section, existing definitions of the turning point will be reviewed, 
which are extracted as examples from publications, and the author's comments on these 
definitions will be given.
In the second part of this section, the turning points that are defined and included in this 
dissertation will be established and explained.
4.2.1. Review of Existing Definitions
The turning points of China's FDI development have been defined by many researchers in 
one way or another. Different criteria create different definitions, which therefore lead to 
different classifications of the turning points. Three different criteria are identified by the 
author among the existing research in connection with defining the turning point. Examples 
of turning points (extracted from publications) according to these criteria are given and 
discussed as follows.
1. The turning point is defined in terms of the "important changes in China's 
specific foreign investment policies".
Two examples are given below. The first example is centred specifically on the foreign 
exchange policy; while the second example is concerned with the legal treatment of FDI in 
seven different FDI areas.
According to Roehrig (Example 1), two turning points can be seen from these three major 
phases of China's policy changes (1983 and 1986) in foreign exchange balancing towards 
foreign invested enterprises.
These two turning points can be described as:
i. From universal tough foreign exchange balance requirement to relieving particular joint 
ventures from this requirement (1983);
ii. From partially relieving foreign exchange balance problems to attempting overall
roo/~kln-fi/-\M /-»-F-flick rvt-/-»K1 orvi ^IQS^^resolution of the problem (1986)
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Example 1
There are three major phases of legislation for foreign investment in the area of foreign exchange since 
1979.
The "Provisional Regulations on Foreign-Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China" in the 
1979 Joint Venture Law required all Sino-foreign joint ventures maintain a positive balance between 
foreign exchange expenditures and revenues. This has proved to be the biggest obstacle for many joint 
ventures, as they needed to import necessary inputs with hard currency, and paid hard currency as 
expatriate salaries and dividends to foreign shareholders. Therefore, the only possible option for the 
joint ventures to meet the requirement of balancing foreign exchange was to export the products they 
produced in China. Between 1979 - 83, this policy had become unpopular and impractical, as one of the 
major reasons for most foreign businesses to invest in China was to produce as well as to sell their 
products in local market.
An important policy change occurred in 1983, when the Chinese government issued the "Implementing 
Act for the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment" and the "Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regulations". These new 
regulations eased the foreign exchange requirements by allowing joint ventures to sell their products to 
qualified domestic enterprises for foreign exchange, and giving local governments the power to lend 
money from their own foreign exchange reserves to import-substitution joint ventures. However, the 
new regulations didn't totally resolve the foreign exchange problem many joint ventures had faced, as 
they only provided a way for particular joint ventures which had to be recognised as import-substitution 
joint ventures - even these joint ventures were not guaranteed by domestic enterprises to provide the 
necessary markets for joint ventures' goods.
Further progress in balancing foreign exchange was made by the government in 1986 when the 
"Regulations on Foreign Currency Balance of Equity Joint Ventures" were announced. This new law 
allowed joint ventures to balance foreign exchange among themselves, that is, joint ventures which had 
foreign exchange reserves were allowed to sell foreign exchange to those which were in foreign 
exchange deficit, or the latter were allowed to buy foreign exchange from the former. This change led 
to the establishment of foreign exchange swap centre in Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities in 
China, which became an important means for most foreign invested enterprises to obtain foreign 
exchange as they relied mainly on swap centres.
(Source: Roehrig, 1994).
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Indeed, the issue of foreign exchange balance or the foreign exchange shortage is 
important, as it had been one of the most common problems experienced by many foreign 
invested enterprises and "inhibiting the rapid growth of FDI in China" (Chen and Raftery, 
1994).
In addition, the important policy changes which led to the two turning points reflected the 
fact that:
i. The Chinese government and foreign investors differed in terms of their respective 
objectives of FDI activities in China. The government had been much worried about the 
foreign exchange balance as the country is a developing country, and badly needed hard 
currency to develop its economy by importing advanced technology and equipment; 
whereas the shortage of foreign exchange had been its long-term problem (Li, p. 139).
On the other hand, however, the main purpose of many foreign investors, especially a 
manufacturing foreign invested venture, is to sell its industrial or consumer goods on the 
domestic Chinese market (Delfs, p.l 14).
ii. Improved or more relaxed legal measures were introduced and implemented had 
indicated that the foreign exchange problem and its negative effect on further FDI 
development in China was realised and understood by the government. The turning points, 
therefore, in this sense were good for both Chinese and foreign parties, and of course good 
for the further development of FDI in China as well.
It can be seen from below the Example 2 that the approach Wei adopted in the study is 
similar to the study shown in Example 1. That is, analysis of the seven tidal changes in 
legal treatment of FDI is focused on significant changes in China's specific foreign 
investment policies. Example 1 is centred on changes in one specific FDI policy area - 
foreign exchange policies; while Example 2 is concerned with seven different specific FDI 
policies, including the foreign exchange policy.
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Example 2
There have been seven tidal changes in the legal treatment of FDI since 1978.
(1). Joint Ventures: From controlling to Regulating.
The Equity Joint Venture Law, as the country's first foreign investment legislation issued in 1980, is more like a 
series of political declarations allowing leeway in its implementation. All the activities of a joint venture must be 
governed by Chinese laws, relating to such items as the chair of the board, domestic distribution and termination. 
In other words, this new form of economic entity with a capitalist element would be dominated by socialist public 
ownership. Legislative developments occurred in the spring of 1990, when the National People's Congress 
adopted the Equity Joint Venture Law Amendment which, for the first time, allowed that the chair of the board of a 
joint venture could be elected from the foreign side. This marked the beginning of regulating FDI firms.
(2). Whole Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries (WFOS): From Regional Experimentation to National Promotion
China's adoption of WFOS was accompanied by the concern about the negative effects of this 100 per cent foreign 
economic participation, namely, the fear of a westernisation of China's economic structures, social values, political 
beliefs, and so forth. This concern effectively paved the way for the gradual adoption of this 100 per cent foreign 
ownership in China. The process, however, was painstaking and involved continuing administrative efforts, from 
the experimenting stage in the SEZs to a limited expansion in the fourteen coastal cities and finally, with relevant 
new laws and regulations in place, to national promotion.
(3). Regional Policies: From Coast-lining to Opening Inland
The architects of the Open Door policy committed themselves to fully utilise the geographic accessibility of the 
coastal region and its relatively more sophisticated technical and infrastructural receptiveness to foreign markets, 
capital, and technology. This would end its several-decade-long self-imposed isolation and, in the long term, to 
spread the benefits to the interior region, thereby closing the gap between that region and the coast.
(4). Tax Regime: From Initial Favours to Proliferating Encouragement and Rationalisation
The first phase came with the adoption of the Joint Venture Income Tax Law, Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law, 
and their respective implementing rules. The initial tax favours were offered to attract more FDI. The second 
phase was marked by the adoption of the 1984 SEZs and Coastal Cities Tax Reduction and Exemption Regulations. 
The regulations recognised the existing tax incentives authorised to be given for FDI firms in the SEZs and further 
extended these incentives to the fourteen coastal cities. The Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise 
Income Tax Law adopted in 1991 marked the beginning of the third phase of China's legislative development in 
the area of income tax as applied to FDI firms and other foreign business activities.
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(5). Foreign Exchange Management: From Relief Qualifications to Greater Accommodation
The primary cause of the foreign exchange imbalance that haunted most FDI firms is the non-convertibility of the 
Chinese currency. Up to early 1986, the joint venture laws and regulations were ineffective in helping to generate 
foreign exchange. The relief offered by the government was limited, such as it allowed domestic sales of venture 
products that are most needed by domestic manufacturers or consumers, or have to be imported.
The growing confidence and accumulated experience in working with FDI operations for the first half of the 
decade, allowed more creative avenues to be proposed and implemented. The new options offered in the Foreign 
Exchange Balance Provisions and the Encouragement Provisions include: (a) domestic sales of sophisticated 
products; (b) reinvestment of RMB profits; (c) government assistance; (d) mortgage RMB on foreign exchange 
loans; (e) import substitutions; and (f) foreign exchange "swaps" at foreign exchange swap centre.
(6). Technology Transfer and Intellectual Property Protection: From Rudimentary Access to More 
Sophisticated Operation
The first change was that Chinese authorities gradually set up intellectual protection laws: the Trademark Law, the 
Patent Law, and the Copyright Law were promulgated in 1982, 1984, and 1990, respectively. This led to the 
establishment of China's own system in the intellectual property arena.
Another major change took place in 1992 when the Chinese government made a series of moves to bring its 
intellectual laws in line with international practices by acceding to a number of international conventions on 
intellectual property protection.
(7). Foreign Bank Operation: From Simple Presence to Operational Expansions
The first step the Chinese government took was the issue of the Foreign Financial Institutions Resident Office 
Procedures in 1983, which permitted foreign banks to establish representative offices in major Chinese cities.
The second step was taken in 1985 when the State Council adopted the SEZ Foreign Bank Regulations. These 
regulations allowed foreign banks to open new branches and to conduct basic retail banking business in the SEZs, 
following the Shanghai branches of two major Chinese banks officially authorised the four foreign bank branches 
to expand their business to include the lending of foreign currency at unrestricted interest rates and the acceptance 
of deposits in foreign currency with interest payable at rates of the Bank of China.
A further step was taken on September 8, 1990 when the People's Bank of China issued the Shanghai Foreign 
Financial Institution Measures. These measures, for the first time, allowed foreign banks to start their branching 
operations into a non-SEZ coastal city.
(Wei, 1994)
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However,, the discussion of the turning point summaring in Example 1 is only a minor part of 
the book - "Foreign Joint Ventures in Contemporary China" - written by Roehrig. This kind of 
study looks just like a simple historic record, and does not provide any theoretical implications, 
although it may give an idea of what kind of turning point takes place in China' FDI history. 
The study Wei undertakes extracted in Example 2 has taken this issue much further, as (a) 
Wei's book is focused on turning points of China's FDI policies and the turning point has been 
discussed in detail, which is hardly seen from the existing research; and (b) this book looks at 
turning points from seven different FDI policy areas, which can therefore be asserted without 
doubt that Wei's work has provided a more comprehensive picture of the historical 
development of FDI in China, along with the important FDI policy changes between late 1978 
and early 1990s. His work has also been useful for other researchers into FDI in China with a 
particular interest in the topic of these turning points.
Nevertheless, Wei only treats seven FDI areas as separate issues, and doesn't attempt to explore 
the relationships between the turning points in these different areas. It also has no intention of 
enquiring whether there are any more general or overall FDI policy changes which would affect 
these specific FDI policy changes in order to make a more comprehensive or a more systematic 
analysis - which could provide in-depth explanations of why these turning points take place, 
what the implications of them are, and how China's FDI development has been affected.
2. Turning points are defined mainly according to the important qualitative and 
quantitative changes of FDI, as a result of changes in FDI policies and important events.
Quantitative changes in FDI refer to how much more or less China attracts FDI after China's 
FDI policy changes in terms of the number of FDI projects, or the amount of foreign capital. 
Qualitative changes in FDI, on the other hand, refer to changes in the form of FDI (there are 
three common FDI forms: Joint Venture, Wholly Foreign-Owned Venture, and Joint Co- 
operative Venture), changes in the development of China's opening to FDI, and changes in the 
industrial areas to which foreign companies make their investment.
Analysis of quantitative and qualitative changes in FDI relating to China's FDI policy changes 
is an approach conducted by many researchers.
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According to Lu (1997), China has experienced three stages of FDI:
(1) Start stage (1979 -86):
At this stage, FDI in China is limited and the average size of FDI projects is rather small. This is because China 
had just started to introduce FDI, the legal environment for FDI was poor, and foreign investors' main objective at 
this stage was to gain experience of doing business in China.
(2) Growth Stage (1987-91):
FDI developed at a good pace, and the amount of FDI was six times greater than the first stage. The main reasons 
for this change are: (a) the Chinese government speeded up the establishment of a legal framework for FDI, and 
issued a series of laws and regulations, including "the Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment", 
which offered many more incentives to FDI makers than ever before; (b) more of China's coastal regions are 
allowed to enjoy the government's special FDI policies, including Shanghai Pudong New Development Area; and 
(c) Infrastructure for FDI has been greatly improved after the government's massive investment, such as more high- 
quality roads and seaports being built up.
(3) Rapidly Developing Stage (1992 - 95):
In 1992 alone, the number of new FDI enterprises was more than the number over the previous thirteen years. In 
addition, in 1993, China attracted more FDI than any other developing country and became the world's second 
largest recipient of FDI (next only to the USA).
The reasons behind this tremendous FDI development include:
A) The tour of south China made by the then leader Deng Xiaoping in early 1992 boosted the country's confidence 
in the Open Door Policy and therefore gave a powerful boost to further development of FDI in China;
The government's decision during the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 
1992 to change China's economic system from a planned economy to a market economy, which provided the 
Chinese with a new and modern concept to deal with international economic co-operation,
B) including China's FDI;
C) Many of China's inland and border cities are allowed to be open areas to FDI in 1992.
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Example 3:
According to Lu (1997), China has experienced three stages of FDI:
(1) Start stage (1979 -86):
At this stage, FDI in China is limited and the average size of FDI projects is rather small. This is because 
China had just started to introduce FDI, the legal environment for FDI was poor, and foreign investors' main 
objective at this stage was to gain experience of doing business in China.
(2) Growth Stage (1987-91):
FDI developed at a good pace, and the amount of FDI was six times greater than the first stage. The main 
reasons for this change are: (a) the Chinese government speeded up the establishment of a legal framework 
for FDI, and issued a series of laws and regulations, including "the Provisions for the Encouragement of 
Foreign Investment", which offered many more incentives to FDI makers than ever before; (b) more of 
China's coastal regions are allowed to enjoy the government's special FDI policies, including Shanghai 
Pudong New Development Area; and (c) infrastructure for FDI has been greatly improved after the 
government's massive investment, such as more high-quality roads and seaports being built up.
(3) Rapidly Developing Stage (1992 - 95):
In 1992 alone, the number of new FDI enterprises was more than the number over the previous thirteen years. 
In addition, in 1993, China attracted more FDI than any other developing country and became the world's 
second largest recipient of FDI (next only to the USA).
The reasons behind this tremendous FDI development include: (a) the tour of south China made by the then 
leader Deng Xiaoping in early 1992 boosted the country's confidence in the Open Door Policy and therefore 
gave a powerful boost to further development of FDI in China; (b) the government's decision during the 
Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 1992 to change China's economic 
system from a planned economy to a market economy, which provided the Chinese with a new and modern 
concept to deal with international economic co-operation, including China's FDI; and (c) many of China's 
inland and border cities are allowed to be open areas to FDI in 1992.
(Lu, 1999).
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Two turning points appear in the above example.
The first one occurred between the start stage (1979-86) and the growth stage (1987-91). A 
criterion of defining this turning point by Lu is the important change of FDI in terms of its 
quantity. The reason behind this change - FDI moving from the initial stage towards growth 
stage - is thought by Lu to be improvements of the legal framework on FDI, notably, the 
Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, which offered significant concessions 
over FDI makers. However, the question of why the government decided to issue the 
Provisions and of their importance remains unanswered.
Again, the quantitative criterion is applied to defining the second turning point - between the 
Growth Stage (1987-91) and the Rapidly Developing Stage (1992-95) - as China started to 
attract much more FDI in 1992. The major causes for the second turning point are claimed by 
Lu to be important political events (Deng Xiaoping's south China tour and China's adoption of 
a market economy system) and the further development of China's FDI policy (the 
government's decision to open up many of China's inland and border cities).
By applying a similar approach, Yongming Fan (1992) declares there have been four phases of 
China's FDI development (see Example 4):
Example 4
(1) Starting phase (1979 - 84):
The "JV Law" was the first ever legal document of China's introducing foreign investment, and marked China's 
Open Door policy. During this phase, China attracted a large number of foreign investment projects, including the 
establishment of 3,278 Chinese-foreign joint ventures, Chinese-foreign co-operative ventures and wholly foreign- 
owned ventures, with a total agreed foreign investment of USD8.99 billion, and actual foreign investment of 
USD3.46 billions. The rapid increase in introducing foreign investment resulted mainly from some of the Chinese 
leadership's belief that any of China's economic problems can be resolved once foreign investment is introduced.
(2) Adjustment Phase (1985 - 86):
China's policy of "stimulating economy" led to foreign investors swarming into the country, especially in 1985 
when 3,069 foreign investment projects were approved, with an agreed amount of USDS.53 billion. However, 
problems relating to investment environment, including poor infrastructure and.a serious lack of foreign exchange ,
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etc, resulted in complaints from many foreign investors. To cool down the economy, the government introduced a 
new economic policy of "retrenchment and adjustment" for the year 1986 and 1987. This policy led to a downturn 
of the country's economy, as well as FDI in 1986. The number of new foreign investment projects and the agreed 
amount of foreign investment were down 51.25 per cent and 51.21 per cent respectively.
The sudden boom and bust of FDI and dramatic criticism from foreign investors urged the Chinese leadership to 
have a serious review of China's FDI policy against the foreign investment problems. As a result, "the Provisions 
for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment" were announced, aimed at encouraging foreign investors to actively 
involve in China's priority projects and areas. "The Provisions" marked new stage of FDI development in China - 
the FDI policy-oriented stage, as, for the first time, the government attempted to guide FDI via its FDI policies.
(3) Development Phase (1987- June 1989):
From 1987, the "second boom" of FDI in China occurred. Some 2,233 new FDI projects were approved, with 
agreed amounts of USD3.788 billion, which was double that of 1986. In 1988 and 1989, new FDI projects went up 
5,945 and 5,779 respectively; accordingly, the agreed amount increased to USD5.297 billion and USD6 billion 
respectively. This is because foreign investors' confidence was renewed after "the 1986 Provisions", and was 
strengthened after the promulgation of the "Laws on Foreign Invested Enterprises" and "Laws on Chinese-foreign 
Co-operative Enterprises" in 1986 and in 1988 respectively. These two laws, for the first time, provided overall 
legal protection to the wholly-foreign owned enterprises and Chinese-foreign co-operative enterprises although 
these enterprises had come to existence in 1979.
(4) Tortuous Phase (June 1989 - June 1991):
The strong FDI growth was suddenly halted by China's "June 4th" incident in 1989. After this incident, the western 
countries launched economic sanctions on China. This included withdrawing and cancelling loans to China and 
some economic cooperation projects. With regard to FDI, Western companies' representative offices closed down 
one after another. Some western investors withdrew from their existing investment projects. In addition, foreign 
businesses' confidence was further hit by China's economic retrenchment policy starting late 1989.
Every effort was made by the Chinese government in the hope that FDI could be revived: (a) the government 
insisted that China's Open Door policy would remain unchanged; (b) the "JV Law" issued in 1979 was amended in 
1990, giving foreign partners more control over the management and operation issues; (c) special financial 
arrangements were made by the central government to foreign invested enterprises to minimise the negative effect 
from the country's retrenchment policy; and (d) opening up Shanghai Pudong as a new development area, allowing 
this area to enjoy some most preferential policies as to attract foreign investment to the promising zone.
Consequently, the negative political effect of "June 4th" event was minimised, and FDI development had taken a 
turn for the better.
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From Example 4, it appears that the same approach is adopted as Example 3 - classification of 
China's FDI's turning points is based on the shifts of China's FDI related policies and important 
political events, in terms of FDI's quantitative and qualitative changes. Example 4 shows there 
have been three turning pints relating to the dramatic increase or decrease in FDI inflows to 
China. The first turning point is between the Starting Phase and the Adjustment Phase, when 
FDI went downwards caused by the government's overheated economic policy. The second 
turning point is from the Adjustment Phase to the Development Phase, when FDI underwent the 
"second boom" as a result of a set of new FDI policies being issued. FDI suffered a serious 
setback, which marked the third turning point between the Development Phase and Tortuous 
Phase and resulted from the "June 4th", famous political incident.
It is without doubt that, by using quantitative and qualitative criterion to determine the turning 
point of China's FDI, research such as Examples 3 and 4 would be useful to provide 
information on how and why China' FDI has been up and down. However, for the study on the 
relationship between the turning point and FDI policy issues, the turning points classified in 
Examples 3 and 4 are not always connected with Chinese FDI policy change. For example, the 
"June 4th" political event did not indicate that China intended to change its FDI policy. 
Likewise, to a great extent, Deng Xiaoping's south China tour was aimed at reconfirming 
China's Open Door policy to the outside world after the "June 4th" incident, as well as China's 
FDI policy, again, it didn't imply any change in China's related policies.
3. Turning points are determined by the important FDI policy changes, which have more 
general, overall, and longer-term impact on China's FDI further development, or lead 
to fundamental change in all China's FDI environment.
According to this criterion, the following turning points are explored:
(1) Allowing or permitting FDI into China marks an important turning point of China's 
FDI development.
As Ho (1984) claims, the Open Door policy adopted in December 1978 is the "historic turning
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point", as, for the first time, capitalist investment was allowed.
More specifically, Pomfret (1991) recognises that "direct foreign investment (DPI) was 
permitted by the July 1979 Law on Joint Ventures", this Law is believed by Fan (in Example 4) 
to "mark the China's open door policy".
Indeed, this dramatic shift clearly indicated that China no longer stuck to its previous inward 
development strategy, notably its self-reliant strategy. This historical change has been generally 
agreed as China's fundamental policy change, which makes western FDI possible to locate in 
China.
(2) Encouraging FDI, Instead of Permitting FDI
As many researchers agree, the insurance of "the Provisions for Encouragement of Foreign 
Investment (also known as "the 22 Articles")" in October 1986 marks another important turning 
point. As Pomfret (1991) states, the provisions "indicated for the first time, that China wished 
to promote rather than simply permit FDI", in other words, China's FDI had moved from 
Permitting FDI to Promoting FDI. Fan (1992) regards "the significance of the Provisions as 
equal to the Joint Venture Law, as it marked another new stage of FDI development of China - 
moving from the stage of establishing FDI basic policy environment to the FDI policy oriented 
stage".
This positive change of the overall strategy and attitude of the Chinese government in FDI was 
clearly shown in "the 22 Articles" and their implementing regulations: to foreign invested 
ventures, the swap of foreign exchange for RMB was allowed, tax and other incentives were 
offered, greater management autonomy and decentralised decision-making about joint venture 
approvals were given (Pomfret, 1991). A detailed discussion about this turning point will be 
carried out in Chapter 6.
(3) Managing FDI Strictly According to China's Priority Projects, Industries and Regions, 
Rather Than Simply Stimulating FDI
Since 1995, the Chinese authority has made some strategic changes in FDI policies, and issued 
several sets of new policies.
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On June 7, 1995, the government promulgated "Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign 
Investment Direction" and "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries'", 
which classify FDI projects into four different categories: encouraged, permitted, restricted, and 
prohibited. From April 1996, China started to withdraw some of the existing preferential 
policies to FDI new comers, and planned to gradually replace most of these policies by "the 
National Treatment" to all FDI makers.
These significant changes indicated that the government, for the first time, decided to strictly 
direct the FDI based upon their priority projects, industries, and regions, and started to consider 
treating FDI according to international practice, such as the government's intention to apply 
"the National Treatment" to foreign invested ventures.
This new and fundamental FDI policy change is seen by Richard Brecher (1995) as an 
important turning point "as Beijing shifts from investment promotion to investment 
management" (p. 15).
4.2.2. Turning Points Are Included In This Dissertation
It can be seen from the above discussion that the turning points of China's FDI development can 
be identified and classified in different ways based on different criteria. Three different criteria 
reviewed above generate three different classifications of turning points of China FDI:
(1) The turning point is defined in terms of the important changes in China's specific foreign 
investment policies;
(2) The turning point is defined mainly according to the important qualitative and quantitative 
changes of FDI, as a result of changes in FDI policies and important events;
(3) The turning point is determined by the important FDI policy changes, which have more 
general, overall, and longer-term impact on China's FDI further development, or lead to 
fundamental change in all China's FDI environment.
Since this dissertation attempts to look at turning points which are derived from overall and 
fundamental changes in China's FDI policies and which have general and longer-term impact
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on China's FDI further development, therefore the third approach from the above three 
approaches is apparently qualified to fulfil this study.
Having adopted this criterion, the author of this dissertation has identified the above three 
turning points generated by the third criterion (page 16-17), and now defines them as follows:
(1) From the "Self-reliant" to Permitting Western FDI (late 1978): Evaluation of the First 
Turning Point;
(2) From Permitting FDI to Promoting FDI (October 1986): Evaluation of the Second Turning 
Point;
(3) From FDI Promotion to FDI Management (June 1995): Evaluation of the Third Turning 
Point.
It is worth pointing out that each of the above three turning points is equally important in the 
sense that they all have changed general direction of China's FDI history. In addition, because 
these three turning points are equally important, and they represent respectively a turning point 
in a different period of time, looking at all three turning points together - the shift from one 
turning point to the next, would provide an overall, general, and consistent picture of China's 
FDI development from 1978 until 1990s, and give answers as to how and why the turning 
points take place, and what the impacts of these turning points on the further development of 
China's FDI are.
Moreover, this study will also seek the relationship between the movement of the turning points 
and the development of China's FDI theory and practice, as Chinese government's 
understanding of and interpreting FDI could be a key to the development of FDI in China.
The detailed analysis of three turning points will be respectively in Chapter 5 (the first turning 
point), Chapter 6 (the second turning point), and chapter 7 (the third turning point).
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CHAPTER 5
From "Self-reliance" to Permitting Western FDI (1978-1986):
An Evaluation of the First Period of China's FDI Development
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, FDI existed in China as early as the 1950s, though these 
investments were not made by Western companies but by the governments of the Soviet 
Union and Poland. It was "not until 1978, with the declaration of the open policy, did 
China's dealing with the West firmly move into the ascendancy, and only then were 
Western companies officially welcomed to invest directly in the Chinese economy" 
(Shapiro,e/a/., 1991, p.12).
During the Maoist period from 1949 to 1978, China followed a policy of "self-reliance", 
partially because it was isolated by the West for political reasons, and partially it feared, by 
allowing the West to get involved in its socialist construction, loss of its sovereignty and 
loss of the state control over the country's development path (Pearson, 1991). This policy 
was followed even more strictly after China's split with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. 
As a result, only exports were allowed in exchange for planned necessary imports, while 
international loans and investment were shunned by China (Pomfret, 1991). During that 
period, the Chinese prided themselves on being a country with neither internal nor external 
debts. This was in fact a reflection of the policy of autarky. Especially during the "Cultural 
Revolution", things were pushed to such extremes that the use of foreign investment was 
actually labelled as worshipping things foreign and fawning on foreigners - characteristics of 
the comprador bourgeois ideology (Liu and Liang, 1987).
China's open door policy was initiated in 1975, when then Premier Zhou Enlai suggested 
China's "four modernisations" in industry, agriculture, science and technology, and military. 
Later Hua Guofeng criticised the "closed door" policy of the Gang of Four when he came to 
power (1976-1978) after the Cultural Revolution, and proposed to import western
technology. In a single year between 1977-78, China signed as much as USD7.8 billion of 
technology transfer agreements from western countries, which was well beyond its 
repayment ability in hard currency (Fan, 1992).
Hua's proposal was so ambitious that it led to a number of the technology transfer 
programmes being withdrawn, and his proposal was soon replaced by Deng Xiaoping's 
"open door" policy. The policy was announced in December 1978, at the Third Plenary 
Session of the 11 th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and was even 
referred to by the Chinese themselves as a "historical turning point" (Ho and Huenemann, 
1984, p2), since this change had important political and theoretical implications, as well as 
having noticeable implications in China's economic policy and legal system.
Politically, the announcement of the open policy was a result of Deng Xiaoping's retention 
of power, who managed to remove the Gang of Four from their state and Party posts in the 
late 1976, then consolidated the power of reformists (Delfs, 1986). In addition, it was made 
clear at the Party's Plenary Session that the adoption of economic reforms and open door 
policy would become China's long-term and essential policy, rather than a temporary 
measure (Hu, 1989).
Theoretically, Deng Xiaoping created a famous theory termed "Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics" (Liu, Li and Tian, 1993, p. 142), after his long "pursuing an alternative 
model of socialism" (Delfs, 1986, p. 19), in order to replace unsuccessful Soviet models of 
development.
The open door policy plays a key part in implementing Deng's new development model of 
"Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (Fang and Xu, 1995, p.26), whilst the use of 
foreign direct investment is a major motivation and the most dramatic manifestation of 
China's open door policy (Roehrig, 1994; Kueh, 1992). This was because the Chinese 
leadership recognised the importance of FDI in contributing to the success of its open door 
policy and to the economic development of the country:
Using foreign funds and attracting foreign businessmen to launch joint ventures, co- 
operative enterprises or wholly foreign-owned ones is a major component of our 
open policy. It is also an important means to make up for the shortage of domestic 
funds, enhance our capacity to earn foreign exchange through export and raise 
China's technological and managerial levels (Qi, 1998).
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China's isolation from the rest of the world during the period 1949-1978 had led the country 
to serious difficulties in developing itself without any external assistance. In terms of the 
industrial sector, only 20 per cent was post-1960's technology, 20-25 per cent was 
serviceable but backward, while 55-60 per cent had to be replaced (Shapiro, et al, 1991). Its 
managerial skills remained poor, and its access to international markets was very limited. 
China's open door policy makers realised that all these required immediate attention if the 
country was going to be able to fulfil its goals of broad modernisation, and "to bring about 
in less than 20 years what it has taken 200 years for the industrial West to achieve" 
(Chalfont, 1986, p. 8). They also realised that FDI in China could facilitate domestic 
technological growth and the development of managerial abilities. This, in turn, would 
foster higher domestic standards of living and increase Chinese national security, through 
the provision of access to modern management methods, advanced production techniques, 
and industrial know-how. In addition, the Chinese government saw FDI as a way to make 
optimal use of its limited foreign exchange resources by encouraging foreign invested 
ventures that would promote import substitution, export promotion, and resource 
exploitation - without having to spend its scarce foreign exchange.
The implications of China's economic policy and legal system derived from China's "historic 
turning point" of opening its door are also significant, since
(1) China, for the first time, "was prepared to accept ... not just technology, but investment 
as well, from the developed countries of the capitalist world", and "the new 'Law of the 
People of the Republic of China on Joint Ventures' using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment" was promulgated on 8 July 1979, which "thereby took a major symbolic step 
toward confirming and implementing the open door policy" (Ho and Huenemann, 1984, 
p. 2).
(2) China's determination to establish Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai in Guangdong province, and Shantou and Xiamen in Fujiang province was a 
pioneering undertaking, as far as socialist countries were concerned (Fang and Xu, 1995). 
In these selected areas, special economic policies were given and a special economic 
system was allowed, in order to test out the open door policy and to set successful 
examples for the rest of China. SEZs' success later not only stimulated China's further 
opening up, but also attracted other developing countries to follow up the model,
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including Egypt and a number of former Soviet Union countries. Recently, even Japan 
has expressed their interest in this model (Hu, 2002).
China's open door policy was indeed a landmark shift, turning the country from the period 
of "self-reliance" to the era of "allowing Western FDI". However, many theoretical and 
practical questions relating to western FDI remained unanswered, as the Chinese knew little 
about what FDI was, and they "started virtually from zero in forming the legislative and 
legal framework..." (Shapiro, Behrman, Fischer and Fowell, 1991, p. 123). In other words, 
since FDI was a totally new area for the Chinese to work in, they had no option other than 
"learning it while doing it", this led to a striking feature of FDI development in the country: 
practising first, study and establishing policy environment later; or studying on FDI and 
making FDI policy followed the FDI practice.
In addition, how the Chinese side worked together with their western partners in a FDI 
project would become a wait-and-see issue, since China was isolated from western nations 
for such a long time, it did take time for both of them to get familiar with each other.
Two major measures were taken by the government in order to resolve problems they were 
facing while introducing FDI. Firstly, western FDI theories were allowed to be introduced 
to the country. As a result, translated FDI related books, articles of introduction to Western 
FDI - written by both western and Chinese scholars - were seen in Chinese bookstores, and 
university students had the opportunity to study on a new course of Western Business, 
which included worldwide recognised western FDI theories. This, as discussed in Chapter 
2, formed the first stage of the development of China's FDI theory. In the meantime, 
however, all Chinese were reminded by the government that China was building up 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, whilst Western FDI was used only for this purpose.
Secondly, the government was fully aware that they lacked the knowledge and experience of 
dealing with western FDI, they therefore realistically decided, to begin with, to allow the 
form of equity joint ventures to be set up in the country. They believed this form of FDI 
was commonly used in the world, it therefore would be easier for western investors and 
Chinese people to follow. Thus, in the year following China's open door policy, the 
government promulgated the Chinese equity joint venture law. Interestingly, this form of 
equity joint venture did not develop as well as the government expected. Instead, two other
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forms of FDI - non-equity joint ventures (also known as contractual joint ventures [CJVs]), 
and wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs) - emerged in China in the absence of 
related laws. The WFOEs were initially confined to SEZs and were small in number, 
although the law on WFOES was not available until 1986 when this form of FDI became 
permitted to fourteen open coastal cities; while the form of CJVs, compared with equity 
joint ventures, soon became a more popular form to attract western FDI in the early years of 
China's open door policy, though the law on CJVs was published as late as 1988.
The problems of China's understanding western FDI and its poor policy environment 
generated the slow FDI growth during 1979-86, and serious dissatisfaction of foreign 
investors caused by the controversial issue of balancing foreign exchange led to a FDI 
dramatic fall between 1985-86. The Chinese took astonishing efforts to resolve these 
problems in October 1986 by announcing an important new FDI policy, namely the "22 
Provisions", which, for the first time, were aimed at encouraging western FDI, instead of 
simply allowing it. This, therefore, marked the second turning point of China's FDI 
development.
The second section of this chapter examines how western FDI was treated in China - in 
terms of the government approach, attitude and policy - and why it was treated as such. The 
actual development of FDI will also be considered with regard to its pattern and features, 
and the reasons for its type and direction of development will be reviewed.
hi the third section, a general evaluation of China's use of FDI will be given, in terms of 
whether or not China had been successful in the introduction of western FDI in the 1978 and 
1986 period; and the reasons for the sudden FDI "boom" and its disappointing "bust" in 
1985-86 will be explained. This will be followed by a summary of the major problems 
related to how China viewed and dealt with FDI and foreign investors, it being these 
problems which blocked the way for its FDI further development in the country. Special 
attention will also be paid to the issue of balancing foreign exchange, as this became a 
central problem and served as a fuse that urged the Chinese government to take action to 
resolve its major problems and which finally led to another dramatic change in China's FDI 
policy, and led to a new historical turning point in China's FDI development.
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5.2. Evaluation of the First Period
5.2.1. Permission and Control: a special combination of China's approach towards 
FDI
As a socialist country, China's opening of its doors to the west was an astonishing shift, 
especially when other socialist countries - such as the Soviet Union, East European 
countries and the communist countries of south-east Asia - still held the door closed to the 
west until the late 1980s. What remained for China to answer, though, was the precise path 
it would take in its move to being an open economy and to welcoming Western FDI in 
China.
It should be noted that the open door did not mean China would give up its control over 
Western business activities in the country. On the contrary, the open policy makers did not 
reject the view that FDI had potential negative effects. Nevertheless, they believed that 
China could "selectively absorb the good things and boycott the bad things from abroad" 
(Pearson, 1991).
The Chinese government thus adopted an approach which combined a bold permission of 
FDI, but with a careful control over it. This approach induced the following determinations:
(1) the model of the "four dragons (Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan)" - to use 
FDI to speed up economic growth, as well as to maintain political stability - was 
followed;
(2) export promotion and technology transfer were seen as two main objectives of using 
FDI;
(3) new legislation was passed both to stimulate FDI in China and to strictly control its 
influence;
(4) "minding the stones under the water while crossing the river " - a gradual opening door 
pattern was designed.
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(1) The Success of the "Four Dragons " and China's Determination to Introduce FDI
China was trying to benefit from the experience of other developing countries, notably the 
"four dragons" - Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea - the Newly 
Industrialising countries and regions of South-eastern Asia, where FDI has played a 
significant role in promoting exports and technology transfer and which thereby has helped 
the economy to meet international standards (Pomfret, 1991).
The government felt a deep regret that the country had missed good opportunities for 
development, especially the one that occurred in the 1960s, because the country had been 
influenced by ultra-left thought (Fang and Xu, 1995). In the 1960s, the western developed 
countries were restructuring their industries, which was generated by their dramatic 
development of high-tech industries. As a result of this, some labour-intensive 
manufacturing industries and less advanced technology were relocated to some developing 
countries. The "four dragons" did not miss the chance to attract these relocated Western 
industries and transferred technology to their countries and regions. This led to a boom in 
their economic development in the late 1960s (Liu, Li and Tian, 1993). Now world-wide 
industrial restructuring was emerging again following "the second petroleum crises" in 
1979, while China was conducting its open policy, and the view was that China could not 
afford to miss it again.
China wanted to follow the experience of the four dragons; each of them had sought to 
contain the impact of foreign investors on their economy, as well as to encourage some 
degree of nationalism to consolidate their desired economic growth and political stability. In 
addition, each of the four had close cultural and historical ties to China, resulting in a 
competitive as well as collaborative relationship. Despite the previous isolation of China, it 
had witnessed these successes and had felt their competitive pressures as it opened into the 
world market in the late 1970s. Moreover, the four managed to exploit their low-cost labour 
and in turn, provide very competitive products for the world market. Low-cost labour was 
also one of the major comparative advantages that China held, and export promotion was a 
key objective other than technology transfer via FDI.
Although China had much in common with the four dragons, the journey of China's 
introduction of FDI to its country has not been smooth due to differences in its political and 
economic systems from that of the four dragons.
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(2) Export Promotion and Technology Transfers: two major objectives of China's use 
ofFDI
China's declared aims of attracting FDI were for export-oriented projects and technology 
transfers.
The scarcity of foreign exchange was always a Chinese major concern as a result of its 
previous isolation. Therefore, foreign exchange earnings were seen as a major goal by the 
Chinese government in order to finance its priority programme (Kueh, 1992). Secondly, 
China regarded the Brazilian debt crises in the 1970s as a good lesson for its dealing with 
foreign investment, and concluded that the Brazilian model of import substitution inevitably 
led to its severe foreign exchange deficit, and China should not let it happen (Fan, 1992; and 
Liu, Li and Tian, 1993). Thirdly, the sudden rise of the four dragons greatly encouraged 
China to favour their model - using foreign investment as a major means of promoting 
export and earning foreign exchange (Roehrig, 1994).
In addition to export promotion, another purpose of China's use of FDI was to attract 
Western technology.
In the early 1980s, China's then Premier Zhao Ziyang enunciated the Chinese government's 
belief that modernisation depended largely on the country's ability to develop high 
technology rapidly: "In order to realise modernisation, reinvigorate the economy, and 
quadruple the total industrial and agricultural output value, we must rely on the progress of 
science and technology" (People's Daily, 19 August 1983, p.5). Technology development 
was expected to improve the quality of labour and management; to increase levels of 
production and labour productivity; and to improve product quality. Consequently, 
competitiveness on the international market would increase and exports could be promoted.
Simply speaking, China's master plan wished to develop exportable products from Chinese 
materials and labour by using Western facilities, technology, and managerial expertise. In 
turn, once exporting is expanded by using advanced technology, technology transfers can 
then be paid for by exporting. In doing so, technology transfers and exporting can promote 
each other, and FDI in China would be running in a good circle.
On the other hand, however, what the foreign investors desired to obtain by investing in 
China was access to a potentially massive domestic Chinese market (Walker and Flanagan,
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1987). "With 22 per cent of the world's population in China, we cannot afford not to be 
there", said the chief executive officer of a major international company (Shapiro, et al., 
1991, p. 17). This objective apparently was against the Chinese objective of export 
promotion. These two different positions thus led to conflicts between foreign investors and 
Chinese FDI participants, which however had been gradually eased by their compromise 
over time.
With regard to technology transfer via FDI, the Chinese had been disappointed that 
technological levels of many of the ventures were unsophisticated, contributing little to 
China's modernisation programme (Shapiro, et al., 1991).
What caused this?
One of the major reasons of foreign investors operating in low-tech activities in China was 
that the Chinese new law on JVs carried idiosyncratic restrictions on foreign partner 
operation and their behaviour, as Western capitalists were viewed with suspicion. As a 
result of this, many foreign investors simply sought quick returns on investment by using 
low technology and cheap Chinese labour before they were more confident in China's 
investment environment (Pomfret, 1991).
In addition, as already noted, the Chinese, in theory, seemed to understand that the 
technology transferred from Western countries to developing countries was declining or less 
advanced as a result of western countries' industrial restructuring, and China expected to 
take advantage of the opportunity of western industrial restructuring.
In reality, the government still wished to "acquire high technology and... the ability to 
export high quality goods" (Walker and Flanagan, 1987, p.45). This contradiction led to 
uncertainty in China's FDI policy on technology transfer. It is a fact that China has 
introduced some more advanced technology via FDI since late 1979, which may be in line 
with its policy of import substitution. However, the majority of FDI ventures had for the 
most part involved products "at the very end of the relevant product cycle" (Kueh, 1992, 
p.657), although these products have been internationally well-known, embodying 
appropriate technological standards. Moreover, many foreign companies do not wish to 
"arm" China with advanced technology, equipment, and know-how which could be used by 
China some day against them in the global competition. This is why Japan, in the early year 
stages of China's open door policy, was reluctant to transfer technology to China; instead
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many more of its investments in China were in the form of financing arrangements (Shapiro, 
Behrman, Fischer, and Powell, 1991).
(3) Welcome, but Under China's Control: The new law on joint ventures
It would be a mistake to interpret the open door policy as one where China had to rely on 
Western advanced countries, so as to achieve its modernisation goals. As mentioned 
previously, the strategy set by the Chinese government of utilising Western FDI was to take 
advantage of its positive effects - modern technology, managerial skills, and so forth - which 
would speed up China's modernisation drive; but in the meantime, to minimise its negative 
effects - such as capitalist ideas, and western influence - which would be harmful to the 
Chinese people. Based on this strategy, joint venture (JV) was selected as a first means to 
introduce FDI as it provided the possibility for the Chinese to gain the control, and the law 
on joint ventures was designed more of less in a Chinese way - welcoming FDI, but under 
China's control.
On the one hand, the Chinese government strongly favoured the form of joint venture 
because it believed that foreign companies were familiar with this form from their 
investment in other countries, and would therefore be willing to invest in China under 
similar terms. The government also believed that, as part owners of joint ventures, foreign 
investors would be more committed to their success and hence would be more willing to 
supply ventures with advanced technology and management skills (Pearson, 1991).
On the other hand, because the JV involves local participation, the government then hoped 
to use the host country's advantage to gain substantial control over the operation of the JV.
'"''The Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment" was adopted on 1 July 
1979 at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated on 8 
July. The publication of the JV law had indicated the Chinese government's firm 
commitment to its FDI policy, as well as showing that China recognised and opened itself to 
western ways of doing business. In addition to its officially welcoming and permitting FDI, 
the JV law also protected the resources that foreigners invested in JVs and their rights to 
dispose of their property and to remit their share of the after-tax profits and other funds 
abroad (Ho and Huenemann, 1984).
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However, some problems arose because the law was too simple, and therefore too vague; 
but there were other problems too.
Firstly, before 1979, China did not have a company law, a contract law or a commercial law, 
it would have been extremely complicated to create the legal framework for the JVs on the 
basis of China's primitive legal system. Instead of drafting a detailed and comprehensive 
law, China chose to produce a JV law of only fifteen broadly worded articles but left the 
detailed rules and regulations to future legal pronouncements. However, great efforts were 
made in drafting of the law: the China State Planning Commission headed a drafting team, 
who had reviewed a large number of related legal documentation existing in more than 
thirty other countries, and visited some of these countries to learn their experience (Liu, 
1993).
Secondly, China desired to remain as flexible as possible in an area where it had no 
experience. In other words, it was a way the government used to protect itself, as it was the 
Chinese authority, not the foreign investors, who was in a position to retain "the power of 
amendment" of the Law.
Other problems occurred because JV legislation was too simple. For example, the Law did 
not give the criteria that China used to judge investment applications nor did it give much 
guidance to potential investors as to the type of JVs preferred or the type of information they 
needed to submit in support of their applications, which led to uncertainty in the approval 
process (Ho and Huenemann, 1984).
In addition, confusion appeared about the foreign ownership. According to Article 4 of the 
JV Law, "The proportion of the investment contributed by the foreign joint venture(s) shall 
generally not be less than 25 per cent of the registered capital of a joint venture".
Does no maximum amount of foreign ownership imply that 100 per cent of foreign-owned 
enterprises are permitted in China?
The fact that eighteen wholly foreign financed enterprises existed in Guangdong Special 
Economic Zones ha answered "yes" to the question. However, this raised another question 
of why the enterprises entirely funded by foreigners should be regarded as a joint venture in 
the absence of Chinese partner.
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It is very important to notice that the JV Law had reflected strongly the Chinese desire to 
maintain their control over the ventures in one way or another.
Firstly, in order that the proposed JVs were under the entire control of the Chinese central 
government, the JV Law required that "the joint venture agreement, contract and articles of 
association signed by the parties to the venture shall be submitted to the Foreign Investment 
Commission of the People's Republic of China, and the Commission shall, within three 
months, decide whether to approve or disapprove them" (Article 3).
The central government's bureaucracy and cautious attitude towards JV project applications 
led to a long and complicated procedure for approvals. Chinese provincial governments had 
the authority to approve the FDI projects only two years later, but their authority to give 
approval was generally subject to no more than USD3 million of FDI value which was set 
by the central government until 1983 when the central government started to gradually 
soften its strict restriction over the amount of FDI projects the local governments can 
approve (Hu and Ji, 1994, p.36).
Secondly, the Law put the Chinese participants in a dominant position by gaining control 
over ownership of equity in the venture. In most JVs outside of China, control over 
decision-making is directly tied to the division of ownership between partners, namely, the 
partner with majority ownership has the majority of votes on the board of directors. In order 
to retain control, host governments in both planned and market economies commonly 
restrict the percentage equity held by foreigners to 49 per cent or less, particularly to the 
ventures in raw materials, utilities, and other strategic industries (Pearson, 1991).
Interestingly, China's JV Law broke with this common host country preference for majority 
equity by allowing the foreign partners to contribute 25 per cent or more of their investment 
to a JV, but did not specify a maximum limit on foreign ownership, therefore offering the 
possibility of majority foreign ownership of a joint venture. However, when the Law was in 
operation, it did not seem to follow this theory, as the Chinese government was clear in its 
preference for Chinese majority or fifty-fifty ownership, for the "comfort of control" over 
management (Pearson, 1991, p. 165). To reflect this preference, many more JVs with 
Chinese majority or equal ownership were approved and established than foreign majority in 
the early years of the Law (Beanish and Spiess, 1993).
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There were some careful considerations behind the Law which did not restrict the 
percentage of foreign ownership. Firstly, the government wished to make sure the new 
Chinese law would make the country attractive enough to foreign investment in China.
Secondly, the government hoped to have some flexibility to deal with different cases. Some 
foreign participants were allowed to hold a majority share because they were in a strong 
position or preferred to do so. For example, foreigners who invested large amounts of 
capital in projects with low profits could be granted by the government the right to hold 
majority ownership, or when the projects were involved advanced technology (Pearson, 
1991). In general, however, JVs with Chinese majority ownership would be much more 
easy to be approved.
In addition to its preference for Chinese majority ownership in the JV, the government also 
found a way to strengthen the Chinese dominance in the JV by requiring that "a joint 
venture shall have a board of directors.... The board of directors shall have a chairman, 
whose office shall be assumed by the Chinese joint venture(s)..." (Article 6). The board of 
directors were designated as the highest authority in the JV, which was in a position "to 
discuss and decide all major problems" of the venture, ranging from "expansion projects, 
proposals for production and operating activities, the budget,... the termination of 
business,..", to "the appointment or employment of the president, the vice president(s)..." 
(Article 6).
In order to show China's fairness to foreigners somewhat, the Law did not restrict foreigners 
to being the president (or the general manager) who was in charge of day-to-day 
management. However, since the board chair had to be Chinese, who is the number one of a 
JV, and Chinese partners held a majority or equal position on most boards, the JV was 
therefore firmly controlled by Chinese hands. This stipulation also provided the possibility 
for the Chinese to dominate JVs with a foreign majority stake, because the Chairman of the 
board is Chinese, who is the most important person in the JV. In other words, foreign 
majority ownership in the Chinese JV under this Law did not necessarily mean that 
foreigner(s) were in a stronger position in a JV.
In addition, the Chinese had instituted a safeguard - "shadow management" (Roehrig, 1994, 
p.39) - against foreign domination at management level. The shadow management system 
was initiated by the Chinese side, who again, attempted to present equality of the Chinese
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policy, as it usually provided for a Chinese deputy for each management position in the JV. 
Under this system, the Chinese side comfortably achieved two of their major goals.
The first goal was that the Chinese could watch and learn how foreign managers coped with 
JV issues with "advanced methods", while they were working together as close colleagues; 
the second was that the deputy title did not prevent the Chinese from playing a key role in 
the managerial areas of the JV, as "managerial decisions must generally be based on 
agreement between the expatriate manager and his deputy".
(4) Crossing the River by Minding the Stones under the Water: a careful designed 
opening pattern
Once the open door policy was determined and announced, and the new law on the JV was 
promulgated, the next move for the Chinese leadership would be to put FDI from theory to 
practice in China. In order to find a safe way in which Western FDI can be fully used, and 
at the same time the Western negative influence can be minimised, an approach combining 
"activeness" and "caution" was adopted (Wang, 1995), which in China is called "crossing 
the river by minding the stones under the water". Under the guidance of this approach, 
China's door was opened very narrowly in the early years of its open policy.
Along the lines of the successful free economic zones in Taiwan, South Korea, the 
Philippines and other Asian countries, together with the consideration of creating an 
economic environment conducive to FDI inflows with an experimental manner, a small 
border township in Guangdong province of South China - Shenzhen was selected as the 
China's first "Export Zone" by the China State Council in January 1979. Within the 
following two years, three more - Zhuhai and Shantou (Guangdong province), and Xiamen 
(Fujian Province) - were established. These zones were renamed as Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs) in July 1981 in order to reflect the broader scope of their business activities (Qi, 
1998).
An interesting question is why these four zones were selected as China's SEZs. Two major 
explanations are the most relevant to the question. The first explanation is that these zones 
are much more easily controlled by the Chinese government. All of these zones are located 
in the periphery of China, far away from major Chinese urban areas, so as to prevent the
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transmission of negative characteristics that the Chinese government expected to accompany 
western investment.
Shenzhen, the largest of the SEZs, is a typical example. It was physically cordoned off from 
the rest of Guangdong by a fifty-three-mile long patrolled high fence, which constituted a 
second border to control the flow of people and materials between the SEZ and the rest of 
China. The government also relied on control of the Hong Kong border to prevent 
smuggling of electronic goods, pornographic materials, and other "corrosive materials" from 
Hong Kong, and to prevent Chinese citizens from leaving Shenzhen for Hong Kong. More 
generally, the government tried to suppress activities it considered immoral, criminal, or 
otherwise anti-socialist, such as gambling and prostitution (Pearson, 1991). Offenders were 
punished harshly to provide examples for others. In addition, the zones cover only very 
limited areas in terms of China's vast land. As a largest SEZ, Shenzhen only covered an area 
of 327.5 square kilometres. Although there was a site extension of SEZs in 1984, the other 
three SEZs remained small : Zhuhai SEZ was extended from 6.7 kilometres (1980) to 15.16 
kilometres, Shantou SEZ was enlarged from 1.6 kilometres (1980) to 52.6 kilometres, and 
Xiamen SEZ expanded from 2.5 kilometres (1980) to 131 kilometres (Fang and Xu, 1995).
Therefore, all of the SEZs were seen as a laboratory where the open policy was tested. As 
the Chinese decision-makers planned, once SEZs were successful, their experience would 
be useful for the further opening of China's doors; if not, the price the government could 
pay would be very little, which would not cause a disaster for the open policy, but would 
provide some lessons for the leadership to draw from, so as to adjust and better the open 
policy (Liu, 1994).
The second explanation was that the SEZs were the areas in which the open policy would be 
more likely to be successfully tried out. The government believed that, because of their 
special circumstances, Guangdong and Fujian provinces - where these four SEZs were 
located - could take full advantage of the open door policy.
Firstly, historically both provinces were more open than many other part of China to foreign 
businesses, and large numbers of Overseas Chinese have roots in the two regions.
Secondly, both are close to Hong Kong, and Guangdong has had a long-term special 
relationship with Hong Kong. Shenzhen was designed as a gateway to Hong Kong, and 
Zhuhai was considered as a special link to Macao, as the former borders on the new
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territories of Hong Kong, and the latter is next to Macao. As for Xiamen SEZ in Fujian, it is 
close to Taiwan which is situated on the other side of Taiwan Channel, and has a great 
potential to develop its relationship with Taiwan along with the improvement of the political 
atmosphere between Beijing and Taiwan.
Thirdly, most Overseas Chinese have much in common with Guangdong and Fujiian people. 
For example, they speak either Guangdong or Fujian dialect, and have a common cultural 
tradition. These advantages facilitate communication and thus help reduce the transaction 
costs of investing in China and the costs of transferring technology and skills to the country.
Finally, there were also political reasons for the government in favour of Guangdong and 
Fujian. As Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan were regarded by the Mainland Chinese as being 
run under the capitalist system, the Chinese government hoped to demonstrate that 
capitalism and socialism can co-exist, even if only in a few restricted SEZs (Ho and 
Huenemann, 1984, p.51). A success of the co-existence would help China in later years to 
take over Hong Kong and Macao more smoothly, and negotiate the reunification of China 
with the Taiwan Administration, as the Chinese government claimed that it wished Hong 
Kong, as well as Macao and Taiwan continue to function under their existing economic 
system after reunification of China. This was called by Deng Xiaoping "one country, two 
systems" (New Star Press, 1991).
Thus, these special circumstances of Guangdong and Fujian helped SEZs tap an extremely 
important source of capital and skills, namely the Overseas Chinese communities in 
Southeast Asia.
Of the Overseas Chinese communities, the nearest and the most attractive is Hong Kong. 
China had been eagerly to learn from Hong Kong's economic success and was hoping to 
gain access to its capital, its managerial skills and international marketing networks.
With regard to the nature of the SEZs, some Chinese defined the SEZ as "an area... [where] 
controls are relaxed as compared with inland China for the purpose of promoting economic 
co-operation by all proper means with foreign businessmen, Overseas Chinese, as well as 
Hong Kong, and Macao compatriots" (Ho and Huenemann, 1984, p. 49). This definition 
implies that the Chinese central government would give more authority to the SEZs in order 
to promote the SEZs' international economic relation, and also to specify the relationhip 
between SEZs and Hong Kong and Macao.
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A clearer and more official definition of the SEZ was given later, when the following was 
written:
"A special economic zone, or fully called 'specially-opened economic zone', means that a 
sovereign state or a region, in order to reach a special goal for its internal and external 
activities, can select a zone in which a special economic management system is practised 
and special economic policies are given" (Ma, 1993, pp. 125-126).
This definition, politically, claims that the SEZs are under the full control of the Chinese 
government, as the government did not expect to develop them as modern "foreign 
concessions", or treaty ports (Chen, 1989, pp.32-3).
Economically, it reveals two things which make the SEZs special: one is a special economic 
management system; the other is special economic policies, which suggests that there is 
nothing special in the political sense. Therefore, the government repeatedly pointed out that 
the SEZs were still the sovereign territory of the Chinese government, and that the SEZ 
governments must follow the policy and the party centre, and that the SEZs were governed 
by the Chinese laws (Hu, 1989, p21; Li, 1995).
Indeed, special economic treatments were given to the SEZs by the government, and they 
were significantly different from those that existed in other parts of China. What the 
"special" really means was specified by the then Chinese vice premier Gu Mu in April 1984 
(ZhangandHe, 1995,p.94):
The "special" in the SEZs, means that special economic policies and the special economic 
management system are adopted in the SEZs.
These included:
(1) The economic development in the SEZs relies primarily on receiving and utilising FDI, 
and products made in there are mainly for the purpose of exporting. The economy in the 
SEZs is a combined economy, that is, the SEZs' economy is under the leadership of the 
national socialist economy, while Sino-foreign joint ventures, Sino-foreign co-operative 
ventures, and wholly foreign owned enterprises play a major role in the SEZs.
(2) Market forces play a prominent role in the economic activities in the SEZs.
(3) Foreign investors in the SEZs receive special preferential treatment in taxation and 
convenience in entrance to and leaving China.
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(4) The administrative system adopted in the SEZs is different from the inland China, and 
allows the SEZs to have a greater authority.
All these policies were intended to make the SEZs different from the rest of China, so as to 
increase the SEZs' attractiveness for foreign companies. This was so "special' because other 
parts of China at that time were governed by the centrally-planned economy system until 
1992, and only state-owned enterprise were allowed to play a dominating role. In addition, 
decentralisation offered the SEZs the authority at the provincial level somewhat, as they can 
"operate their enterprises independently in the special economic zones", and review and 
approve investment projects.
For example, Shenzhen can authorise FDI projects without the approval of higher 
authorities, as levels of capital investment - some USD 17 million for heavy industry, 
USD 10 million for light industry, and USD33 million for non-industrial projects such as 
hotels - are considerably higher than commonly permitted to local authorities (Shapiro, 
Behrman, Fischer and Powell, 1991). This was designed to let foreign investors face less 
red tape and bureaucracy in the SEZ than other parts of China. Other measures of 
decentralisation for the SEZs included the retention of foreign exchange, and deciding how 
to use funds to improve their infrastructure.
Furthermore, all SEZs were permitted to offer incentives above and beyond national 
investment incentives.
The most important of these was that net earnings of enterprises in the SEZs were taxed at a 
flat rate of 15 per cent, as compared to 33 per cent for JVs in other parts of China. Also, there 
was no remittance tax on after-tax profits remitted abroad. "Machinery, spare parts, raw 
materials, vehicles and other means of production for the enterprises in the SEZs are 
exempted from import duties", and the duties on necessary consumer goods for use in SEZs 
may be lowered or exempted depending on "the merits of each case". To encourage the use 
of Chinese products, domestic machinery and raw materials are available to enterprises in the 
SEZs at a lower export prices, but they must be paid with hard currency (Ho and Huenemann, 
1984, p. 50).
As a sign of China's early year's open policy, SEZs were growing quickly. The injection of 
large sums of investment for basic infrastructure in Shenzhen between 1979 and 1986, had 
developed it from a small township surrounded by the rural landscape to the largest economic
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zone of its type in the world (Shapiro, Behrman, Fischer and Powell, 1991, p. 63). The 
emergence of Shenzhen SEZ was described as "a modern city built up overnight" (Hu, 1989, 
p. 27). Economic growth was also fast in the SEZs. Shenzhen's annual average growth rate 
of GDP was around 50 per cent during the period of 1979-86. "Shenzhen speed", and 
"Shenzhen efficiency" became government's slogans to encourage Chinese people, especially 
those outside the SEZs, to build up China's modernisation more quickly and more efficiently. 
Standards of living were improved greatly for residents in these zones, which had attracted a 
great number of Chinese people (skilled and unskilled workers) to cross the Shenzhen boarder 
and seek opportunities in the zones.
Of the skilled workers, those who came from Shanghai may be the most active group, as there 
were so many Shanghai people working in Shekou (industrial area of Shenzhen SEZ), that the 
Shanghai dialect had become one of the most important local languages. "A couple of years 
after the establishment of Zhuhai SEZ, local people no longer leave Zhuhai for Macao 
illegally by crossing the bay", said a Zhuhai local official, pointing to the bay between Zhuhai 
and Macao - during a research visit made to China as part of this study. As a pioneer for 
receiving foreign investment, the SEZs had attracted more amounts of FDI than any other part 
of China during the period of 1979 - 86 (see Table 5.1).
It should be noted that the figures during the period of 1979-1983 are absent because only the 
SEZs were opened for FDI at the time and there was therefore nothing else existing to 
compare with the SEZs until 1984 when fourteen coastal port cities were allowed to be 
opened for FDI.
In general, it can be seen from the Table 5.1 that FDI attracted to the SEZs accounted for an 
important part of China's total in terms of the number of projects agreed, as well as the 
amount of capital agreed and the actually realised amount of capital. However, it is important 
to note that the agreed amount of capital appeared to remain on a sharp downward trend, 
which implies that more and more FDI makers were seeking opportunities in newly opened 
areas, thus the SEZs were facing a big challenge from them.
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Table 5.1 FDI in SEZs and Its Percentage in China (in US$ 10,000)
1984 1985 1986
Agree- Agree- Actually Agree- Agree- Actually Agree- Agree Actually
ment ment Amount ment ment Amount ment ment Amount
No. No. No.
China Total
SEZs Total
Percentage of
SEZs in China
Total (%)
Shenzhen
Zhuhai
Shantou
Xiamen
Percentage of
Shenzhen in
SEZ total (%)
1,856 265,100 125,800 3,073 593,100 166,100 1,498 283,400 187,400
511 80,022 34,268 454 110,257 27,868 285 31,868 43,571
27.53 30.19 27.24 14.77 18.59 16.70 19.03 11.24 23.25
331 53,289 18,437 253 76,322 17,651 190 22,716 36,080
70 9,705 11,000 71 6,020 2,181 45 5,191 3,298
24 2,061 787 23 1,303 732 16 1,202 800
86 14,967 4,044 107 26,612 7,304 34 2,759 3,393
64.77 66.5 53.80 55.73 69.22 63.34 66.67 71.28 82.81
(Sot/rces: 1. China Statistical Yearbook, 1992;
2. China Foreign Economic Statistics, 1979 - 1991 )
The growth of SEZs was accompanied by some disappointments.
The USD 1.5 billion (agreed amount) and USD720 million (actually used) in FDI in Shenzhen 
was a considerable amount. However, the amount spent on infrastructure in Shenzhen by the 
Chinese government only accounted for little more than half of the dollars (in terms of agreed 
amount of FDI), which was not as much as local officials expected. In addition, only a small 
proportion (10 per cent in 1984) of the manufacturing enterprises established in Shenzhen 
was classified as high-tech. The definition of high-tech at that time was exactly as a self- 
critical Shenzhen official said, "If a [foreign] manufacturer made a product just a little better 
than we could, we considered it to be high technology" (Pearson, 1991, p. 15 8).
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It was estimated that only around 10 per cent of the manufacturing sectors in Shenzhen in 
1984 was seen as high-tech, whilst the majority of the manufacturing ventures in Shenzhen 
were "essentially rather crude, labour-intensive ventures that produced such products as cheap 
radios, knitwear, and plastic followers" (Shapiro, et at., 1991, p.66). The Chinese 
government felt disappointed about this unexpectedly poor result, but some local people 
viewed it in a different way. For example, Li Guofu, President of the Shenzhen Industrial and 
Trading Centre, commented "We are naive if we think this industrial desert can go hi-tech in 
just a few years" (Shapiro, Behrman, Fischer and Powell, 1991, p. 66).
Moreover, total exports from Shenzhen were only 20 per cent of the zone's industrial output 
in 1984, and far short of the government's target of 60 per cent by 1980. Shenzhen's imports 
usually outweighed exports by a substantial margin (by five to one in 1983, for example). 
While the overall contributions of the SEZs to national foreign currency reserves started out 
relatively small, they apparently became a net drain on reserves in the mid-1980s, when 
foreign exchange deficits in the zones ranged as high as USD542 million (Pearson, 1991).
Finally, national control over the entrance and spread of western "decadent" values and goods 
was not as effective as the Chinese leaders had expected. In fact, unhealthy capitalist elements 
more commonly started to exist in the SEZs than in inland China, especially in Shenzhen. 
Illegal trading of smuggled goods (most were electronic goods and cigarettes), corruption, 
beggaring and prostitution had become an undesired phenomenon in these zones, which was 
severely criticised by the older cardres in the zones and Chinese conservative leaders. 
Younger Shenzhen officials and managers took it less seriously, however. They argued 
privately that the Chinese people would be able to learn for themselves what is right and 
wrong. One official stated that it was more important to pay attention to China's' economic 
development than to unhealthy tendencies (Lin, 1987).
What caused these problems? One answer says that the problems resulted from the 
combination of pressure for quick results and the incentives arising from decentralisation of 
authority hindering the capacity of SEZs to fulfil their original development goals (Pearson, 
1991). It is true that the SEZs had faced considerable pressure from the government that had 
intended to make these zones a successful example for the whole of China to utilise FDI, and 
from the Chinese people in other parts of the country who had been seriously learning from 
the SEZs experience of fast economic development via FDI, and eagerly expecting the open
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door policy to reach their regions soon. The question is why this pressure would put the SEZs 
in a dilemma even though the SEZs were in the meantime given incentives of decentralisation 
of authority.
It is evident that because of the fundamental difficulties the SEZs had, quick results were 
therefore unlikely to be achieved in the zones. Firstly, as already noted, labour is cheap in the 
SEZs by Western standards, but is more expensive than elsewhere in China, which is a 
disadvantage compared to many other regions of the country to attract FDI. Secondly, the 
labour in the zones impose significant limitations, as the majority of factory employees were 
previously rural-based labour, and technical and skilled workers were very difficult to find 
locally. Last but not least, because the SEZs have no established industrial base, enterprises 
that depend on a network of suppliers are less likely to be attracted to locate there. This is a 
major shortfall in the development of the SEZs.
Despite the problems with the four SEZs, these zones were still considered by the Chinese 
leadership to be successful examples. The much faster rate of growth in SEZs than the rest of 
the country had brought the hope for the leadership to develop the country further by opening 
up its door more widely. On the other hand, the government faced pressure from both China's 
major cites and foreign investors for further opening-up, as these cities anxiously wished to 
benefit from the open policy and demonstrate their huge potential to take advantage of FDI. 
Foreign investors were more interested in China's vast market and some areas with better 
investment environment, such as better infrastructure, better local talent, and better industrial 
base. With regard to the western negative influences derived from their investment, the 
government realised it was inevitable, butt it was not a reason to withdraw the open policy, as 
the principle the government followed was to "resist external negative elements", but not to 
"resist foreign investment" (Fan, 1991).
Two measures were taken. One was to strengthen education, so as to build material 
civilisation and spiritual civilisation spontaneously in the SEZs. The second measure was to 
more effectively control the SEZs, such as more firmly punishing the offenders, and 
upgrading the staffing of the second border, and initiating audits of enterprise finances to 
detect smuggling (Tang, 1988).
The status of a good example for testing the open policy was officially approved by Deng 
Xiaoping when he inspected Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xiamen in early 1984 "The fact of
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experience and development of Shenzhen have shown that our policy of setting up SEZs has 
been right", "Zhuhai Special Economic Zone is excellent", and "Making Special Economic 
Zones faster, and better" (Qi, 1998, p. 17).
More importantly, Deng's speech in Beijing a month after his tour in the SEZs indicated that 
China would launch a new policy of open policy, as he states, "We must make it clear that our 
purpose of establishing SEZs and adopting open policy is not to withdraw them, but to 
develop them further" (Zhang and He, 1995, p.89). As a result, the government decided in 
May 1984 to open fourteen coastal port cities for foreign investment.
These coastal open cities (COCs) were Beihai (Guangxi province), Zhanjiang (Guangdong), 
Guangzhou (capital of Guangdong), Fuzhou (capital of Fujian), Wenzhou and Ningbo 
(Zhejiang province), Shanghai, Nantong and Lianyungang (Jiangsu province), Qingdao and 
Yantai (Shandong province), Tianjin, Qinghuangdao (Hebei province), and Dailian (Laoning 
province).
All of these newly-opened cities were offered incentives similar to those in the SEZs, but less 
preferential, as these areas were not considered as special economic zones. For example, 
income tax of enterprises in COCs was 33 per cent (15 per cent in the SEZs).
The authority of approving FDI projects varied from city to city. Shanghai and Tianjin 
municipal authorities were allowed to approve investment up to USD30 million; Dalian and 
Guangzhou, USD 10 million; and the others were limited to approvals of USD5 million. In 
addition, each COC was allowed to establish an Economic and Technical Development Zone 
(ETDT) outside the city, where income tax rates of 15 per cent were offered and the 10 per 
cent profit remittance tax was also waived (Shapiro, Behrman, Fischer, and Powell, 1991).
Unlike Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where there are second border controls to prevent unhealthy 
tendencies from spreading to other parts of the country, COCs were unlikely to be controlled 
in this way, as they covered huge areas of the country. The central government therefore used 
a slightly different way to control the COCs by offering them less favoured policies to make 
them less relaxed than the SEZs. However, this led to a struggle between Central Government 
control over COCs and the COC government's strong desire for more incentives and greater 
decision-making authority. In addition, regional conflicts derived from unbalanced regional 
development had become more serious, especially in the later years of the open policy. 
Consequently, a new open strategy or pattern was formulated in October 1987, when the 13th
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National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held, which was described as a 
"gradual expanding open pattern", from "SEZs - COCS - CEOZS - Inland" (Liu, 1994), or 
from "South - North, East - West, Coast areas to inland areas" (see Table 5.2 for the details of 
China's open events).
Table 5.2 Major Events of Geographical Opening up of China to Foreign investment
Year
1979-80
1984
1985
1985-91
1988
1990
1990-92
1990
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992
Status of Opening
4 Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs)
14 Coastal Open Cities 
(COCs)
3 Coastal Economic 
Development Open 
Zones (CEDOZs)
14 Economic and Tech- 
nological Development 
Zones (ETDZs)
Hainan SEZ
Shanghai Pudong
13 Free Trade Areas 
(a small district with 
closed access facilities)
Taiwanese Investment 
Zones of Fujian
13 Open Border Cities 
(OBCs)
5 Cities along the Changjiang 
(Yangzi River)
11 Capitals of Inland and 
Autonomous Regions 
(treatment equivalent to 
COCs)
27 High and New Tech- 
nology Development Zones
Hainan Yangpu Econo- mic 
development Zone
Geographical Location
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen
Beihai, Zhanjiang, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Wenzhou, Ningpo, 
Shanghai, Nantong,Lianyungang, Qingdao, Yantai, Tianjin, 
Qinghuangdao, and Dalian
Changjiang (the Yangzi River) Delta, Zhujiang (the Pearl River) Delta, 
and Xiamen, Zhangzhou and Quanzhou Delta [in Fujian province]
Outside the cities of fourteen COCs, but Wenzhou and Lianyungang are excluded, and 
Shanghai has three ETDZs (Minxin, Hongqiao, and Caohejing)
The whole Hainan province
The east bank of the Huangpu River in Shanghai, New Zone covering an area of 350 
square kilometers
Waigaoqiao (Shanghai), Tianjin Port, Dalian, Shatoujiao and Futian (Shenzhen), 
Guangzhou, Zhangjiagang (Jiangsu), Haikou (Hainan), Qingdao (Shangdong), Ningbo 
(Zhejiang), Fuzhou (Fujiang), Xiangyu (Xiamen), and Shantou (Guangdong)
(l)Xinglin and Haichang of Xiamen SEZ; (2)Fuzhou Mawei ETDZ
Huichun (Jilin Province), Heihe and Suifenhe (Heilongjiang Province), Manzhouli and 
Erenhot (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), Tacheng, Bole and Yining (Xingjiang 
Uygur Autonomous Region), Hekou, Wanding and Ruili (Yunnan Province), and 
Pingxiang and Dongxing (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region)
Chongqing (Sichuan province), Yueyang (Hunan province), Wuhan (Hubei province), 
Jiujiang (Jiangxi province), and Wuhu (Anhui province)
Taiyuan (Shanxi province), Hefei (Anhui province), Yinchuan (Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region), and so on.
Shanghai Caohejing, Guangzhou Tianhe, and so on.
Yangpu Port
(Sources: 1. China Economic Development Trends; 2. China Handbook, 1993 ).
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5.2.2. Characteristics of FDI in China between 1979 and 1986
(1). Slow inflows of FDI into China
A. Trend in FDI growth
The Table 5.3 below illustrates that, during the period 1979-86, the growth of both agreed and 
actually used value of FDI was rather high except in 1986, as there was no western FDI in 
existence before the introduction of the open door policy. In terms of size of the country, 
however, the amount of FDI inflows seemed to be very small, and thus the pace of FDI was in 
reality slow. In addition, the speed with which China introduced FDI was uneven during the 
whole of the above period. That is, the growth of FDI inflows between 1984-85 was relatively 
quicker than that in previous years, especially in 1985 (in terms of agreed value of FDI 
inflows) when China's "first boom" in FDI inflows occurred.
Table 5.3 China's Utilisation of FDI (in USD 100 million)
1979-82
1983
1984
1985
1986
Total
Number of 
agreement
922
470
1,856
3,037
1,498
7,783
Value of 
agreement
46.08
17.32
26.51
59.32
28.34
177.57
Actually used 
value
11.66
6.36
12.58
16.61
18.75
65.96
Used value as a
% of agreement 
value *
25.30
36.72
47.45
28.00
66.16
37.15
(Source: China Foreign Economic Statistics [1979-91], published by China Statistical Information & 
Consultancy Service Centre, 1992;
* The "Used value as a percentage of agreement value" is calculated by the author of this dissertation)
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The boom, however, was followed by a FDI bust in 1986 (especially in terms of agreed value 
of FDI inflows). Therefore, these growth trends suggested that the inflows of FDI can be sub- 
divided into three different periods:
o 1979-83, when FDI rose from almost zero 1979 to USD 1.732 billion in 1983);
o 1984-85, when FDI increased dramatically, reaching a peak in 1979-86 period);
o 1985 - 86, when FDI was sharply down.
Moreover, the realisation of the FDI value as a percentage of agreement value was poor, as 
the average FDI realisation was only 37.5 per cent, a little more than one third, although the 
annual FDI realised value seemed to be up year by year except for 1985.
B. Explanation for the above results of FDI in China
Factors causing the growing features of FDI in the above period are various. It was generally 
agreed, however, that China's legal environment had contributed significantly to the FDI 
growing features.
According to Wang (1995), Pearson (1991), and Roehrig (1994), there have been three major 
phases of legislation since China opened up to the world from the late 1978, marked by the 
years 1979 (when the Joint Venture Law was issued), 1983 (when the Implementation of the 
Regulations of the Joint Venture Law was announced), and 1986 (when "The 22 Articles" 
were promulgated); and the trends in the flow of FDI are closely related to these phases in the 
regulatory environment. It is interesting to consider how the development of the Chinese legal 
system affected FDI in the three different phases (the discussion of the third phrase - as it 
relates to the second turning point - will be covered in the following chapter).
As noted earlier, in July 1979, a few months after China's determination of the open door 
policy, the Chinese government moved quickly in taking its first step towards undertaking 
FDI legislation by issuing the Law of the People's Republic of Joint Ventures using Chinese 
and Foreign Investment. The law allowed western companies to make investment directly in 
the country, and guaranteed foreign investors' property and dividend rights. It was the first 
formal statement of commitment to foreign investment by the Chinese government, and 
established the principles and procedures for investment. The Law therefore marked the first 
regulatory phase (1979 - late 1983).
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Very soon after the promulgation of the Law, foreign business representatives thronged to 
China to investigate the potentially lucrative situation. Some foreign investors did take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the Government. As can be seen in the table of 
Chapter 5, by the end of 1983, 1,392 projects (all FDI forms) had been approved with an 
aggregate value of USD6.34 billion pledged investment, of which, equity joint venture was 
190, with the whole pledged value of USD362 million, accounting for only 13.65 per cent of 
the total number of projects, and 5.8 per cent of the total pledged FDI value (the trends of 
different FDI forms - equity joint ventures [DJVs], non-equity joint ventures or contractual 
joint ventures [CJVs], and wholly foreign owned enterprises [WFOEs] will be discussed 
separately in Section 5 of this chapter).
One of the major reasons why there was such limited flow of FDI to China was the broadness 
and vagueness of the EJVL, which had only fifteen short and general articles, and far short of 
guiding both Chinese and foreign partners in crucial legal and operational matters (Pearson, 
1991, p.71). Although, before the announcement of Implementation of the Regulations of the 
Joint Venture Law in 1983, there were several regulations concerning some practical issues of 
FDI activities, ranging from taxation to labour management, and these legal rules more or less 
helped clarify the EJVL, however, the foreign investors still felt that the regulatory 
environment was quite restrictive, or not attractive (Liu, 1993, p. 866).
For example, the income tax law announced in 1980 offered 33 percent of income tax to joint 
ventures located outside of SEZs (15 per cent of income tax offered in SEZs), which was not 
generous enough in comparison with some other Asian countries (see Table 5.4 below).
The Table 5.4 shows that the income tax rate of Chinese joint ventures is about average - 
lower than that in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, but higher than South Korea and 
Taiwan, and about the same as that in Thailand. In addition, a rough comparison of the length 
of tax holiday suggests that Chinese incentives were less generous than these were available 
in other parts of Asia, as the tax holiday is the most important tax incentive for foreign 
investors to operate in a high-risk environment such as China and thus they are anxious to 
recover their investments in as a short period of time as possible (Ho and Huenemann, 1984).
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Table 5.4. Effective Tax Rates On Profits And Number Of Years Of Tax Holiday In 
Selected Asian Economies, 1981
Effective tax
Rate on profits(a)
Tax holiday 
(number of years)
China
Republic of Korea
33% (b)
25%
3(c)
(exemption - 1 year, 
reduction - 2 years)
Malaysia
Pholippines
44.5%
35%
2-5(d)
none
8
(exemption - 5 years, 
reduction - 3 years)
Taiwan
Singapore
maximum effective 
rate not to exceed 
22%- 25% (depending 
on industry)
40%
(or the use of 
accelerated depreciation)
15
(exemption - 5 years, 
reduction - 10 years)
Thailand 29.5% 13
(exemption - 8 years, 
reduction - 5 years)
(1. Source: China's Open Door Policy - The Quest for Foreign Technology and Capital, published by University of British 
Columbia Press, Vancouver, 1984
2. Notes:
a. Assuming an industrial joint venture with a total investment of USDS million and a 20 per cent pre-tax 
rate of return on investment;
b. 30 per cent if local surtax is excluded;
c. If the joint venture is located in an underdeveloped region or is engaged in a low profit industry, such as 
farming and forestry, a tax reduction of 15 per cent to 30 per cent for ten years beyond the original three 
may be granted;
d. The precise period depends on the size of the investment and the number of workers employed. Exemption 
may be extended to ten years if the enterprise produces a priority product, meets the local content 
requirement, or is located in a "development area").
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In addition to being offered less attractive tax incentives, foreign investors were also 
discouraged by China's bureaucracy such as long and complicated FDI project application 
and approval; and by the uncertainty of policies, such as China's cancellation of large 
importing contracts for its ambitious domestic construction plans, notably the Baoshan Steel 
Plant invested by Japanese companies (Pearson, 1991). As a result, only a few "intrepid' or 
"foolhardy" foreign investors decided to establish their businesses in China (Pomfret, 1991) 
and to "test" its investment environment (Liu, 1993).
By 1983, the Chinese Government had recognised that the legal framework during 1979-82 
did not provide sufficient incentives to foreign investors, and had to be improved if China 
wished to attract more FDI. Thus, in May 1983, at a national meeting concerning FDI, the 
State Council called for more open and more comprehensive policies and regulations towards 
FDI, which were reflected in the detailed and long-awaited "Implementation of the 
Regulations of the Joint Venture Law" (IRJVL) in September 1983 (Liu, 1993, p. 865).
The IRJVL contained sixteen chapters with one hundred and eighteen articles, ranging widely 
from JV establishment, management durations to taxation and foreign exchange control, 
thereby making some important issues much clearer. All of these matters were raised by 
foreign investors and their advisors as areas of concern (Kemp, 1987, p46). It also provided 
some additional incentives to JVs, such as the rules governing the exemption of import 
duties, and the consolidated industrial and commercial tax (CICT) on goods imported by JVs 
were liberalised marginally. The new regulations also relaxed the rule on the amount of 
income foreign workers of JVs may remit home. Now, foreign staff may request permission 
to remit abroad all, instead of previously only 50 per cent of their income after living 
expenses. Taking account of the revised income tax law of May 1983, which offered JVs the 
exemption of income tax in the first two profit-making years, and income tax reduction by 
one-half in the third, fourth, and fifth profitable years (the original provision provided only a 
one-year tax exemption plus a two-year 50 per cent reduction in income tax), China's tax 
incentive for foreign investment moved closer to that available in other parts of Asia (again, 
see Table 5.4).
From the viewpoint of the foreign businessman, the most interesting - and, potentially the 
most significant - change was China's announcement that it planned to relax its insistence
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that each JV must export at least enough to satisfy its own foreign exchange needs (Ho and 
Huenemann, 1984). The RIJVL, for the first time, provided the possibility for some JVs to 
sell their products mainly on the Chinese market, if the products were urgently needed or 
were import substitutes (Article 61), although the RIJVL was not designed primarily to 
liberalise China's investment environment, but to clarify it so as to relieve the doubts of many 
existing and potential investors.
Nevertheless, the additional tax incentives and the improved prospect of selling to the 
domestic market did make China more attractive for foreign investors. For this reason, the 
RIJVL initiated a second regulatory phase (late 1983 - late 1986).
In addition, the Government also made further efforts to attract western companies by 
promulgating the new patent law in March 1984, by opening the fourteen coast cities a month 
later, and by signing investment protection treaties with a number of western countries. As a 
result of these changes, many contracts were signed, and the growth rate of used and pledged 
investment went up sharply in 1984-85, which led to the first boom of FDI in China (see 
Table 5.3).
However, the short-lived FDI boom was soon replaced by a sudden bust in 1986, for the 
following reasons. Firstly, China was again faced with growing competition for investment 
within Asia throughout the 1980s, which threatened to offer more favourable locations to 
investors seeking a source of low-wage labour.
Secondly, China's greatly expanded imports in 1985 and 1986 caused a serious cut in 
domestic spending of foreign exchange, which affected JVs immediately, as fewer domestic 
buyers could pay for JV goods in foreign currency. Added to existing difficulties JVs were 
facing in exporting their products, the forced reduction of domestic sources of foreign 
exchange made it very difficult for them to earn the foreign exchange they needed to both 
import materials and, eventually, repatriate profits. Finally, after the optimistic expectations 
of previous years, foreign investors were disappointed by the high cost, price gouging, 
unproductive labour, and excessive government bureaucracy (Pearson, 1991).
(2). Regional concentration of FDI distribution
Foreign invested ventures were concentrated geographically in the coastal region, especially 
in the SEZs, which was one of the two striking characteristics of China's FDI. This primarily
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reflected the fact that within these areas, the economic benefits and preferences were provided 
by the laws and regulations of the Government (Brown, 1993).
Taking advantage of China's special policies and their geographical location, SEZs 
introduced the largest share of FDI, accounting for 52.2 per cent in China's total in 1979-83, 
but was sharply down in 1986, accounting for only 28 per cent. By contrast, FDI in the 
fourteen coastal cities increased from 16.1 per cent in 1979-83 to 26.1 per cent in 1986, which 
was very close to the level of the SEZs (Casson and Zheng, 1991). This dramatic change in 
geographical distribution of FDI over the period mainly resulted from the extension of 
preferential treatment to these areas. The further opening of the fourteen coastal cities 
reflected the view of some economists that the SEZs had relatively little to offer investors, 
and should therefore be de-emphasised in favour of the country's northern areas (The SEZs of 
Guangdong and Fujian are located in southern China, therefore, other parts of China are 
usually seen as northern areas of China.). Administratively, however, Shanghai is regarded as 
being in the east part of China, Beijing and Tianjin as in north part and Liaoning in the North 
East.
In addition, it was arguable that if it was worth building up the basic infrastructure in the 
SEZs in order to facilitate foreign investment, which proved to be more expensive than the 
foreign investment in other old cities. Cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin and Dalian already 
had well established infrastructure available, which only needed to be modernised. "The 
marginal cost per foreign investment dollar is therefore lower in these cities than in the SEZs" 
(Kemp, 1987, p. 58).
Furthermore, the government desired to promote FDI with modern technology, which is one 
of the major considerations of the open policy apart from export promotion. Since a great 
number of export-oriented projects already existed in SEZs, which were characterised as 
small and low-technology, it became very necessary to open the fourteen coastal cities for 
preferential foreign investment, as in those cities, both the existing physical infrastructure and 
the skills endowment were more conducive to the absorption of higher-technology 
production, and these cities were therefore more likely to attract high-tech FDI projects.
It is interesting to note that, on the one hand, as has been mentioned, SEZs were in the 
dominant position to introduce FDI, and later the fourteen coastal cities emerged to share the
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dominance. On the other hand, a particular open area was also dominated by a particular 
investor/country to make the investment.
For example, companies from Hong Kong and Macao and South East Asian countries chose 
to invest in one of the SEZs rather than in one of the older city areas, as they could fully use 
the comparative advantages that the SEZs had, namely their proximity to Hong Kong and 
Macao, and South East Asia; a common language, culture, and tradition; a joint heavy 
dependence on imported raw materials as the Zones are a long way from most of China's 
natural resources and suppliers of many raw materials; and their relatively cheap labour 
forces.
In addition, these investors viewed China as an export processing zone, in order to take 
advantage of its cheap labour, and favourable tax conditions, then to sell back into the region. 
Most of them only required basic skills from their work force, and imported raw materials or 
semi-manufactured goods from abroad for processing or assembling. All products were 
exported once they were finished. They therefore did not require an established infrastructure 
connecting the production processes with other parts of China. Their main concerns lay in 
quality port facilities and transport between the port and the production cite. Consequently, 
SEZs particularly suited overseas Chinese and Hong Kong investors, as about 90 per cent of 
foreign investors in the SEZs were overseas Chinese and almost 80 per cent were from Hong 
Kong(Kemp, 1987).
Investment in the north of China was much influenced by Japanese companies. In Dalian, for 
instance, at the end of 1984, all but one of the representative offices of foreign business had 
been set up by Japanese firms, and the majority of JVs had involved Japanese investors. This 
is in part because the north of China is not far from Japan, and historically had much more 
influence than other parts of China by the Japanese during the period of Japanese occupation.
Shanghai was somewhat different. Its previous emergence as a financial and industrial centre 
in the Far East had much to do with the influence from the US and the UK and other 
European countries. The determination to open up Shanghai as one of the fourteen coastal 
cities immediately attracted many foreign investors, especially those from America and 
Europe, whose investments were largely involved in technology-intensive and capital- 
intensive projects. Shanghai Volkswagen, Pilkington and Foxboro were established in 
Shanghai, as Shanghai was able to provide necessary support to these ventures, such as more
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technically skilled labour, better links with inland provinces, and a more developed 
infrastructure for the supply of locally available raw materials, and a stronger industrial base 
which provide both local suppliers of components and a market for finished products.
Investors in Shanghai were therefore able to become more fully integrated into the Chinese 
economy and its markets than investors in the SEZs. Also, part of their product could be sold 
into the domestic market, although, in most cases, some must also be exported. As a result, 
coastal areas of south China attracted more FDI than the north, whereas in the north coastal 
cities received a better quality of FDI than the south.
Undoubtedly, the SEZs and open coastal areas benefited a lot from the regional emphasis of 
China's FDI policy to develop themselves. However, this development strategy was in spite 
of the fact that most of the Chinese mineral and natural resources are distributed in inland 
areas, especially in the north-western part of the country, and that there were a good number 
of industrial bases already existing in these regions which were built up before the open door 
policy for the purpose of narrowing the gap of the economic development between coastal 
areas and inland regions. The uneven economic development of these two different regions 
would worsen if the Government placed emphasis only on certain preferred regions rather 
than giving priority to more industrial development areas (this issue will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 7).
(3). Majority of FDI from Hong Kong/Macao and overseas Chinese investors
Up until 1986, most of the FDI into China came from Hong Kong and Macao, and South 
Eastern Asian countries. FDI from South-eastern Asian countries was described by a Japanese 
scholar as "overseas Chinese investing to mainland China" (Fan, 1992, p. 57), as most 
investors from these countries were ethnic Chinese. More notably, almost all of FDI in 
Guangdong was made by Hong Kong/Macao companies (from 100 per cent of FDI in 
Guangdong in 1979 to 87 per cent in 1986). It is therefore fair to say that in the early years of 
China's open door policy, the door of Guangdong was primarily opened to Hong Kong and 
Macao (Hou, 1993). Accordingly, China's FDI was dominated by overseas Chinese from 
Hong Kong and Macao and South-eastern Asian countries, with little FDI coming from 
Western countries. Therefore, China's opening-up had yet to reach a world level, only a 
regional level (Fan, 1992).
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Table 5.5. Source of FBI Commitments in China, 1979 - 1985
Amount: USD1 million
Country/Region
Hong Kong
United States
Japan
Great Britain
France
Sweden
Singapore
West Germany
Italy
Australia
Others
Amount
10628.96
2177.01
1628.63
378.30
262.50
202.40
192.50
162.10
137.40
105.20
765.46
Per cent of Total
63.8
13.1
9.8
2.3
1.6
1.2
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
4.6
(Source: US Joint Ventures in China: A Progress Report, National Council for U.S. China 
Trade, 1986, p. 186.)
As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong and Macao were the largest and most frequent foreign 
investors in China, especially in Guangdong, because they have some well-known advantages 
in dealing with China due to shared languages and culture, and proximity to Guangdong. 
More importantly, however, it was because joint production by both Hong Kong and Macao 
and China/Guangdong were mutually suitable.
Most manufacturing firms in Hong Kong and Macao, in most cases, used small-scale and 
labour-intensive technology and production facilities, and were oriented to take advantage of 
cheap labour to produce goods for export. A chronic shortage of cheap labour in Hong Kong 
and Macao made their companies have no hesitation in crossing the border to Mainland 
China/Guangdong, where wage rates were far lower than in Hong Kong and Macao and many 
other Asian countries.
From China's point of view, Hong Kong and Macao-backed ventures met with government 
objectives of export promotion, despite the fact that the Chinese government was not
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completely happy with the low level, small-scale of Hong Kong and Macao investments. In 
addition, Hong Kong and Macao invested projects continued to be the most important portion 
of FDI in China, although the share of FDI from the US, Japan, and Western Europe 
gradually increased over the period.
As a neighbouring country of China, Japan was one of the world's largest foreign investors, 
and its relationship with China seemed to be strengthened with its signing of the Sino- 
Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. As shown in Table 5.5, however, only a 
tiny portion of its investment went to China. The Chinese government remained disappointed 
not only with the amount of Japanese FDI in China, but also with the nature of its investment. 
"Small" (small-scale) and "low" (low-technology) were the primary nature of Japanese FDI in 
China (Pan, 1991).
In the early years of China's open door, the average value of total Japanese FDI projects in 
China was less than USD2 million, lower than the average value of its projects in the world 
total. In 1984, only four out of the fifty-nine FDI projects in China with a value exceeding 
USD 10 million were invested by the Japanese (Fan, 1992). The Japanese were not willing to 
invest advanced technology in China, partially because, as noted earlier, they feared that the 
Chinese would become their strong competitor in Asia. Partially , according to Kojimas' FDI 
theory discussed in Chapter 2, because the Japanese believed they could benefit more by 
investing less-advanced technology in other countries especially Asian countries where the 
low technology was more efficient and labour costs were relatively low.
In addition, Japan's reluctance to make large direct investment in China was also explained 
by themselves for several reasons, such as China's poor infrastructure and an uncertain supply 
of raw materials. More importantly, as the Japanese in general favoured the investment mode 
of the joint venture, many of them were not satisfied about being unable to run their 
enterprises "along the lines agreed to in joint venture contracts", because the Chinese local 
authorities and venture's Chinese partners had dominated influence in joint ventures, and run 
them in their own way (Shapiro, et al, 1991, p. 78).
According to the US-China Business Council (1987), US businesses tended to be more 
interested than others in investing in higher technology, capital-intensive, and larger-scale 
FDI projects. Some US large world transnational corporations were also involved in FDI in 
China, such as American Motors (Beijing Jeep), and Foxboro (Shanghai). Although the
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United States was ranked second in terms of FDI into China, the Chinese government would 
still have expected FDI from the US to have risen more significantly as, up to 1985, China 
had received only 4 per cent of total US direct investment overseas. For their part, US 
investors were unlikely to make major investments of capital and technology unless China 
was able to relax its strict requirements on foreign invested ventures such as requirements of 
foreign exchange balance, production exportation.
As shown in Table 5.5, European direct investment in China was more modest than Japan and 
US. However, the government was rather happy with a number of ventures which had been 
capital-intensive, involving quite sophisticated levels of technology, such as Shanghai 
Volkswagen Auto Factory, and Shanghai Pilkington. Lack of contacts (of overseas Chinese) 
in European countries may be the reason why European direct investment was relatively small 
(Fan, 1992).
(4). More FDI in service sectors than in manufacturing sectors.
The concentration of FDI projects on service sectors was another striking feature.
According to the data from Year Book of Chinese Foreign Economy and Trade (1986-90), 
between 1979 and 1984, only 54 per cent of the contracts and 30 per cent of the foreign 
capital pledged in foreign invested ventures involved productive projects. During the same 
period, direct investment in service areas made by Hong Kong and Macao, and Japan 
accounted for 89 per cent, and 59 per cent of their total FDI in China respectively. Of projects 
in service sectors, the major composition was hotels and tourism-related projects. In 1986, 
FDI in service sectors reached as high as 60.9 per cent in China's total FDI value, while 
manufacturing sectors decreased dramatically to 27.7 per cent.
Yet the large proportion of FDI in manufacturing sectors was into labour-intensive, low 
technology, and export-oriented projects. As noted previously, the majority of manufacturing 
projects from Hong Kong and Macao was to use cheap labour and make such products as 
toys, clothing, shoes, foodstuff, and bags, and electric clocks and watches for export. Some 
large ventures were formed in the electronic and electrical industry, such as the Hitachi- 
Fuzhou Television Joint Venture in Fujian province. Both the Japanese and American 
investors had heavy commitments to making electronic and electrical goods and small 
appliances, reflecting a trend among investors from Japan, the US and other countries towards 
shifting their least price-competitive manufacturing to low-wage areas. This phenomenon was
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described as "a logical extension of consumer electronics exports that started pouring into 
China in the early 1980's" (Seo, 1993, p. 129).
The manufacturing sector of FDI being biased towards the low-technology projects, 
especially FDI being concentrated on the service sector was not in line with the government's 
initial objectives of transferring advanced technology via FDI; the sectoral distribution of FDI 
in China was very important as it was "crucial to the modernisation of the country" (Pearson, 
199, p. 87).
A major factor contributing to China's dissatisfaction with the performance of sectoral 
distribution of FDI was that China lacked the detailed policy to implement its objectives 
towards priority sectors.
For example, the Implementation of Joint Venture Law did not put emphasis on the 
government's priority industries, instead, it provided opportunities for foreign investors to 
enter six major industries, as can be seen below, which covered most sectors of China's 
existing industrial areas :
o energy exploitation, building materials, chemicals, metallurgy;
o manufacturing of machinery, instruments and apparatus, sea oil prospecting and 
exploration;
o electricals, computing industry, manufacturing of telecommunications;
o light industry, textiles, food processing, pharmaceutical, packing industry;
o agriculture, animal husbandry, breeding;
o tourism and services.
Leaving such a wide range of sectors for foreign investors may reflect the hesitation of 
China's position towards FDI:
Firstly, the government needed to ensure that FDI would come to China, rather than by over- 
emphasising the priority sectors which may lead too little FDI to accommodate in the country 
(Fan, 1992). On the other hand, due to China's principle of closing its domestic market for 
foreign investors, and China's relatively cheap labour forces, it was a logical result that the 
majority of FDI projects were low-tech, labour-intensive, and export-oriented.
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In terms of a large number of hotels and tourism-related projects in service sectors, it seemed 
to be necessary to build up a number of international standard hotels and office buildings for 
foreign investors to live and work, as existing facilities were far less likely to meet the 
increasingly high demand following the rapid growth of international business in China.
In addition, in the early years of the open door policy, foreign investors remained worried 
about the certainty of China's policy environment, and Chinese local governments and 
partners eagerly expected FDI to be successful, therefore, with quick returns, straightforward 
management and low-risk became the major concerns for both foreigners and the Chinese to 
involve FDI sectors and projects (Duan and Yang, 1993), while hotels and tourism-related 
projects met these concerns very well.
Moreover, investment in these projects made it easy to balance foreign exchange, as these 
international standard facilities were used mainly by foreign businessmen and foreign 
travelers, who were required to pay using foreign exchange rather than the local Chinese 
currency.
However, the attractiveness of investment in hotels led to over-expansion in the middle of 
1980s. In the meantime, modern technology projects with high risk, low-return, and large- 
scale investment had not been paid enough attention by foreign investors (Li, 1990).
(5) The dominant form of FDI was contractual Ventures (CVs), rather than equity joint 
ventures (EJVs).
As noted in Chapter 2, equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual joint ventures (also known as 
co-operative ventures [CJVs]), wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs), and joint 
exploration have been recognised as the four major types of FDI in China.
Of these, EJVs, CJVs, and WFOEs (since 1986) have played a major role in China's FDI in 
terms of the number of ventures, the value of their investment, and their sectoral distribution. 
Joint exploration has only narrowed its role in exploring offshore oil and is less significant in 
terms of the total number of ventures (less than 1 per cent). Therefore, study and discussion 
of China's FDI usually gives little attention to the form of joint exploration (Pearson, 1991; 
Shapiro, et al, 1991), and this study makes no exception.
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It can be seen from Table 5.6 that, among the three forms of EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs, EJVs 
were the first to be introduced to China. JVs Law was passed soon after JVs came into 
existence in 1979. In the following year, CJVs and WFOEs followed.
In addition, CJVs had caught up with EJVs and become the dominant form from 1980 until 
1985, in terms of both the number of contracts approved and amount of foreign capital 
pledged. Moreover, WFOEs grew very slow especially by the number of enterprises approved 
in the same period.
Table 5. 6. Foreign Investment Actually Used by Form (1979 - 1986)
Unit: USD100 million
Form
EJVs
CJVs
WFOEs
1979-1982
0.98
5.32
0.40
1983
0.74
2.27
0.43
1984
2.55
4.65
0.15
1985
5.82
5.85
0.13
1986
8.05
7.94
0.16
(Source: China Foreign Economic Statistics, China Statistical Information & Consultancy 
Services Centre, Beijing, 1992).
There is no doubt that EJVs were the form most preferred by the Chinese government who 
published JVs law shortly after its announcement of the open door policy.
This form is believed by the government to be the most likely way of introducing advanced 
western technology and equipment, and management know-know, because the foreign 
partners share the profits and risks proportionately according to their equity stake, and they 
therefore have to make a firm commitment to the ventures in order to succeed. However, 
EJVs did not become as a dominant form of FDI as the Chinese authority expected, but grew 
well behind the CJVs in the initial years.
For Chinese FDI participants, the initial slow growth of EJVs derived from two major 
reasons. Firstly, they knew little about EJVs, although the JV Law established the first legal 
framework regarding FDI, it took time for them to learn how to follow the law. Secondly,
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Chinese partners were very eager to have quick results after setting up a joint venture, whilst 
the majority of foreign investors were Hong Kong companies, which also sought a quick 
return from their investment. Consequently, CJVs were the more popular investment vehicle 
for both Chinese and foreign partners (Liu, 1993), as the set up of CJVs was based on 
negotiation, and much easier than the set up of EJVs. Foreign investors preferred to wait for 
improvements in China's investment climate before making any serious commitments. They 
therefore favoured CJVs over EJVs .
However, some western investors - especially the Americans - had strongly favoured the 
EJVs over the CJVs and not found the CVs as attractive as had the Southeastern Asian 
investors, because they thought it was uneconomic to set up CJVs which were short-term 
(usually 1-5 years) by spending so much time on difficult partner search, negotiations, and 
approval process. By contrast, Southeastern Asian investors were likely to be more adept at or 
more patient in doing so as they have "advantages in know-how, patience, flexibility, and 
proximity to China" (Shapiro, et al, 1991, p. 57).
Because most FDI projects came from Hong Kong investors and other Asian investors who 
were in favour of CJVs, these were the dominant form of FDI in China in the early years 
following the introduction of FDI. The following points may explain why CJVs were the 
predominant type of FDI in China until 1985. Firstly, it is an arrangement that permits the 
participants to work together for a short period of time to become better acquainted before 
entering into a more permanent relationship such as the EJVs if they wished. This obviously 
suited the majority of foreign investors who invested in China in a very careful manner in the 
early 1980s.
Secondly, this form is extremely flexible and adaptable. It can therefore be used for a wide 
variety of projects - everything from small manufacturing operations to large property 
development projects.
Thirdly, they were quicker to establish than EJVs because they were restricted by fewer legal 
requirements and therefore were easier to negotiate.
Fourthly, this arrangement does not necessarily require Chinese partners to participate in the 
venture with investment of cash. Instead, they can contribute existing property or factory 
facilities and site to the venture. For foreign partners, this investment form provided them
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with the opportunity to have a quicker return on their investment, as the contract would allow 
them to have more profits than their proportion of investment.
Finally, until 1986, CJVs had tax advantages over EJVs. In particular they were not required 
to set aside a portion of their funds as registered capital, interest on which was not a tax- 
deductible expense even if the sum was raised through borrowing. As a consequence, the CJV 
became the most favoured form of FDI until 1985 as it was suitable for most initial foreign 
investors, particularly for those from Hong Kong, who preferred to establish a short-term, 
quick return and project-related venture.
The majority of this type of enterprise was located in Guangdong province. Many of them 
were restaurants, hotels and taxi services. Outstanding examples in this respect were the 
White Swan Hotel in Guangzhou, the Lido Hotel in Beijing, and the China Scientific and the 
Technological Exchange Centre in Hainan Island (Liu and Liang, 1987).
With regard to WFOEs, these were initially not encouraged by the Chinese government as 
this form of FDI was seen to be beyond government direct control. In contrast, a major reason 
for foreign investors to set up WFOEs was to retain entire control so that they could make 
sure, as an affiliate, that its local activities were in line with its parent's worldwide strategy 
(Shapiro, Behrman, Fischer and Powell, 1991). In addition, the protection of commercial 
secrets and a lack of working capital from local potential partners were also other reasons for 
foreign companies to adopt this structure (Beamish and Spiess, 1993). However, WFOEs 
were only allowed to be established in SEZs from 1980 until 1984. During this period, only 
forty eight WFOEs were approved. Following China's further opening of the fourteen coastal 
cities in 1984, WFOEs began to be permitted outside the SEZs. It was not until 1986 that the 
government changed its cautious attitude over this form of FDI because of a significant 
decrease of FDI over the year (Casson and Zheng, 1991).
5J. A General Assessment and Problems of China's Use of FDI During 1979-86
Following the above discussion of China's FDI during the period of 1979-86, it is now 
necessary to assess if China's use of FDI had been a success.
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It is also necessary to generalise and discuss some key common problems which negatively 
affected the further development of FDI in the country. Some of these problems were so 
serious that a call for a big change in Chinese policy was demanded.
5.31. General Assessment of FDI during 1978 -1986
It is true that the development of FDI in China during the first period was accompanied by 
some disappointments. These included: neither a great number of nor high level of FDI 
projects were introduced; the investment environment and, especially, the policy environment 
was poor; and in spite of the open door policy, many doors still remained closed. However, if 
the following factors are taken into account, China's FDI in its initial stage can still be seen as 
a success.
(1) The determination of China's use of FDI means China changed itself qualitatively, 
although the quantitative impact had been relatively modest.
In terms of the absolute amount of FDI that China had absorbed, it was not insignificant. 
Between 1980-85, for example, China was the fifth largest recipient of FDI among all 
developing countries, accounted for 5.8 per cent of the world total, and followed Brazil, 
Mexico, Singapore, and Malaysia (Pearson, 1991); the World Bank estimated net FDI in 
China during 1981-86 at USD 1.4 billion, second only to Spain as a net FDI recipient, and 
well above other Asian countries (Pomfret, 1991).
However, when compared to the size of China's economy, the amount of FDI introduced was 
relatively small.
For example, FDI accounted for only one per cent of China's GDP in 1985, which was a 
fraction of the amount contributed by the foreign sector in 1979 to other large developing 
countries such as Indonesia (11 per cent), Brazil (7 per cent), and Mexico (5 per cent), and 
was well behind Brazil in 1985 (12 per cent) (Pearson, 1991; Pomfret, 1991).
In terms of the level of technology transferred via FDI, as already noted, most FDI projects 
did not contain sophisticated technology, and were concentrated on the service sector (hotels 
and restaurants) and on comparatively low technology sectors. These disappointments were 
derived partially from China's complete lack of experience in dealing with FDI, which made 
China very cautious towards its introduction; and partially resulted from the careful response 
of foreign investors to China's open door policy, as they wished to test the water through
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some form of limited arrangement before committing substantial capital and technology and 
management know-how (Pomfret, 1991).
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the open door policy fundamentally altered China's 
approach to the utilisation of Western investment and technology (Ho and Huennemann, 
1987), which was regarded by both Western countries and China itself as "the second great 
revolution" after the first revolution of 1949 when the new China was born (Nee, 1986, 
p. 101). The invitation of FDI to China was indeed a significant political change in the sense 
that China denied its previous political position. Bearing this quality change in mind, a 
"quantity" outcome of FDI to China becomes less important in the initial stage of China's 
open door policy.
Firstly, the open door policy changed the Chinese thoroughly in their ideology. For example, 
at the beginning of the 1980s, there was a serious debate in the Shanghai local press regarding 
a Japanese product advertisement placed on the top of a city centre hotel, where it was 
initially a political slogan of "Long live Chairman Mao"! Some local people were very 
confused as this advertisement reminded them of the time when Western powers occupied 
Shanghai in the 1930s, and they wrote to the local papers asking what was going on and why. 
In contrast, other people wrote articles to support the open door policy.
The argument lasted for several days. In the end, the local government made an official 
explanation which calmed down this radical sentiment (the government explained the 
situation by emphasizing that China's present open door policy was totally different from the 
previous "foreign concessions", as under the Open Door policy, China did not lose its full 
status of a sovereign country).
In later years, more and more Shanghai people were eager to work in foreign invested 
companies, and even left Shanghai to find jobs in Shenzhen where it was at that time much 
more open than Shanghai (traditionally, Shanghai people preferred to stay in Shanghai to 
work and live).
Within a few years of China opening-up, some western aspects of ideology had been 
introduced and accepted by Shenzhen people. For example, two slogans, "time is money", 
and "efficiency is life", were commonly used in the construction of the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone. A few years later, these two slogans were widely recognised in many other
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parts of China, and became widely used for encouraging the Chinese people to speed up the 
country's modernisation process.
Secondly, FDI, for the first time, brought the opportunity for the Chinese to learn western 
technology and management skills by working together with foreign partners, which would 
improve significantly the quality of Chinese personnel in terms of both modern knowledge 
and technology. As a result of this, these talents would be able to play an important role in 
China in catching up with western economies.
Thirdly, the existence of foreign invested companies in China provided immediate examples 
for China's economic reforms. In addition to FDI, economic reforms were also a major aim of 
China's open door policy. Allowing China's SEZs to follow the law of the market economy 
reflected the impact of western companies running in the country. In the later years of China's 
reforms more changes occurred. These included the removal of the "iron rice bowl", and 
"dual pricing systems", which were more or less influenced by the approach western 
companies adopted.
(2) The investment environment, especially the legal environment, was consistently 
improved, although China had a long way to go to establish a sound environment 
for FDI.
As previously mentioned, these had been hardly any legal formation existing in China when 
the country opened its doors to the outside world. It is therefore understandable that it was not 
easy for the country to build up its comprehensive legal environment in a short period of time, 
since everything was new to the government, and there was a "leaning curve", within the new 
type of foreign invested firms, as well as in implementing a new policy, which involved a 
historical change (Pomfret, 1991, p. 127).
It is a fact that, generally speaking, the government had shown its willingness to establish a 
regulatory base for FDI.
For example, only a few months after the country declared its intention to undertake the open 
door policy, the Law on FJVs was published. Between 1979-86 the government issued 
several hundred relevant regulations, covering a wide range of commercial activities such as 
advertising, commerce and domestic trade, economic contracts, trade marks and patents, etc.
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(Kemp, 1987). Of these regulations, nearly one hundred were foreign investment-related laws 
and regulations, which was "a noticeable event in a country that had forsaken legal 
procedures during the Cultural Revolution..." (Plasschaert, 1993, p. 103).
In addition, the Chinese authorities made an effort to make laws and regulations in 
accordance with common international practice. In order to draw up EJV law, the government 
had sought advice from a wide variety of foreign sources including academia and practising 
lawyers, businessmen, and foreign government agents (Kemp, 1987). Also, China had been 
open to criticism of its new laws and regulations, then gave response to the concerns of 
foreign investors by supplementing improved editions or promulgating new laws and 
regulations (Beamish and Spiess, 1993).
Moreover, in the early years of its open door policy, China's FDI policy was by no means as 
attractive as that of its Asian neighbouring countries. However, compared with the policies 
applied to local companies, these policies were seen as "special treatments" in the sense that 
local enterprises were not allowed to enjoy them. In terms of taxation, foreign invested 
companies enjoyed lower rates of income tax than Chinese companies.
Furthermore, foreign invested ventures were granted full power of decision-making and were 
allowed more flexibility in terms of the way they operated. These policies were not available 
for Chinese state-owned enterprises. For instance, a foreign-funded company had the power 
to make its own plan, and had the right to conclude economic contracts with corporations and 
enterprises at home and abroad. It was also entitled to open accounts with the Bank of China 
or other banks approved by the Bank of China, where it could deposit or draw money freely 
and could also apply for loans. It could raise funds for its own use from foreign banks (Liu 
andLiang, 1987).
It is fair to say, therefore, that the Chinese policy and attitude towards FDI was becoming 
increasingly more favourable over the period of 1979-86, which in general led to a steady 
growth of FDI inflows into the country.
(3) An important foundation was established for the open door policy, although the 
door was yet to be opened widely.
As noted earlier, China conducted a cautious approach to its opening-up to the world 
economy, and the open policy began with a very strict regional emphasis. Thus, only four
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small SEZs were approved to become open areas in early 1980s. Therefore, the door was only 
"ajar" (Ho and Huenemann, 1987, p. 174), or was only "cracked a little way" (Soe, 1993, p. 
113).
However, the initiative and development of these four SEZs attracted great attention 
thoughout the country, in particular from China's major cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Tianjin and Beijing, and so on. Government officials, company managers and scholars of 
these cities made visits to SEZs and learned experience from the open zones. More 
importantly, the success of the SEZs set a good example which led to a further opening-up of 
China's fourteen coastal cities including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Dalian.
All of these cities, as compared with SEZs, contained some of China's most advanced 
infrastructural and industrial facilities, had better access to supplies of raw materials, a greater 
supply of skilled labour and experienced management, and were generally more productive 
(Pearson, 1991; Kemp, 1987).
In addition to their existing advantages, these coastal cities held a dominant position in that 
they collectively:
produced about one-quarter of China's gross value of industrial output; 
generated one-quarter of its taxes and profits; 
provided two-fifths of its exports;
had productivity levels two-thirds above the national average; and 
handled one-fifth of all China's freight and virtually all of its cargo. 
(Shapiro,efa/., 1991).
It is important to note that the opening-up of China's fourteen coastal cities had significant 
implications. Firstly, it indicated that China had become confident about its open-door policy 
as it believed the policy had been successful in SEZs. Secondly, allowing fourteen further 
coastal cities to be open areas implied that the government wished to ensure further success as 
these cities were historically "open" cities and therefore in a better position than other areas 
of China to attract and take advantage of foreign investment. The initial opening of SEZs was 
more or less designed by China as a "laboratory" to test whether and how western investment
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could be introduced into the country while under socialist principles. Thirdly, as these 
fourteen coastal cities were so important to China's economic development that their opening 
suggested that China had made a very serious decision towards western countries, and its 
"open policy" was unlikely to be changed. From this point of view, the opening of China was 
not a temporary or short-term measure, but a strategic long-term policy.
5.32. Major Problems of China's Using FDI in the 1978 - 86 Period
The preceding section comes to a generally positive conclusion towards FDI development in 
China in 1979-1986 period, finding that the opened door of China would not be closed again, 
and that the main issue for China would be whether or not the country could manage to attract 
FDI from the West. It also concludes that China has acted successfully (Qing, 1998, p. 13), 
although this was characterised by the small amount of FDI introduced.
With regard to why there was little inflow of FDI to China in the initial years of the open 
policy, it is generally agreed that the following are the main contributing factors: poor 
infrastructure, lack of legal framework, and fears and worries western investors had to make 
direct investment in the country (Ho and Huenemann, 1984; Lu, 1997, p. 146; Qing, 1998). 
However, little attention is paid to the factors such as how western FDI is interpreted and 
treated in the country and why, as this would much more significantly determine the fate of 
FDI in China.
As noted in Chapter 2, and in the Introduction Section of this chapter, as far as western FDI is 
concerned, it was China that took the initiative to "allow" or "welcome" it. This is one of 
striking features of China's inward FDI. It is logical to argue, therefore, that how FDI was 
viewed, interpreted, treated, and developed depended, to a great extent on the Government's 
attitudes, approach, and related policies. It was also mentioned in Chapter 2 that China made 
it clear that the country was building up "the socialism with Chinese characteristics", which 
meant that all foreign invested enterprises would exist in a totally different environment, and 
that FDI would be treated in a Chinese way. It should be noted, however, that the Chinese 
leadership did realise that FDI was new to them and that they would need to "learn from 
practice, learn from books, and learn from experience and lessons of others" (Lin, 1993, p. 
35). This led to western publications and books about FDI being introduced to the country, 
while at the same time Chinese universities were permitted to launch a new course of western
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business, including FDI. However, once western FDI was put into practice in the country, it 
was used, treated, and explained in a different way.
It is Chinese understanding of western FDI that decided their attitudes and approach towards 
western FDI and investors, and these attitudes and approach turned to affect the making of 
FDI policy, in the end, FDI policy induces FDI performance. In the first period of China's 
FDI development, many major problems were mainly derived from the Chinese way of 
dealing with western FDI. More specifically, as Pomfret (1991) recognised, some of the most 
serious problems were "policy induced" (p. 23). The existence and development of these 
problems led to limited FDI inflow to China between 1979 and 1986, and finally led to the 
well-known foreign exchange crisis which marked the end of the first period of China's FDI 
development, and urged China to improve its FDI climate.
(1) Problems associated with Chinese approaches and attitudes towards western FDI:
A. Undertaking the new policy of open door, but still maintaining the old policy of "self- 
reliance ".
It appears that China's announcement of the open door policy did not mean that the country 
would give up its "long-held socialist principle..." (Seo, 1993, p. 111). Instead, Chinese 
leaders and official scholars repeatedly insisted "self-reliance" policy was still important for 
China. As Deng Xiaoping declared, "...self-reliance, used to be in the past, and is at present, 
and will be in the future, our foothold...", and he then proceeded to issue the following 
warning to the West: "no foreign country should ever expect China to be their dependency, 
and to accept something which may be harmful to our country's interests" (Deng, 1984, p. 3). 
This declaration therefore politically decided the nature of the relationship between the policy 
of self-reliance and the open door policy, including the use of western FDI, namely that of 
relying mainly on our own efforts, while making external assistance subsidiary, otherwise 
China will suffer (Fang and Xu, 1995; Ji, 1999).
One of the important reasons behind this position, as Pearson recognises (1991), was that the 
Chinese leadership believed western FDI "would lead to a number of negative results..."; 
they doubted "China's ability to capture its share of the economic benefits generated by 
foreign investment..."; and they also feared "loss of political independence" (p. 3). However, 
there is still a difference between the self-reliance policy period and the early years of the 
open door policy: the former totally rejected western FDI, while the latter accepted it but "did
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not reject the view that FDI had potential negative effects..." and they would need to 
"selectively absorb the good things and boycott the bad things from abroad" (p. 3).
Now that it had been decided that external assistance would play a minor role in the open 
policy, how could significant western FDI be expected to flow into China? This approach 
really means, as Seo (1993, p. 113) concludes, that China's "open door is not really open - it 
is only cracked a little way...", which, therefore, "will undoubtedly hinder their economic 
progress in years to come" (Seo, 1993, p. 113).
B. Accepting FDI, but still worrying about the capitalist influence
It was believed in China, that the introduction of western FDI was accompanied by several 
negative effects, notably bourgeois decadent ideology and life style (Ji, 1999). When signs 
of wealth and prosperity appeared in the opened coastal areas of China that were earlier to 
open to the outside world, condemnation of "capitalisation" was voiced widely in the country 
(Chen, 1989, p. 1). In order to protect China from the capitalist influence, Deng Xiaoping 
claims, in the process of the open policy, the country must "keep a cool head, firmly resist the 
corrosive influence of bourgeois ideology, and never allow the spread of bourgeois life style" 
(19xx, p372). As mentioned in the above section of this chapter, Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone - China's most open area at the time - was also guided by this strict attitude. As Tang 
explained (1988), "Shenzhen is a Special Economic Zone, but not a Special Political Zone" 
(p. 362).
This attitude - accepting FDI while worrying about its negative influence - led the government 
to adopt the policy which would not only attract western investors, but would also control 
their negative effects. This was the so-called "getting rid of dirty things, but not the whole 
foreign investment" (Tang, 1988, p. 363). This attitude had been reflected in a number of 
China's FDI policies, notably the Chinese-foreigner equity joint ventures' law, as discussed in 
Section 2 of this chapter.
Foreign businessmen therefore felt uneasy as they believed that "the open door policy is the 
direct result of political changes in China and is closely tied to Deng Xiaoping and his 
supporters..." (Ho and Huenemann, 1984, p. 178). As China was regarded by the west as a 
country with a high political risk for international business according to their "deep
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impression of China's past political turbulence" (p. 178), and its politically-oriented attitude 
and policies led them to doubt, "how long the door will remain open and whether future 
political shifts will adversely affect the profitability of international economic co-operation in 
China..." (p.!78).These concerns inevitably resulted in hesitancy of foreign companies to 
make their investment cautiously, and consequently caused the slow development of FDI in 
China.
C. Willing to follow the international practice, but still doing things largely in the Chinese 
way
The Chinese government realised the importance of following international practice in order 
to successfully deal with western FDI. Deng Xiaoping urged the Chinese to establish a 
favourable investment environment for foreigners, and let their business be profitable (Fang 
and Xu, 1995).
As a starting point of accommodating western FDI in China, the government tried very hard 
to learn western experience when formulating their first legal document, namely the equity 
joint venture law (Liu, 1993). However, Chinese domestic aspects were clearly included in 
the law, notably the chairman of the joint venture board had to be Chinese regardless of the 
percentage of the participation of the foreign party, which obviously did not reflect the 
principle of international practice.
In addition, the way joint ventures and foreign investors were treated was also problematic, in 
spite of the existence of the law. For example, the law did not say joint ventures had to 
export their products but, rather, that joint ventures were "encouraged" to make products for 
export. In practice, non-exportable ventures were hardly to be approved by the governments. 
Also, the law did not block the way for foreign parties to become majority shareholders, but 
in reality, joint ventures with a foreign majority were unlikely to be granted.
Another problem relates to the joint venture's legal status. In many western countries, foreign 
invested companies can apply the host country's company law in the same manner as 
domestic companies. In China, foreign invested companies had to follow the law on Chinese- 
foreign joint ventures, since there was no company law available in the country. In fact, 
however, joint ventures were deemed by the Government to be "a Chinese corporate body",
137
"whose operational activities..." should be therefore "subject to the guidance, inspection and 
supervision of relevant Chinese authorities" (Liu and Liang, 1987, p.515). In other words, 
joint ventures were actually denied as "foreign enterprises", and they had to follow Chinese 
laws. This position of the Chinese government over joint ventures was stricter than many 
other countries, even other socialist countries, as foreign sides of joint ventures in these 
countries had a choice between enforcing their contracts based on either the host country's 
laws or the non-host country's laws (Pearson, 1991). This paved the way for the government 
to entirely control joint ventures in the country.
Interestingly, at local level, joint ventures and other foreign invested enterprises had suffered 
from time to time just because they were regarded as "foreign enterprises" by Chinese local 
authorities. A typical example is the price charged over foreign invested firms: prices set by 
local governments for foreign companies' various business activities were much higher than 
those of Chinese domestic companies, as foreign companies and investors were thought to be 
rich. This unfair treatment seriously dampened the enthusiasm of foreign investors investing 
in China (Tang, 1988).
China's willingness to follow the international law, while acting greatly in its own way is 
seen by Li (1990) as the key cause of many other problems, "before China manages to 
establish an investment environment based on international practice, significant growth in 
FDI is impossible" (p. 3).
D. Taking advantage of western FDI, but minimising the possibility of being used by 
western investors
In theory, China repeatedly and officially emphasised that "mutual benefits" were one of their 
principles for doing business with their foreign counterparts. In reality, however, it behaved 
differently.
It is understandable that the Chinese government should have selected the introduction of 
advanced technology and encouraging export as the two main goals of western FDI. This was 
because the country badly needed western technology in order to catch up with the developed 
countries and to realise its modernisation. It was believed that FDI could offer technology 
directly and indirectly: directly, in the form of advanced machinery, equipment and other
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advanced knowledge, which would become a part of foreign investors' commitment to set up 
foreign invested companies in China; and indirectly, export via foreign invested firms could 
earn foreign exchange for China, with which China could import advanced technology.
However, this was only one-sided planning, as the Government did not think further then to 
ask: what did the foreign investor come to China for? According to Kemp (1987), foreign 
investors were motivated by three different objectives: market-related objectives, production- 
related objectives, and objectives related to special incentives.
Most foreign companies investing in China had market-related objectives, because they saw 
China as a massive market, and aimed at gaining an access to this market in the long term 
(Kemp, 1987; Shapiro, et aL, 1991). However, their attempts to enter the Chinese domestic 
market were blocked by two measures set by the Government. One measure was aimed at 
encouraging foreign invested companies mainly to export their products. The second measure 
was concerned with foreign exchange - foreign invested companies were required to maintain 
the balance of their foreign exchange, which had proved a very tough requirement and caused 
a serious crisis between the foreign investors and the Chinese government in 1985-86 (this 
crisis will be discussed separately below). This led to a dramatic change in Chinese FDI 
policy, and marked a beginning of the second period of China's FDI development.
Restricting foreign investors by these two measures, on the one hand, reflected the fact that 
China was worried about loss of its home market to foreign invested companies, as Chinese 
industries were backward and non-competitive. On the other hand, it showed the 
Government's lack of a basic understanding of what foreign investors came to China for. As 
noted in Chapter 2, one important advantage of FDI over international trade is that FDI 
provides the opportunity for foreign investors to produce and sell their products locally. In 
addition, foreign investors recognised comparative advantage as the essential economic 
principle, and they believed it was fair for them to provide their capital and know-how in 
exchange for China's market; "China's policies, however, are clearly designed to provide 
maximum benefit for China with little or no consideration for trading partners or foreign 
investors" (Seo, 1993, p.l 14).
Labour intensive foreign companies were mainly motivated by production related factors of 
China. They were attracted by China's cheap labour force, and by the low cost of land use 
and other production factors. As indicated in the above section, the Chinese government
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displayed their disappointment with these firms, as they basically manufactured low 
technology products like toys, clothing and electronic watches for export, most of which came 
from Hong Kong and Macao.
The main motivation of the third group of foreign investors was to take advantage of special 
tax incentives which China offered. The nature of these companies was similar to the foreign 
investors who were motivated by the low production costs, most of them being Hong Kong 
and Macao companies, and who were located in China's SEZs and other areas of Guangdong 
province, and were engaged in labour intensive and low technology industrial activities, 
including hotels.
The Chinese one-sided policy inevitably led to its failure to achieve both the promoting of 
technology transfer and of FDI-led exports. The latter two groups of foreign investors were 
not particularly welcomed by the Government because they did not meet one of the Chinese 
goals, namely that of introducing high technology. However, they did meet another of 
China's goal - exporting. In addition, service industry enterprises such as hotels were not on 
the Chinese priority list, but they had no problem in maintaining their foreign exchange 
balance as the Chinese policy required.
(2) The foreign exchange crisis and its impact on China's FDI development
As shown in the previous section, there was a FDI boom in the late 1984 and 1985, followed 
by a bust in the late 1985 and 1986. China's overall economic policies and the economic 
situation these policies generated were the main causes for the boom and the bust. The 
foreign exchange balancing problem - many foreign invested companies, especially some 
large joint ventures such as Beijing Jeep, had long suffered - developed so seriously that it 
had become the centre of the problem, with complaints from foreign investors about China's 
FDI environment policy being heard widely in China and reported by the press in their home 
countries, and as a result of which some foreign governments became involved in dealing 
with this issue.
From 1984, China speeded up the pace of its economic reforms, which led to credit inflation 
and to a dramatic increase in the capital investment in fixed assets. In the meantime, a large 
amount of foreign loans started coming into the country from western governments and
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international financial organisaions. All these misled foreign investors who overestimated 
China's market potential and the ability to pay back the foreign exchange (Fan, 1992). In 
addition, there was a sign of China's reaffirmation of its open door policy (demonstrated by 
the further opening up of fourteen coastal cities in April 1984), and of the improvement in the 
foreign investment climate (exemplified by signing investment protection treaties with a 
number of western countries in the late 1984). All these led to a sudden boost in the 
confidence on the part of foreign businessmen towards investing in China: (a) Some small 
foreign invested projects were switched to the form of an equity joint venture as it was 
believed to be a more stable and a longer term selection; (b) some big multinational 
enterprises started to make serious commitments by expanding their investment; and (c). 
Many more newcomers "rushed to make a deal before they missed the boat" (Pomfret, 1991, 
p.54). As a result, a FDI boom occurred in 1985, when 3,073 FDI projects were approved 
with a pledged amount of USD5.932 billion. As a consequence, the rate of growth increased 
sharply in 1985 over 1984 (66 per cent and 124 per cent respectively).
The overheating of the economy caused a shortage of raw materials, electricity, and working 
capital, and caused many industrial enterprises to cut production. In addition, China's 
widening trend of its international trade deficit in 1985 led it to impose stricter regulations on 
foreign exchange allocation in the same year. In 1986, a more restrictive import and export 
licensing system, and strict controls on bank credits and loans to foreign invested companies 
were implemented.
China's reversed economic situation and its policy adjustments immediately had a negative 
impact on FDI growth. In 1986, only 1,498 FDI projects were approved with pledged 
investment of USD2.834 billion, both of the figures were down 48 per cent over 1985. 
Dissatisfaction of foreign investors with Chinese FDI policy - in particular its foreign 
exchange rule - was expressed widely and became a central issue in China. The case of 
Beijing Jeep, an American Motors (AMC) joint venture in China was a most publicized 
relating to the foreign exchange issue at the time.
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Case of Beijing Jeep
The agreement of a joint venture, approved in June 1983, was for a USD51 million project, 32 
percent US-owned and 68 per cent Chinese, to produce Jeeps and Jeep engines in an existing 
Chinese factory. The foreign partner, American Motors (AMC), contributed USDS million in 
cash and USDS million in technology to update the Beijing plant. The joint venture could 
become operational quickly because the factory was in place and it was successful in maintaining 
output levels of the Chinese BJ212 with a much-reduced labour force. However the plans to 
produce a jointly-designed Jeep and to export over a quarter of the joint venture's output were 
wildly over-optimistic and the joint venture ran into problems from the start. The design project 
broke down amidst mutual suspicion, and in October 1984 the Chinese partner started to have 
difficulty in finding adequate quality domestic components. In addition, production problems 
within the plant soon revealed that the export targets were unrealistic. Although these problems 
were endemic to the Chinese economy of the early 1980s, AMC was also widely criticized for 
believing it could produce an export-quality Jeep in China with an outlay of only USDS million. 
In mid-1985, Beijing loaned the joint venture USDS.5 million and AMC provided an extra USD6 
million for a new assembly line and production of Cherokee Jeeps in September 1985.
The infusion of cash did not, however, soothe the joint venture's troubled relationship. AMC's 
additional purchasers would pay in FECs (foreign exchange currencies), but it soon became 
apparent that they would not, in part because the need to import components subject to high 
potential buyers simply did not have foreign exchange allocations. When the American president 
of Beijing Jeep discovered the joint venture had not even been paid in RMB for recent sales, he 
decided to go public with the joint venture's problems and this led to a showdown in March 1986 
when AMC allegedly threatened to pull out of China. The threat was averted by Central 
Government's agreeing to pay USD2 million for already assembled Jeeps, and more importantly 
guaranteeing payment in foreign exchange for 12,500 Cherokee kits over the next four years plus 
convertibility of RMB earnings. Nevertheless, the joint venture's production problems continued 
as output was well below its 1986 target of 4,000 Cherokee Jeeps and exports remained a distant 
prospect.
(Source: Richard Pomfret, "Investing in China - Ten Years of the Open Door Policy", pp. 48-9, published in 
1991 by Harvester Wheatsheaf).
The problems of China's FDI policy and investment environment were also paid serious 
attention by western governments. In May 1986, in a news conference in Beijing, the
142
American Treasury Secretary criticised the fact that "foreign investors are facing serious 
problems, including increased costs, shortage of foreign exchange, and unstable tax systems". 
A month later, a German association of machinery and electronic industries warned their 
members to be especially cautious when investing in China (Fan, 1992). The US-Chinese 
Business Council communicated with their Chinese counterpart, explicitly calling for certain 
policy changes in China, as they believed "it would be needed if China wished to induce more 
investment" (Pearson, 1991, p. 74).
The Chinese government was under great pressure. A positive approach was adopted and 
significant action was taken. The central government arranged a number of serious meetings 
to review its policies and the current situation, and was "open to criticism of its new laws, and 
in response to the foreign concerns of foreign investors the State Council issued '22 
provisions'". This policy change had turned a new page in the history of FDI in China.
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CHAPTER 6
From Permitting Western FBI to Promoting It (1986-1995): 
An Evaluation of the Second Period of China's FDI Development
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, after a long period of "self-reliance" policy, in order to 
promote China's modernisation, the government decided to replace it with a new policy - the 
open door policy. This new determination paved the way for western FDI first ever to get into 
the country. However, the decision makers gradually realised that their approach towards the 
western FDI - welcoming it but strictly controlling it - was not effective, as not as much FDI 
as the government expected materialised, and there were serious complaints about tight 
control over their investment from the existing FDI makers. The announcement of the "22 
Articles" in October 1986 marked a new period of China's FDI development: from Permitting 
western FDI to Promoting it (Pomfret, 1991).
This chapter will evaluate how China's FDI was promoted after the government introduced a 
number of more positive policies; and it will also discuss the problems due to incompletion 
and misuse of the government FDI policies. It will, to begin with, review the effectiveness of 
the "22 Articles"; and then look at the impact of other new and more positive FDI policies, 
which include the issue of the Law on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises in April 1986, and 
the Law on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures in April 1988, and the revised Law on 
Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures in April 1990. The further development of China's 
opening pattern will be analysed, which is followed by looking at several important political 
events that help accelerate China's FDI to the fastest growth pace.
This chapter will also consider a number of facts, in order to draw an overall picture of 
China' FDI in terms of FDI inflows, regional and industrial distribution of FDI, sources of 
investing countries/regions, and form of FDI. Last, but not least, this chapter will discuss 
important problems: the problem of the central government's favourable policies over FDI
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being misinterpreted and misused by local governments, problems of poor technology transfer 
via FDI, problems of serious imbalance of FDI distribution in China's different regions and 
industries, and more importantly, the FDI quality being largely ignored following the FDI 
booming since 1992.
This chapter concludes that the development of these problems lead to the Chinese leadership 
finally deciding to change the FDI policies dramatically in the hope that FDI Quality and 
quantity can be well balanced. Consequently, China's FDI development moves into a new 
stage: from Promoting FDI to Managing FDI.
6.2 The 1986 Provisions Leads China to a New FDI Development Era 
6.2.1. The Effectiveness of the "22 Articles" of the 1986 Provisions
As mentioned in the last chapter, the 1986 Provisions was an important response to the fall in 
FDI after overheating of the China's economy in 1985, when severe balance of payment 
problems occurred. A number of large Joint Ventures (JVS) that mainly sold products locally 
had serious foreign exchange difficulties that were all well publicised (Leung, 1990). 
Complaints of individual Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), and western organisations, 
such as the US-China Business Council, were well noticed by the Chinese government.
The government was increasingly aware that, in order to reach their target - raising the 
quality and quantity of FDI - foreign investors must be ensured that the problems they faced 
needed to be resolved quickly and that the Chinese investment environment needed to be 
improved (Li & Li, 1999). To tackle these problems and to revive and promote FDI, a series 
of positive actions were taken by the government. Firstly, in order to promote more FDI to 
China, the government issued "the Law on Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises" in April 
1986. For the first time, it legally allowed this kind of venture to run in a socialist country 
(Fu, 2000). Secondly, in July 1986, the central government published the Notices for Further 
Improvements in the Conditions for the Operation of FIEs, and urged the local governments 
to take action to improve operations conditions for FIEs (Ji, 1986). Thirdly, in 1986, the State 
Council set up a leadership team to deal with foreign investment. This team was headed by a
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vice premier, to decide FDI related measures and policies, and to coordinate and resolve 
important FDI issues across the country. Later, several major FDI recipient province cities of 
China established the local Foreign Investment Office to help foreign investors sort out their 
FDI related problems (Ji, 1989).
However, among the number of attempts made to improve FDI environment, the particularly 
important one was the 1986 Provisions (together with its implementational details published 
several months later), as, for the first time, foreign investors were provided with 
comprehensive legal documentation. They felt that the documentation ensured the protection 
of their interests, and the provision of privileged operating conditions, and that all of their 
major concerns were dealt with and removed (Fang, 1995).
One of the striking features of the 1986 Provisions is they went much further than the 1983 
regulations, in terms of offering incentives towards two kinds of FIEs that introduced 
advanced technologies and that were export oriented (Li and Li, 1999).
The main reasons for giving more special treatment to the above two types of FIEs were that 
the government still wished to stick to its objectives on introduction of FDI - improving the 
country's technology and exporting, and the government was not happy with the FDI 
performance in these two main areas. For example, there was a big national debate about the 
development direction of SEZs during the end of 1985 and early 1986. Some claimed that 
SEZs were supposed to give a good example to the rest of the country, in terms of focusing 
on high-tech and export oriented FDI projects. The fact is, however, FDI in SEZs was going a 
different way, as the majority of FDI was from Hong Kong, with low technological level, and 
many of the products made there were sold to the inland China (Fan, 1992).
As a response to this, the Chinese State Council, in February 1986, set up a meeting on SEZs, 
which reconfirmed the government initial objectives for SEZs: SEZs should stick to 
internationally outwards development policy, and play an example role in introducing foreign 
advanced technologies, management skills and opening to the outside world. The debate and 
the government reconfirrnation had great impact on China's FDI policy adjustment and 
change, and led to more favourable policies being given to technologically advanced and 
export-oriented FIEs (Fan, 1992). This was regarded as a well balanced policy for the
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government to follow, as the government not only gave a positive response to the foreign 
concerns, but also satisfied its own goals (Pearson, 1991).
The main difference between the 1986 Provisions and previously existing government 
policies was that more open policies and more special preferences were now focused on 
export-oriented and technologically advanced FIEs (Wang, 1995). These two types of FIEs 
that were located in other part of China would enjoy tax deduction from 30 per cent to 15 per 
cent, the same as those in SEZs. In addition, their tax holiday and deducted tax rate could be 
extended (Fan, 1992).
More JVs in these two categories were growing quickly in a number of municipalities and 
open cities, such as Guangzhou, Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and Dalian (F Li and J Li, 1999). 
These new incentives also promoted large companies to invest in China with relatively high 
technologies. For example, American Wang-An IT Co. Ltd established a JV with Shanghai 
Computer Development Company, which was called Shanghai-WangAn and produced super- 
mini PCs of VS series that represented the technology of the 1980s. Japanese Gu-He 
Electronics Co. Ltd set up a JV with Xi'an Cable Manufacturer called Xi-Gu Optics-Fibre & 
Optics Cable Co. Ltd, annual production capacity reached 20,000 kilometer of optics fibre 
and 2,000 kilometer of optics cable (Fan, 1992).
The 1986 Provisions also improved overall investment environment for all FIEs as below: 
A. JVs parties were allowed to decide the duration of the establishments, depending on 
the necessity and the nature of the projects, rather than being fixed between 10 and 30 
years by the previous policies.
B. Foreign exchange centres were set up that enabled the FIEs to swap foreign exchange 
for RMB (Ren-Min-Bi, meaning People's Currency, which is the name of Chinese 
currency), to keep the balance of their foreign exchange (Ji, 1989). 
C. Central government gave more local governments the power to approve a large 
amount of FDI projects, such as the municipal government of Shanghai, Beijing and 
Tianjin were allowed to approve the FDI project with a maximum amount of under 
USD30 million, under USD 10 million for Dalian City and USD5 million for other 
local authorities (Fan, 1992).
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D. The favourable treatment was provided to JVs, including international trade 
privileges, in particular the greater freedom to import and export on their own 
accounts and to retain foreign exchange earnings, and equal terms as the China stated- 
owned enterprises to gain access to water, electricity, transport, and RMB loans.
E. FIEs were permitted to make decisions regardless of the state plans (e.g., they had 
freedom to hire senior managers, determine employment of their employees and 
decide the level of salary) (Pomfret, 1991).
The 1986 Provisions were the response to "all problems about which, investors had 
complained loudly. Many of the provincial and local versions of these provisions went even 
further than the central regulations to induce investment to meet the concerns of investors" 
(Pearson, 1991, p. 76).
After the promulgation of the 1986 Provisions, Chinese local governments made every effort 
to improve quality and efficiency of their services, many different government agencies 
worked together very closely to approve FDI projects in order to simplify the application 
procedure and shorten the application time. Government officers in charge of FDI were 
required to attend a training programme so as to obtain professional knowledge of FDI and 
deal with their work more efficiently and more effectively. The Chairman of Sino-Japanese 
Fu-Wan Toys Co. Ltd claimed that Chinese government attempts to improve investment 
environment "has brought in promising future", and "has boosted my confidence in investing 
in China" (Ji, 1989, p. 123).
The 1986 Provisions now enabled all FIEs to balance foreign exchange by establishing 
foreign exchange centres where FIEs with foreign exchange surplus and FIEs with foreign 
exchange deficits met and negotiated, they either bought or sold their foreign exchange. Such 
swap centres, beginning with cities of Shenzhen and Shanghai, were quickly spread across the 
country - about 90 swap centres were set up by year 1990 (Fu, 2000).
A survey report showed that balancing foreign exchange used to be the "most thorny issue" 
facing many FIEs; now it was no longer a serious problem. In the case of Fujian province, 
FIEs that became able to maintain a favourable foreign exchange were increasing fast, from 
21.5 per cent in 1985, to 73.3 per cent in 1988. In the country as a whole, the general
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situation of FIEs with a favourable balance of payment was improving from 1988 (see Table 
6.1. below):
Table 6.1 Foreign Exchange Balance of FIEs (1987-95)
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Balance (US$ million)
-0.1
4.1
11.4
10.1
16.5
24.2
60.6
31.2
49.2
(Source: Fu, 2000).
The new means of balancing foreign exchange changed the foreign exchange situation of 
famous Beijing Jeep that was in serious foreign exchange difficulty before the promulgation 
of the 1986 Provisions. The company first ever made profits in thousands of USD since its 
establishment in China in 1984. The chairman of the company expressed, "I am full of 
confidence in doing business in China" (Ji, 1989, p. 124).
The promulgation of the 1986 Provisions resulted in the recovery of FDI and record level 
being reached in 1987 (Pomfret, 1991). The pledged investment in JVs rose 85 per cent (41 
per cent for utilised) in 1987 over 1986, and a further increase 59 per cent (23 per cent for 
utilised) in 1988 over 1987. The strong growth of FDI remained sustained in the first half of 
1989 (pledged FDI rose 44.2 per cent, and utilised FDI rose 21.5 over the same period of 
1988), even the government took tough retrenchment measures to slow down its economy. 
The FDI growing pace was affected when Tiananmen incident happened in June 1989 (Li and 
Li, 1999).
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Like the JVs Law in 1979 that marked the beginning of the first turning point of Chinese FDI 
development, the 1986 Provisions marked the beginning of another turning point of China 
FDI development as the country started to positively promote FDI by offering additional 
incentives in order to remove the difficulties and concerns the foreign investors faced and by 
improving overall investment environment (Fan, 1992). The provisions were also "the key 
turning point in establishing joint ventures as equal as Chinese enterprises" (Shapiro, et at, 
1991, p. 126).
6.2.2. Setting Up Essential FDI Law Systems and Improving Terms of These Laws
During 1986 and 1995, laws and regulations on FIEs - Equity Joint Ventures (EJVs), 
Contractual Joint Ventures (CJVs), and Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises (WFOEs) - were 
either improved by the terms of the laws, such as the Law on EJVs; or were finally in place, 
such as the promulgation of the Law on WFOEs and the Law on CJVs.
Law on WFOEs
It is interesting that WFOEs existed in China since early 1980 in the absence of the Law on 
this kind of venture. Six years later, in April 1986, the Law on WFOEs finally became 
available, as the government was urged to improve the legal environment, and to encourage 
more FDI projects and WEOEs to come (Casson and Zheng, 1991).
The Law on WFOEs gave the registered ventures a "legal status" (International Business, p. 
78), and was "an institutional breakthrough" in China's FDI legal system, as the country 
became the first socialist country to regulate a law allowing western capitalist companies to 
set up their subsidiaries on its territory where state-owned enterprises are dominate (Fu, 
2000).
Some 120 WFOEs had existed by the end of 1985, of which 104 were situated in the SEZs, 
and the rest of them were in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and Changsha respectively (Fu, 
2000). The WFOEs Law did not push up the new number of WFOEs significantly and
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immediately, but the number of WFOEs did go up in 1987 when 183 WFOEs were approved, 
and more significantly in 1988 when 410 WFOEs were approved (Pomfret, 1991).
Several factors contributed to the slow increase in WFOEs number. Firstly, the WFOEs 
Implementation Act for Law on WFOEs was not available until October 1990 - four years 
after the WFOEs Law was passed, which resulted in some potential foreign companies 
adopting a wait-and-see approach. Secondly, unlike JVs, WFOEs had restrictions on 
investing in certain sectors. They were forbidden to operate in the areas of media, retail and 
wholesale, telecommunications; and were restricted in the areas of public utilities, 
transportation, real estate, trusts and leasing. Thirdly, WFOEs faced discrimination in the tax 
payment. For example, they were required to pay higher taxes than JVs: the enterprise income 
tax for WFOEs was based on a progressive rate, ranging from 20 per cent on income at RMB 
250, 000 to 40 per cent on income over RMB1 million. A local tax surcharge was also 
applied, which brought a total rate to a maximum of 50 per cent. The total rate therefore was 
10 per cent higher than JVs that were charged a total rate of 40 per cent (30 per cent as 
enterprise income tax, plus 10 per cent of a local tax surcharge) (Fu, 2000).
The tax discrimination provided an explanation of why WFOEs only accounted for a 
relatively small proportion of China's whole FDI. Two new policies turned round the 
situation. One was the promulgation of the Implementation Act for Law on WFOEs in 
October 1990, which gave detailed legal guidance for WFOEs' operations, and the other was 
the Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law became effective 
in 1991, which unified the Foreign Investment Enterprise Income Tax Law and the Foreign 
Enterprise Income Tax Law, and treated all forms of FDI equally (Lin, 1994).
151
Table 6.2 Agreement of China's FBI by Form
USD 100 Millions
EJVs
CJVs
WFOEs
EJVs
CJVs
WFOEs
1979-82
1.27
27.27
3.32
1989
26.59
10.83
16.54
1983
1.88
5.03
0.40
1990
27.04
12.54
24.44
1984
10.67
14.84
1.00
1991
60.80
21.38
36.67
1985
20.30
34.96
0.46
1992
299.73
136.45
160.86
1986
13.75
13.58
0.20
1993
544.23
253.84
291.34
1987
19.50
12.83
4.71
1994
401.94
203.01
219.49
1988
31.34
16.24
4.81
1995
397.41
178.25
336.58
(Source: 1. China Foreign Economic Statistics (1979 - 1991), Published by China Statistical 
Information & Consultancy Services Centre, Beijing, 1992 ;
2. China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook (1994), Published by China Statistical 
Publishing House, Beijing, 1995.
3. J, Xing, (1998, p. 153): A Study on Foreign Invested Enterprises in China, Published 
by China Construction Materials Industry Press, Beijing).
Law on Contractual Joint Ventures
The law on CJVs was not issued until 16, April 1988, after nearly 10 years of CJVs operation. 
In the early years of China's open door policy, unlike WFOEs, which only received limited 
FDI, CJVs, together with EJVs were two main vehicles for China to introduce FDI. Among 
all FDI forms, however, CJVs received more FDI than any other form of FDI (Fan, 1991).
Unlike EJVs that were directed by EJVs Law, CJVs were mainly based on a contract agreed 
and signed by Chinese and foreign partners concerned. At the same time, some existing laws 
were consulted by the CJV. For operational issues, CJVs followed EJVs Law; for financial 
issues, the Chinese side and foreign sides were taxed separately - the foreign party was taxed 
by Income Tax Law of Foreign Enterprises, while the Chinese party was taxed by the laws
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applied to China's domestic enterprises, either taxed from its profits, or from its income (Yao, 
1989).
Since CJVs is non-equity partnership, their key issues were discussed and finalised in a 
contract. This kind of joint venture therefore enjoyed great flexibility in the following aspects:
Proportion of contribution and return on investment by either partner was not 
seriously valued and calculated. It is then possible for the foreign party to take more profits 
and to recover their capital contributions before termination of the venture. For the Chinese 
party, they would obtain the whole ownership of the venture after the termination of the 
venture.
This form of FDI particularly suited investment projects of short term, small and medium 
size, and low technology (Lin, 1987).
Flexibility of management structure. CJVs could be managed by both foreign and 
Chinese parties, or by either the foreign party or the Chinese party, or a third party agreed by 
the venture.
With the above flexibility, JVs successfully became the FDI form that attracted more FDI 
than other FDI forms in China until 1986. However, a majority of CJVs were made by Hong 
Kong and overseas Chinese, and their investments were usually small-medium size, short- 
term, and labour-intensive. Many western investors adopted a wait-and-see approach in the 
absence of the legal framework for CJVs, and some of them made a small amount of 
investment in order to test out or have their presence in the market (Lin, 1987).
Logically, CJVs were focused on certain FDI projects, such as hotel, house and office 
building construction, and hotel and factory management, as these projects tended to be short- 
term, labour-intensive, and small and medium size of investment (Brown, 1993; Yao, 1989). 
In order to attract more FDI from western investors who preferred the law governing the 
venture (Beamish and Spiess, 1993), and to promote export-oriented and high-tech FDI 
projects, the government believed the time had come to regulate the Law on CJVs after 
several years of lessons learning from running such a venture (Wang, 1995). The Law on
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CJVs was passed on 16 April 1988, which paved the way for more FDI to be attracted, 
although further development of FDI did not occur until September 1995 when Implemental 
Details of Law on CJVs was published (Zhao, 2001).
Amendment ofEJVs Law in April 1990
As mentioned earlier, as one of the key signs of China's opening to the outside world, the 
government passed the Law on EJVs on 8 July, 1979, which is the first ever legal document 
concerning FDI in China, and laid a legal foundation for the foreign investor in investing in 
the country (Fan, 1992).
However, until 1988, both the project number and value of FDI in the form ofEJVs were 
much fewer than CJVs that were run in the absence of the related legal framework. According 
to Hu and Ji (1994), causes of the relatively slow growth ofEJVs include:
As far as the Chinese partner is concerned, they were not used to being restricted by 
the law, instead, they preferred a simple, flexible and quick way to do business with the 
foreign partner. The CJV was the form of FDI they preferred, to the form of the EJV.
For most foreign investors, they were not sure whether or not the Chinese investment 
environment would be stable. Since they required much stricter commitment from the EJVs 
than the CJVs, they therefore preferred the CJV that enabled them to have less commitment 
and quick return on their investment.
Some articles of the Law on EJVs were not in line with international practice, but full 
of Chinese characteristics. For example, the Chairman of the board of an EJV had to be 
Chinese, regardless of the percentage of the ownership the foreign partner had in the EJV. 
This was because the Chinese wanted to make sure the venture, to a large extent, was in their 
control. The duration set for an EJV was between 15 and 30 years, regardless of the nature of 
the FDI project, as the government did not wish the foreign investor to be involved in its 
economy for too long.
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In April 1990, the Chinese government decided to amend the Law on EJVs, as one of the 
efforts to revive China's FDI, due to the fact that China's FDI suffered a setback - FDI boom 
in 1987-88 was replaced by a sudden drop due to the "June 4" Tiananmen Square Incident, 
which resulted in Western company's withdrawal of substantial existing FDI from China, and 
cancellation of new FDI projects (Fan, 1992).
The amended Law on EJVs had made three major changes:
A. The requirement that the chairman of the board of an EJV had to be Chinese was
changed to being "decided by mutual agreement of foreign and Chinese investors or
by election of the board members"; 
B. The requirement that the duration of the venture had to be up to 30 years was changed
to being decided based upon the venture's strategic planning; and 
C. The government made it clear that the venture would not be nationalised. In the event
that this happened, compensation would be given. 
(Fan, 1992)
These changes were welcomed by foreign investors, as all these changes were just something 
they had long expected. The amendment of the Law was also served as a good sign from the 
government for foreign investors, meaning that to promote western FDI in China was a longer 
term policy of the country, rather than a short-term strategy. Consequently, the policy 
amendments helped to accelerate FDI to China (Zhao, 2001).
As noted already, from 1979 when China published its first law concerning FDI - the Law on 
EJVs, until 1995 when the country promulgated the Implement Details of the Law on EJVs, 
China in the end had all essential legal documents available to govern the FDI activities of the 
country. Therefore it can be concluded that China's Laws have been successful in the 
promotion of FDI, which was witnessed by the fact that through 1994, China had approved 
some 206,000 foreign investment projects which together employ over 14 million people and 
accounted for approximately 29 per cent of China's exports (Xing, 1998).
6.2.3. China's Further Opening Up and the Completion of an Overall Opening 
Pattern
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As discussed in Chapter 5, China adopted a gradual and cautious open-up approach since it 
decided to follow its open door policy in late 1978.
As a first step in 1979, the government allowed limited area to be opened up on an 
experimental basis. To this end, two small border towns in Guangdong province were chosen 
- Shenzhen (next to Hong Kong), and Zhuhai (next to Macao) - as Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs), as western successful economic experience can be easily introduced from or through 
Hong Kong to Shenzhen, and from or through Macao to Zhuhai (Yao, 1989). SEZs were 
offered special policies by Chinese central government, including favourable tax rates for 
foreign investors (such as 15 per cent income tax, much lower than the tax rate applied in the 
rest of the country), and special administrative power for local authorities to deal with FDI 
activities (such as local governments being allowed to approve FDI projects, which was 
different from the other part of the country, where all governments had to follow the central 
government's instructions and decisions). Later, SEZs was extended by including Shantou 
city in Guangdong province, and Xiamen city in Fujian province (Hu and Ji, 1994).
In 1984, 14 Coastal Open Cities (COCs) - Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, 
Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and 
Beihai - were selected to open to FDI, and partially enjoyed the policies offered to SEZs (such 
as favourable 15 per cent of income tax rate was offered). In 1985, three Coastal Economic 
Development Areas (CEDA) were established. They are Yangtzi River Delta Area, Zhujiang 
Delta Area, and Xia-Zhang-Quan Delta Area, in which a 15 per cent income tax rate was 
applied (Yao, 1989).
From 1984, Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs) started to be set up 
within 12 COCs, except Wenzhou and Lianyungong city. Within ETDZs, FIEs were offered 
the same income tax rate as those in CEDAs (Investment in China, 1993). In 1988, Hainan 
Island was separated from Guangdong province, and at the same time, became a new 
province as well as the largest SEZ in China, as the whole island was given the special policy 
from the central government. In 1990, Pudong, East bank of Shanghai River Huangpu, was 
decided by the government to be a new development area, in which a set of more favourable 
policies were offered. From 1991, a number of border cities and capital cities of inland areas 
were approved to be opened up to foreign investment (Liu, 1994).
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China started opening up to the outside world as early as late 1978; however, during the 
second period of China's FDI development between 1986 and 1995, the pace, width, and 
depth of China's opening up reached a much higher level, which finally shaped the overall 
opening pattern as follows (Liu, 1994): Opening up from the south (Guangdong/Fujian) to the 
east (Shanghai/Tianjing/Liaoning), from the east to the west (such as Guangxi), or from the 
coastal regions to the inland areas (Hu and Ji, 1994). As the main open events before 1986 
were already reviewed in the previous chapter, this chapter will discuss two major events 
between 1986 and 1995. One of them is the opening up of the whole Hainan province as the 
largest SEZ in China in 1988, and the other is developing Pudong in Shanghai by offering it 
more flexible and favourable policies than other SEZs (Liu, 1994).
Whole Hainan Province being opened up as the largest SEZ of China
Hainan is the second largest island of China, and its size (33,920 square kilometres) is very 
near Taiwan (35,774.6 square kilometers) that is the China's first largest island. This island 
was part of Guangdong province until April 1988 when the Chinese central government 
decided to separate it from Guangdong and give it a provincial status in order to offer it more 
and higher level support, as Hainan had long been one of most underdeveloped regions of the 
country (Mai, 1993).
In fact, Hainan has a number of strengths that suggests it has great potential to become a more 
developed place. Firstly, Hainan is famous for its rich natural resources in petroleum and 
natural gas, tropical plants, and sea products, etc. Secondly, Hainan is also called "Eastern 
Hawaii", or "the Pearl of South Sea", as it is full of extremely beautiful sceneries, it is 
therefore one of the most attractive tourist destinations in the world (Yao, 1989).
The decision of the Chinese government making Hainan another SEZ was based on the 
following considerations:
A. First four SEZs' successful experience in developing themselves by attracting foreign 
investment encouraged the decision maker to use the same way to develop Hainan 
(Liu, 1994).
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A. In the view that Hainan was so underdeveloped that the government believed the more 
effective way to improve its economy and catch up other more developed areas of 
China in the shortest possible time was to offer more special policies than existing 
SEZs'. By doing this, Hainan's advantages of abundant natural resources could be 
quickly and possibly explored (Yao 1989).
B. Asia and Pacific region was then "the Growth Pole" of the world economy, while 
Hainan was ideally situated in the centre of this region. This means Hainan was facing 
a unique development opportunity, as well as a big challenge (Mai, 1993).
Consequently, on 13, April, 1988, the Chinese leadership made two important decisions:
A. The decision of setting up Hainan province; and
B. The decision of establishing the whole island as a special economic zone (Yao, 1989).
In order to speed up the economic development of Hainan, more special policies than those 
given to existing SEZs were offered to Hainan, which included:
  Premier rate of 15 per cent of income tax for both foreign invested and local invested 
enterprises (in four existing SEZs, 15 per cent of income tax was only applied to foreign 
investors).
  Unlike other areas of the country, the right to run exports and imports was authorised by 
the central government. Hainan was allowed to approve the exports and imports programme 
by itself (Liu, 1994).
On 1 August, 1988, Hainan government passed "Act of Hainan People Government's 
Implementing the State Council's No. 26 Document, Speeding Up Hainan's Economic 
Development and Construction. This Act provided detailed policies and measures that were 
more special than those available in four existing SEZs. Both foreign and local investors 
responded positively to these policies by taking action in Hainan.
More special and flexible policies of the Act included:
  In addition to being allowed to invest in infrastructure, agriculture, industry and tourism, 
foreign investors were also allowed to operate domestic and foreign trading, and retailing and
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wholesaling, which foreign investors were not allowed to get involved with in any other area 
of China until the 1990s.
  Encouraging foreign and domestic investors to contract, lease and buy local state-owned 
or collectively owned enterprises, which were not permitted anywhere else in the country 
until the 1990s.
  Encouraging foreign investors to contract one area and to develop this area 
comprehensively. That is, the Hainan government provided an area (up to 100 square 
kilometres) where the transportation system was good, and natural resources were abundant. 
This kind of area was fully contracted by the foreign investor who was asked to pay a very 
low cost for using the land. This kind of area can be developed differently as an economic 
area, such as economic development zone, or free trade zone, or free port, or export zone, or 
science park (Yao, 1989).
Hainan, as the largest SEZ, grew strongly in the initial five years. By the end of 1992, it 
attracted 3,393 foreign companies from 34 countries, with USD3.41 billion of contract value, 
and USD 868 million of realised value. In addition, 14 development areas were set up based 
on "developing the whole area" module, including Haikou Bonded Area, Sanya Yalona Bay 
Tourist and Holiday Resort Area, and Yang-Pu Economic Development Zone (Mai, 1993).
Shanghai Pudong New Area being established and opened up for Foreign Investment
In June 1990, the Chinese government made a big decision: establishing and opening up 
Shanghai's Pudong New Area. The significance of this opening up was made clear as the 
government stated, "this is an important strategic plan aiming at strengthening China's 
ongoing reforms and pushing further the open policy", therefore "this is a vital issue for the 
whole nation, which must be done successfully" (Qi, 1998, p. 94).
1. Pudong New Area was given more special policies than existing Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs)
(1) Pudong is situated in the east side of Shanghai Huang-Pu River, and at the south-western 
tip of the Estuary of the Yangtze River. Pudong New Area is a triangle-shaped area close to
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Shanghai city centre at Puxi - in the west side of Huang-Pu River. The New Area has a 
designed area of 518 square kilometres and population of 1.3 million people (Investment in 
China, 1993).
Developing and opening up Pudong New Area was seen by the government as China's key 
open event for the 1990s, following the success in opening up of four SEZs and 14 coastal 
cities in the 1980s. The aim of opening Pudong was to promote the development of cities 
along the Yangtze River, hence to form China's overall open pattern - opening the whole 
country, both the North and the South, and both the coastal region and the Yangtze River area 
(Fan, 1992).
Shanghai is an internationally well-known city, and used to be the largest world trade centre 
and financial centre of Asia as early as in the 1930s. Having long been restricted by the 
Chinese traditional policies and systems, Shanghai's development pace had been slow. 
However, Shanghai's strategic location, and high level of technological and economic 
capability, were still seen by the Chinese leadership as a "trump card". In March 1990, then 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping claimed, developing Shanghai was a shortcut to develop the 
whole nation. He regretted that the decision of developing Pudong was delayed, but he hoped 
Pudong could catch up by starting their development at a high level (Qi, 1998).
Consequently, the special policies being offered to Pudong New Area not only included those 
that were in use in SEZs, but also included some new policies that were not available for 
anywhere in China (Investment in China, 1993). These new policies gave Pudong New Area 
the permission to:
- get foreign investors to involve in retail, finance and insurance sectors.
- issue A Share and B Share by Shanghai Stock Exchange.
- set up China's first bonded area - Wai-Gao-Qiao Bonded Area. Within the Area, Chinese 
and foreign trade agencies were allowed to be established, and they were free of import and 
export tariff, and of a trading license. In addition, there was no restriction on use and 
transaction of foreign currencies. Moreover, Shanghai municipal government was given
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greater power to approve inward foreign investment and international trading projects (Liu, 
1994).
(2) Pudong New Area was proposed to act as a "dragon-head" - to lead the further 
development of Shanghai and the whole of China (Hu and Ji, 1994).
In October 1992, two years after the opening up of Pudong, Jiang Zemin, then General Party's 
Secretary of China, reaffirmed the goal of developing and opening up of Pudong - let Pudong 
play a role like the dragon-head, leading the way of opening up cities along the Yangtze River 
and taking the economic development of Yangtze River area on to the fast track, and 
promoting Shanghai to become one of the world economic, financial and trade centre in the 
shortest possible time (Investment in China, 1993).
The whole Yangtze River area - Pudong/Shanghai being a centre of this area - is situated in a 
central part of China's coastal line, and is the end of the Yangtze golden waterway. This area 
has a group of China's largest ports, and has one third of China's total population. The total 
value of output of industry and agriculture in that area accounted for almost half of that in 
China's total. Therefore, to a large extent, the opening up and development of the Yangtze 
River area led by Pudong/Shanghai, had led the whole country to be opened up, or had helped 
to shape the overall open pattern - opening from the south to the north, from the east to the 
west, from the coastal area to the inland area (Hu and Ji, 1994).
2. Pudong's achievements up to 1997
After seven years of open policies since 1990, Pudong New Area had grown very strongly 
and made steady and great progress in introducing foreign investment (Qi, 1998):
(1) Achievements in foreign investment:
Strong growth in foreign investment. Every year, foreign investment was growing, 
especially in the more recent years when the annual growth rate reached around 33 per cent.
- Large scale of foreign investment projects were introduced to Pudong. For example, 
Shanghai General Motors - a car-making joint venture between Shanghai Automobile Co.
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and American GM invested USD157 million. Huahong - NEC, a joint enterprise between 
China and Japan invested USD 120, to produce microelectronic products.
Pudong had become an important destination for FDI. Up to 1997, 85 transnational 
enterprises (TNEs) that were on the list of the world's 500 largest enterprises invested 138 
projects in Pudong, which involved 63 countries/regions, including Hong Kong, Japan, the 
US, Taiwan, Singapore, Canada, the UK and Australia. 4,918 projects were invested with the 
total value of USD 623.836 billion.
Foreign invested projects had moved towards high level sectors and new sectors. For 
instance, world famous TNEs like Intel, HP, and Bell invested high-tech projects in Pudong 
New Area. Up to 1997, around 50 per cent of foreign invested projects in Pudong New Area 
were High-Tech. Meanwhile, foreign invested projects were shifted from traditional services 
sectors (such as office building, hotels, restaurants, entertainment centres) to new sectors, 
including finance, international trade, retailing and wholesaling, real estate management, 
design, investment and technology consulting firms, and other services sectors.
(2) Four function zones of Pudong New Area had been developed to a high level
Pudong New Area is featured with four function zones: Lu-Jia-Zui Financial and Trading 
Zone, Jin-Qiao Export Processing Zone, Wai-Gao-Qiao Bonded Area, and Zhang-Jiang High- 
Tech Park. Each of these four function zones has a different focus of attracting foreign 
investment, and was successfully developed to a high and international level. The Table 6.3 
below highlights these four function zones about their main features and 
development/achievements in foreign investments based on the data up to 1997.
Pudong New Area's development and opening up also followed the strategy of "collectively 
developing with Puxi". That is, Pudong's development would be backed up by Puxi's strong 
economic, technological, and talent resources. On the other hand, Puxi's further development 
would be benefited by learning Pudong's experience of developing and opening up (liu, 
1994).
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Table 6.3 Main Features and Achievements of Four Function Zones in 
Pudong New Area
Zone Feature Development/Achievement
Lu-Jia-Zui 
Financial & 
Trading Zone
1. China's only zone as such; 2. situated at the 
east bank of Huangpu River, close to the west 
side of the River where it is part of Shanghai 
city centre, and a number of big Chinese banks 
are well-established; 3. occupying an area of 28 
square kilometre; 4. aim of the zone is, together 
with Puxi - the other side of the River, to be 
developed as an international financial and trade 
centre
1. the Zone had been established and 
shaped as the "Golden Triangle" by 189 
modern high buildings around that were 
set up by foreign and Chinese investors.;
2. These modern buildings were used by 
companies from over 60 countries as 
business offices, ranging from trading 
companies, financial firms, regional 
headquarters, and business centres, etc.
Jin-Qiao 
Export- 
Processing 
Zone
1. China's only such zone; 2. Four major 
functions: export-processing, trading operations, 
business services, and people's living; 3. Aim of 
the Zone: establish an export-processing system 
based on the combination of middle level of 
export-oriented strategy and high level of 
import-substitution strategy.
1. 302 projects were invested, of which, 
164 were foreign invested, involving 18 
countries/regions; 2. Majority of world 
large TNEs located in Pudong was in this 
Zone; of which, 21 TNEs were listed on 
the "Fortune" of 1996, including GM, 
Coca-cola, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp, 
Ricoh, Siemens, Bell, International 
Digital (UK), and Philips, etc.
Wai-Gao-Qiao 
Bonded Area
1. China's first and largest such zone; 2. 
Established on the basis of international standard 
of "Free Trade Zone"; 3. Businesses conducted 
in the Zone ranged from entrepot trade, export- 
processing, storage, to port and financing 
services.
3,100 investment projected made, with 
total value of US$ 3.8033 billion; of 
which, 2,059 projects were foreign 
invested, with total value of US$ 2.864 
billion
World biological medicine giant 
Roche Group set up 6 branches in the 
park; 2. Motorola set up a software area 
within the Zone.
Zhang-Jiang
High-Tech
Park
1. Key areas for research & development 
included: modern medicine science, 
microelectronics, and IT. 2. In terms of IT, 
priority was given to Networking, software, and 
digital communications projects.
1.
(Source: Yuan Qi, 20 Years of China's Open Policy, 1998, Zhongzhou Ancient Literature Press, Zhengzhou 
City, China).
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Pudong New Area was emerging strongly to be a modern downtown in Shanghai and China 
(Qi, 1998):
Its GDP was increased from 7 per cent in the 1980s to around 10 per cent in the 
1990s. Pudong New Area is 1/12 of Shanghai's total size, and its population accounted for 
1/10 of Shanghai's total. However, in Shanghai's total in 1997, Pudong's GDP accounted for 
1/6, gross industrial output accounted for 1/5, exports accounted for 1/4, and inward foreign 
investment accounted for 1/3.
In addition, Pudong's astonishing development made itself a new and very important 
connecting point between Shanghai and the rest of China, and between China and the rest of 
the world. In fact, in July 1992, two years after opening up of Pudong, China's State Council 
decided to open five cities along the Yangtze River, which were Chongqing (formerly a city 
of Sichuan province, granted the status of municipality in 1997 by the central government), 
Yueyang (Hunan province), Jiujiang (Jiangxi province), and Wuhu (Anhui province). These 
cities were offered to enjoy the Open Coastal Policies. At the same time, 15 further cities 
were opened to enjoy the same policies, which included 4 boarder cities and 11 capital cities 
in China's inland areas.
Pudong New Area was growing strongly, and leading the way for further development of the 
Yangtze Valley area, and the rest of China. Pudong was also leading the whole country to 
open to the outside world and helping to get China's overall opening pattern finalised (Wang, 
et. al, 1995).
6.3. Three Important Political Events and Three Years of FDI Boom 
Between 1992 - 94
As discussed early in this chapter, China's FDI had moved into a new development era - 
from the period of Permitting Western FDI to the period of Promoting It in 1986 when the 
government promulgated "22 Articles" to encourage FDI. However, "June 4" Tianmen 
political incident in 1989 brought in a big question mark on the Chinese leadership: whether
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or not the country would continue its open policy, since FDI was dropped after the incident. 
The government's positive efforts to revive FDI and the recovery of FDI proved China's 
consistency of moving on its already chosen direction. Foreign investor's confidence was 
restored soon after the political statement was made by Deng Xiaoping - then Chinese 
political leader - on his south China tour in early 1992, and the declaration of the adoption of 
a market economy by the 14th National Congress of Chinese Communist Party in October 
1992. These above two events not only successfully clarified the Chinese government 
position over the open door policy and removed worries, doubts and concerns of foreign 
investors, but also led China's door to be opened much more widely (more geographical 
locations were granted to open to foreign investment, which led to the overall open pattern of 
China being established) and much more deeply (various business sectors were allowed to 
open to foreign investment). This new open situation led to a dramatic FDI boom for three 
years between 1992 and 1994.
6.3.1. "June 4" Tiananmen Event in 1989 and Its Impact on China's FDI Development
China's FDI saw a surge for thirty months during the period between January 1987 and June 
1989, after the government started to promote FDI 1986 by issuing "22 Articles" in October 
1986; both the number of agreements signed and the value of these agreements were raised 
sharply. The number of FDI projects signed had gone up by 400 percent, and the value of 
these projects had increased by 67 percent, compared with the figure in January 1987 (Seo, 
1993).
However, the "June 4" Tiananmen Incident caused significant destruction of the above 
achievements (Li and Li, 1999), and FDI further development was largely affected (Fan, 
1992).
"June 4" Tianmen Event and Its Causes
"June 4" Tianmen Event was seen as "the massive student movement" (Li and Li, 1992, p. 
65), which began with "a full social crisis in May 1989" (Soe, 1993, p. 119). The 
demonstration of Chinese students and civilians in Tianmen Square of Beijing city centre 
eventually led to a crackdown by the military forces on June 4, 1989.
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This event started with economic difficulties. Inflation, which began in 1985 when the index 
of urban cost-of-living rose by 11.9, reached a very high level in late 1988, when the cost-of- 
living index in the city increased 30 points over 1987. The serious economic situation led the 
whole country to economic chaos: people rushed to the bank withdrawing their money and 
panicked to do the shopping. The central government responded by announcing anti- 
inflationary policies in September 1988, aiming at slowing down the economy. Several 
measures of economic retrenchment were taken, including tightening Renminbi (Chinese 
currency) credit, taking a toll on existing joint ventures. These policies led to severe economic 
difficulties in the early of 1989 (Soe, 1993).
In addition, along with China's opening up to the outside world, the Chinese people were 
being greatly influenced by western ideas, values, philosophy and culture that were blocked in 
the country before. Moreover, growing corruption and lack of social justice led to a strong 
desire of more democracy and political reform of the country (Li and Li, 1999).
Effects of "June 4" Tiananmen Event
Consequences of "June 4" Tiananmen Incident were various and enormous:
Western countries, including United States, Japan, and Western European countries 
announced political and economic sanctions against China (Fan, 1992).
Foreign loans were suspended. These included an eight-year loan from the world 
bank, amounting to USDS.5 billions (USD3.4 billions was interest free); the Japanese 
government decided to delay a new seven-year loan of USD5.8 millions in June 1989 (Soe, 
1993).
In terms of FDI, although the majority of existing foreign investors did stay in China, 
they either reduced production or delayed new investment. For example, both Peugeot S A and 
Pepsi-Cola Inc planned to expand their joint ventures in south China, but the "June 4" 
Tianmen Incident led them to postpone their new commitments; the five American companies 
that were included in Fortune-500 enterprises initially planned to invest as much as a total of
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USD650 millions, but four of them finally decided to cancel their plans (Seo, 1993). Some 
foreign investors moved their investment away from China to Southeast Asian nations (J Li 
and F Li, 1999). Little new FDI was made in China after the "June 4" Tiananmen Incident, 
apart from a small number of FDI projects that were ready to be finalised at that time. The 
number of new FDI agreements signed and the value of these agreements in the second half 
of 1989 dropped 11.3 per cent and 11.4 per cent respectively, compared with the first half of 
the year (Fan, 1992).
Implications of the "June 4" Event
After the "June 4" Event took place, researchers gave different explanations about the 
implications of the event. Some believed that this event "signalled that China was reverting to 
the old system", and leading to "the foreign investors confidence in the economic 
restructuring of the new China rapidly wasted away" (pi20, Seo, 1993). In addition, this 
event even "marked a new phase of China's open door policy", as "the top leader in China 
realised that a wide range of political, social and ideological issues associated with the open 
policy needed to be reassessed" (Li and Li, 1999, p. 64).
Some argued that the "June 4" Event .... "for a moment it seemed that China would close its 
doors to foreign investment. But that prospect did not materialise" (Fu, 2000, p. 50).
In fact, soon after the event, the Chinese government made a number of great efforts in order 
to minimise the damage, to renew the confidence of foreign investors, and to continue its 
open door policy (Fan, 1992; Fu, 2000).
Firstly, the State Planning Commission of China arranged 400 millions of Chinese RMB yuan 
to foreign invested enterprises. This served as emergency loans to support these enterprises' 
investment to the fixed capital, so that they could alleviate their severe financial difficulties 
derived from the retrenchment policy.
Secondly, in April 1990, the Joint Ventures Law was revised. The improved terms and 
conditions of the Law over foreign investors included: 1. The Chairperson of the board could 
now be elected, rather than having to be Chinese; 2. The duration of the venture became
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flexible, depending upon the strategic plans of the venture, rather than being fixed between 10 
and 30 years; and 3. The venture was not to be nationalised by the local government, only if it 
became absolutely necessary, but full compensation would be paid (Fan, 1992).
More notably, the State Council, in October 1990, announced a big decision - to develop and 
open up Shanghai Pudong New Area (that has been discussed in detail in the early part of this 
chapter). This brave move was actually "lightened and encouraged" by Deng Xiaoping who 
made it very clear that "the country must be courageous and accomplish new things to show 
to the world that we are sticking to the open policy" (Fu, 2000, p. 51).
In the meantime, the situation was moving positively in China's way.
The government successfully restored the social and political order. In addition, for their own 
political and economic interests, Western governments started to play down the "June 4" 
Tianmen Incident and to re-establish their relationship with China in July 1990. For example, 
the Japanese government announced the release of its loan of 810 billions of Japanese yen; 
and a year later, in 1991, several major western leaders paid official visits to China, including 
Mr James Baker, the then American Secretary of State, Mr Miyazawa Morihiro, the then 
Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. John Major, the then British Prime Minister. These visits 
resulted in the removal of Sanctions they imposed on China, and their continuation of co- 
operation with China's economic reforms and open door policy. This later led the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank to resume their loans and financial aids to China. 
Moreover, Western countries' attention was no longer focused on China, and actually their 
attention was shifted away to the issues of the collapse of the old political systems of Eastern 
European countries and former Soviet Unions, and the Gulf Crisis after Kuwait was invaded 
by Iraq (Fan, 1992).
As a result, economic recovery started to get underway, and the effects of the "June 4" 
Tianmen Event on China's FDI development receded. In 1990, FDI was gradually growing: 
approved new FDI contracts was 7,276 with a value of USD6.567 billion; actually used FDI 
in the same year was USD3.4 billion. Contract value and actually used value of FDI 
introduced to China increased 23 percent and 17 percent respectively, compared with the 
previous year. A further rise occurred in 1991 (up to August), new FDI programmes were
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7,280, with agreed amounts of USD6.374 billions, and actually used amounts of USD2.321 
billions, increased by 44 percent, 45 percent and 23 percent respectively over the same period 
of the previous year (Fan, 1992).
In conclusion, it is true that the Chinese government paid huge costs for the "June 4" 
Tianmen Crisis, which contributed to a fall in foreign investor's confidence in their 
investment in China. However, it cannot be ignored that it was the severe inflation before the 
"June 4" Incident that played a major part in leading China to social and political chaos, then 
to the "June 4" Incident. There was a misunderstanding from foreign investors over Chinese 
retrenchment policy that was adopted in September 1988, aiming at bringing down the 
inflation rate from 18.5 per cent in 1988 to 10 per cent in both 1989 and 1990. This policy 
involved cutting down the investment and money supply in order to slow down the economy, 
but instantly put foreign invested companies in financial difficulties. This was mistakenly 
thought by foreign investors as a sign of China's change in its open door policy, especially as 
the "June 4" Tianmen Incident happened to take place after the retrenchment policy became 
effective (Fan, 1992). The fact is that the Chinese government had made every effort to prove 
itself to be sticking to the open policy by taking a number of measures, including opening up 
Shanghai Pudong for foreign investment, making positive changes in the Joint Ventures Law 
by improving terms and conditions for foreign investors, etc. It is therefore fair to say that the 
Chinese government had no intention of changing its open door policy, and that the "June 4" 
Tianmen Incident cannot be regarded as a new phase or turning point in terms of China's FDI 
policy change. In addition, the "June 4" Tianmen Event proved itself to be a "short-lived" and 
unexpected incident, compared with the mainstream of China's open door policy and its FDI 
development (F Li and J Li, 1999).
6.3.2. Impact of Deng Xiaoping's South China Tour and The 14th National Congress of 
Chinese Communist Party on China's FDI Development
In 1992, two important political events took place in China. One was Deng Xiaoping's South 
China tour in early 1992; the other was the 14th National Congress of Chinese Communist 
Party that was held in October. Both events had significant impact on China's further FDI 
development.
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Deng Xiaoping's South China Tour and the 14th National Congress of Chinese 
Communist Party
As discussed in Chapter 5, China made a historic change in late 1978 when western FDI was 
permitted to be introduced to the country. Since then China had received a growing number of 
FDI. However, many Chinese were still worried about the role FDI played in Chinese 
socialist construction. That is, since China was a socialist country, FDI could do harm to the 
Chinese economy, as it came from western capitalist countries. These worries and concerns 
affected the Chinese policy-makers who had adopted a very cautious approach to dealing with 
FDI activity, and this indeed led to a slow pace of FDI development in the country (Hu and Ji, 
1994).
In addition, the sudden collapse of former Soviet Unions and Eastern European countries put 
big pressure on the Chinese leadership, who were concerned that China could be affected by 
the capitalist "peaceful evolution" from western countries, including the introduction of 
western FDI (Fu, 2000).
FDI in China therefore could not move forward quickly before these political and ideological 
beliefs were removed. Deng Xiaoping, then Chinese political leader, launched a political 
activity by visiting a number of cities in south China, including Wuchang (in Hubei 
province), SEZs of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and Shanghai, in early 1992. He argued against 
these beliefs when he talked to local officials, "being afraid of the capitalist influence causes 
China's slow pace of reforms and opening to the outside world. He claimed that the criterion 
to distinguish the socialist from the capitalist should be: 1. whether or not the socialist 
productivity can be developed; 2. whether or not the overall national power of the socialist 
country can be strengthened; and , 3. whether or not the living standards of Chinese people 
can be improved" (Ji, 1998, p351).
Deng Xiaoping's remarks successfully clarified the confusion and doubt over the open door 
policy and the introduction of western FDI.
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In his tour of south China, he also challenged the traditional definition of the socialist 
economic system. This system was interpreted as a planned economy based on social 
ownership in Third Plenary Session of the 12th Communist Party of China in 1984; in the 13 th 
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the system was developed as a socialist 
commodity economy based on internal harmony between planning and market, Deng 
Xiaoping pointed out, market could not simply be seen as equal to capitalism, as capitalism 
did make use of the planning in some way. Likewise, the planning could not be seen as equal 
to the socialism, and the socialism could also make use of the market (Li and Li, 1999).
Deng Xiaoping's idea on the relationship between the market and the planning had broken 
through the traditional socialist beliefs and laid a theoretical foundation for a fundamental 
change of the Chinese economic system. That is to say, in October 1992, the 14th National 
Congress of Chinese Communist Party announced to the world that the aim of China's 
reforms was to "establish a socialist market economy" (p.73).
China's shift from the planned economy to the market economy led the country to move 
towards the way of the market economy. As a result, various market systems were being 
established, including the production materials market, the financial market, and the labour 
market, etc; these markets were really necessary for foreign invested companies to conduct 
their businesses in China (Hu and Ji, 1994). The market was playing a more important role in 
the country's economic development. For example, the planning proportion in the total 
national industrial output was going down to 6 per cent in 1994, from 70 per cent in 1979 (Li 
and Li, 1999).
Deng Xiaoping's remarks and ideas in the South China Tour in 1992 were regarded as "the 
Second Liberation of People's Thought", if the first one was to get the Chinese to accept the 
Western FDI in 1979. This new liberation immediately led various markets to be established, 
and the pace of economic reforms and activities of opening to the outside world to be 
accelerated. This finally led to three years of FDI boom in China between 1992 and 1994 (Ji, 
1998).
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6.3.3. Three Years of FDI Boom Between 1992 and 1994
China's economy and FDI successfully recovered from the "June 4" Tiananmen Incident after 
the country took effective action to overcome the economic and political difficulties and to 
stick to the open door policy. Deng Xiaoping's south China tour and the 14th National 
Congress of Chinese Communist Party in 1992 put the country on a fast gear to the 
development road, which finally brought China into a three-year FDI boom from 1992.
This boom had generated several historical records and created a number of important 
features of FDI development in China.
Historical Records of FDI Development in China
- In terms of China's introduction of all forms of foreign investment, foreign loans - one of 
the indirect foreign investment forms - had been a dominant form (accounting for 60 per cent 
of the total value of China's introduction of foreign investment) before 1992. Since 1992, 
however, the total value of actually used FDI, for the first time, has overtaken that of the 
indirect foreign investment, and become the dominant form of China's introduction of foreign 
investment (Ji, 1998).
In 1993, China became the second largest FDI receipt country, next only to the United 
States (Xing, 1998). In other words, China was the largest FDI receipt country in terms of 
whole developing countries, and this position had stayed every year for 14 years since 1993 
(Pang, 2003).
In 1992 alone, the actually used value of FDI in China was equal to that actually used in 
previous three years from 1989 to 1991 (Ji, 1998); and the total number of agreements signed 
and the value of the agreements in 1992 were almost half of those in the previous 13 years 
from 1979 to 1991 (Hu and Ji, 1994).
Total value of FDI agreements and actually used value of FDI for three years between 
1992 and 1994 were 4.8 times and 3.1 times respectively more than some of those in the past
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13 years from 1979 to 1991 (Li, 1995). Table 6.4 below lists the annual FDI figure in terms of 
the number of FDI project, agreed value and actually used value of FDI.
Table 6.4. Inward FDI in China from 1979 to 1994
Unit Price: USD 100 millions
No. of FDI 
Projects
Agreement 
Value
Actually 
Used
Value
1979- 
86
7819
191.8
65.9
1987
2233
37.1
23.2
1988
5945
53.0
31.9
1989
5779
56.0
33.9
1990
7273
65.7
34.1
1991
12978
119.8
43.7
1992
48764
581.2
110.1
1993
83437
1114.4
275.2
1994
47490
814.1
337.9
Total
221718
3033.1
955.9
(Source: Li, "Principles of China's Utilisation of Foreign Investment", 1995)
Important Changes of FDI Development in China
In addition to the above historical records generated by the FDI boom between 1992 and 
1994, the boom had also brought in several important features of FDI development in China.
Growing number of FDI source of countries
From the 1980s until the early 1990s, major FDI players in China were from Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, and a few from other counties only played a minor role in China's FDI 
activity. From 1992, the number of countries and regions that invested in China rose sharply. 
Up to 1994, over 130 countries/regions invested in China. Notably, western countries started 
to invest in China seriously (Wang, et al, 1995). Take America and Japan for example. Not 
until 1992 did American FDI in China become significant. In 1992, its actually invested FDI 
value in China, for the first time, exceeded USD500 millions. And its actual FDI in the
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following year reached beyond USD2 billions. Before 1992, Japan was not enthusiastic to be 
involved in direct investment in China, and it invested a small scale of projects with low level 
of technology. Two factors affected the Japanese attitude towards their investment in China in 
the early 1990s: 1. China's stability of political and economic environment and consistence 
of following the open door policy; 2. Products made in China by American and European 
invested ventures started to compete strongly against Japanese products in the world market, 
which made Japan feel a threat. In 1993, the Japanese began their participation in China's 
FDI much more seriously. Some world electrical giant firms established their factories in the 
country, including Sony, Toshiba, and National, etc (Hu, 2003).
Major Transnational Enterprises (TNEs) Pouring into China
Before 1992, little FDI was made by TNEs as China's FDI was gradually growing. Instead of 
involving themselves in FDI, the majority of TNEs in China set up their representative 
offices, selling their products and technology to the country. From these companies, China 
purchased a large number of consumer products and production facilities, including the whole 
set of a production line. For example, for the TV production line alone, China imported over 
100 such lines (Ji, 1999).
According to a survey by Zhile Wang (1996) on 30 German and Japanese TNEs on Fortune- 
500 List, only two - Japanese Sanyo and German Volkswagen - of these 30 TNEs made 
significant FDI in China. Sanyo set up six enterprises in Shenzhen; and Volkswagen 
established two joint car ventures, one of which was in Shanghai, the other was in 
Changchun. All other 28 firms either took a wait-and-see approach, or invested a couple of 
small-sized projects. Not until 1992 did TNEs start to pour into China. Some of them that 
never invested in China before now actively took part in FDI there; some of them that 
previously had small amount of investment raised the number of FDI projects. Table 6.5 
shows the sharp rise in 30 German and Japanese companies, in terms of the number of FDI 
projects in three years between 1992 and 1994, compared with the previous years.
174
Table 6.5. 30 Japanese and German TNEs Investing in China 
by Number of FDI Projects from 1980 to 1994
Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
No. of FDI Projects
0
1
0
1
5
4
1
4
Year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
No. of FDI Projects
2
7
5
5
16
37
69
(Source: "Investment of Transnational Corporations", Zhile WANG, 
Economic Press of China, Beijing, 1996)
Up to 1994, over one hundred of the world's top TNEs invested in China. Among the 
American's 500 largest TNEs, 52 of them had FDI in China, involving over 80 projects with 
agreement value of USD3.6 billions, which accounted for around half of the total FDI value 
made by American investors in China. 15 out of 20 Japanese companies, which were the 
world largest 100 companies, invested in China, including National, Hitachi, Toshiba, Sanyo, 
NEC, Fujitsu, Mazda, and Toyota. 10 out of 15 German enterprises, which were included in 
the world's largest 100 manufacturers, had FDI projects in China, including Volkswagen, 
Siemens, Bayer, Basf, and Hester. This marked the first wave of TNEs' investing in China 
(Ji, 1999).
More Sectors/Industries to open for FDI
FDI in the 1980s was mainly concentrated on manufacturing sectors, particularly in product 
processing sectors, and the tertiary industry (i.e., services industry) was restricted for FDI. For 
example, domestic commercial sectors (retails and wholesales), foreign trade, and advertising 
industry were forbidden for FDI (Wang, et al, 1995).
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Since 1992, more sectors and industries had been gradually opened up for FDI. Several 
sectors and industries that were previously forbidden for FDI were now allowed to introduce 
FDI on an experimental basis. For example, the new policy allowed: 1. foreign investors to 
operate retailing and wholesaling industries in the form of a joint venture or a wholly foreign 
owned enterprise; 2. foreign firms to run foreign trade in certain open regions; 3. foreign 
financial institutes to set up a bank with a Chinese partner, or on their own in coastal open 
cities. Sectors and industries that were previously restricted for FDI were now permitted to 
open further. These sectors and industries ranged from land development, real estate 
development and management (including regeneration of old urban areas), restaurants and 
hotel development and management, and information and consulting services (Hu and Ji, 
1994).
Moving towards the overall opening up of the whole country to the outside world. 
Before 1992, China's opening up was concentrated on coastal cities and regions where a 
number of cities were given favourable policies for FDI by the central government, which led 
to the majority of China's FDI being located there. This along the sea opening up strategy was 
adopted in the view that these coastal cities had location advantage - they were relatively 
developed areas with established infrastructure, educated labour forces, and experience of 
international business. This strategy proved to be successful in the sense that the country 
managed to receive a good number of FDI, which helped to upgrade the economy of these 
opened areas (Zhao, 2001).
However, on the other hand, this strategy did not help China's less developed inland areas to 
improve their economy, and therefore made the gap of their economic differences even larger 
(Peng, 2003). Soon after Deng Xiaoping's south China tour at the beginning of 1992, China's 
State Council took action to open up the inland areas of the country. This new opening up 
adopted a new strategy, which in fact puts these inland cities and areas in a similar position to 
coastal open cities, as now these two different kinds of locations were given the same 
favourable policies that were originally given to the coastal areas, and the divide between 
these two areas could be improved (Hu and Ji, 1994; Fu, 2000). See Table 6.6. for details of 
this opening up.
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Table 6.6. New Opening Strategy for China's Inland Areas
Date Areas Policy
From 9th March 
to 30th July 
1992
Opening Up Along the Border Cities:
13 border cities were opened up. They were Heihe City and 
Suifenhe City in Heilongjiang province, Huichun City in Jilin 
Province, and Manzhouli City and Erlianhaote City in Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region, Pingxiang and Dongxing in 
Guangxi Autonomous Region, Wanding, Ruili and Hekou in 
Yunnan Province, Yining, Bole and Taicheng in Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region
These border cities were given 
more power to operate border trade 
with neighbouring countries and 
deal with issues of foreign 
economic co-operation.
pnning on 
30th July 1992
Opening Up Along the (Yangtze) River:
Chongqing City, Yueyang City, Wuhan City, Jiujiang City and 
Wuhu City - these 5 port cities along the Yangtze River were 
opened, and half year later on 18th February 1993, Huangshi - 
a further city along the River was opened.
These cities were offered the 
favourable policies that 
applied to Coastal Open Cities
As above Opening Up Provincial Capital Cities:
18 capital cities of inland provinces were opened, including 
Hefei City (Anhui Province), Nanchang City (Jiangxi 
Province), Nanning City (Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region), Changsha City (Hunan Province), Zhengzhou City 
(Henan Province), Shijiazhuang City (Hebei Province), 
Taiyuan City (Shanxi Province), Huhehaote City (Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region), Xi'an City (Shaanxi 
Province), Changchun City (Jilin Province), Harbin City 
(Heilongjiang Province), Yinchuan City (Ningxia Autonomous 
Region), Lanzhou City (Gansu Province), Xining City 
(Qinghai Province), Mulumuqi City (Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region), Chengdu City (Sichuan Province), 
Kunming City (Yunnan Province), Guiyang (Guizhou 
Province).
Like the above port cities along 
the Yangtze River, all these capital 
cities enjoyed the special policies 
initially only given to the open 
coastal cities.
From 1992, 
after the first 
Bonded Area in 
Shanghai in 
1990.
13 more bonded areas were established:
These further 13 bonded zones were located in Futian and 
Shatoujiao (in Shenzhen City), Tianjin Port (in Tianjin City), 
Dalian City (in Liaoning Province), Guangzhou City (in 
Guangdong Province), Qingdao City (in Shandong Province), 
Zhangjiagang City (in Jiangsu Province), Ningbo City (in 
Zhejiang Province), Fuzhou City and Xiamen City (in Fujian 
Province), Shantou City (in Guangdong Province), Haikou 
City (in Hainan Province).
Enjoy same preferential policies as 
in Shanghai bonded area
(Source: Hu and Ji, 1994).
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This new dramatic opening up also shaped China's open pattern - from south (coast) to north 
(coast), from coastal areas to inland areas. This finally led to the whole country opening up to 
the outside world (Hu and Ji, 1994).
6.4. Overall Assessment and Major Problems of China's FDI Development 
During 1986 -1994
6.4.1. Overall Assessment
As discussed in the opening part of the chapter, "22 Articles" of the 1986 Provisions marked 
another turning point of China's FDI development - from permitting FDI to Promoting FDI. 
During the period of FDI promotion, the Chinese government comprehensively liberalised its 
foreign investment systems in order to encourage more FDI to be introduced to the country 
(Lardy, 1995). The liberation included taking effective measures to resolve the problem of 
foreign exchange balance for foreign invested enterprises, to improve operating conditions 
and provide more attractive incentives and greater authority for their management issues. 
Meanwhile, the government improved the legal system by making the Law for the wholly 
foreign owned enterprise (WFOE) in 1986 and the Law for the contractual joint ventures 
(CJV) in 1988, which meant, together with the law for the equity joint venture (EJV) being 
issued in 1979, that now all legal frameworks were being made available for these three major 
types of FDI in China. Moreover, in 1988, the government took a brave step to open up the 
whole Hainan Island as a special economic zone - China's fifth special economic zone by 
offering it full provincial status and separating it from Guangdong province (Qi, 1998).
The dramatic policy development brought the country a thirty-month FDI boom until 1989, 
when the "June 4" Tiananmen political incident occurred. This event led to severe worldwide 
political and economic sanctions over China, including withdrawal and suspension of FDI 
projects in the country. The Chinese government, however, made every effort to successfully 
turn the difficult situation by developing and opening up of the Shanghai Pudong New Area 
in 1990, and two years later in 1992 opening up the whole country for FDI, and changing the 
Chinese economic system from a planned economy to a market economy. These significant
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changes clearly indicated that the country was still well on the track of opening up. According 
to the Economist (21, May, 1994), to assess China's investment environment in terms of the 
political stability and the economic and investment potential of all nations, China's risky 
rating was improved to 25 in 1992 from 35 in 1989, and was regarded as a less risky country 
for foreign investment. China's stable investment environment and the market potential 
therefore greatly boosted foreign investors' confidence, and led China to a tremendous FDI 
surge for three years between 1992 and 1994.
The boom generated several historic records of China's FDI development: (a) since 1992, in 
terms of the value introduced to China, FDI has overtaken foreign loans, and become the 
most important form of China's introduction of foreign investment (Xing, 1998); (b) since 
1993, China has constantly become the largest FDI receipt country of the developing 
countries, and the world's second largest FDI receipt country, next only to the USA (Xing, 
1998); and (c) actually realised value of FDI in three years between 1992 and 1994 was 3.1 
times more than the total value of FDI in the past 13 years from 1979 to 1991 (Li, et at, 
1995).
According to Sun (1995), then Deputy Minister of China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, the overall performance of FDI development in China was deemed by 
the government to be a success:
FDI had played an important role in the fast growth of China's economy. For 
example, in 1994, FDI China received accounted for 13 per cent of the total amount of 
China's fixed investment (which was only 2.3 per cent in 1985) (Zhao, 2001). This made an 
important contribution of 11 percent to China's high economic growth rate.
Western technology and products made by foreign invested enterprises in China had 
changed people's work and life style and lifted their living standards, especially advanced 
electronic products.
Western FDI had also helped to train many Chinese entrepreneurs who learned the 
advanced and effective operations techniques and management skills from their foreign 
partners in a venture.
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Foreign invested enterprises provided an important job opportunity for the Chinese. 
By 1994, around 14 million Chinese people worked in foreign funded enterprises.
Foreign invested firms contributed more and more revenue to China. In 1992, they 
contributed 10.7 billions of Chinese yuan, but the figure was increased to 20.6 billions in 
1993, and 39 billions in 1994.
Foreign funded companies had become a major player of China's exports. In 1994, 
their exports accounted for as much as 28.7 per cent of China's total exports, which is much 
higher than that in 1985 when it was only 1.1 per cent (Zhao, 2001).
6.4.2. Major Problems
As discussed above, Chinese continued positive approaches and policies over FDI between 
1986 and 1994 did successfully attract a record number of FDI, and made the country one of 
the most important FDI receipt nations in the world.
On the other hand, however, the government, as well as researchers, started to have a 
thorough review of China's FDI development during 1986 and 1994, in order to identify 
some guidelines for the further development of its FDI (Pan, 1997).
It was generally agreed that the general picture of China's FDI development was still 
unbalanced, and some fundamental problems of China' FDI remained critical, notably, the 
quality of FDI was still unsatisfied, although the FDI quantity had reached the peak in the 
history of China's introducing FDI (Chen, 2004; Li P, 1995; Li L, 1995).
The unsatisfactory quality of FDI was regarded as a low level of FDI structure in terms of 
FDI's scale, industrial distribution and geographical distribution, source countries/regions of 
FDI, and type of the projects (Pan, 1997; Chen, 2004). These problems relating to FDI 
quality are discussed below.
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Problems of FDI Quality
Small scale of FDI: generally speaking, the advanced FDI projects usually came on a 
larger scale. For example, in the middle of 1990s, the average FDI scale by world major 
TNEs was around USD6 million, while the average scale of 70 per cent of China's FDI was 
under USD1 million, and the average scale of FDI projects made by 300 largest foreign 
invested enterprises in China was still under USD5 million. FDI projects that were over 
USD 10 million only accounted for 4-5 per cent of China's total FDI projects (Chen, 2004).
The Majority of FDI was from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan
The Table 6.7 below shows that the majority of China's FDI came from Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan, and actually used FDI from these regions accounted for 77.1 per cent of China's 
total FDI between 1979 and 1993.
Table 6.7. Source of China's FDI Investors (1979 - 1993)
Unit Price: USD100 million
Investors
HK & Macao
Taiwan
USA
Japan
Others
Total
Agreed amount
1472.7
184.3
146.5
89.3
276.3
2169,1
Percentage in 
Total ( % )
68
8
7
4
13
100
Actually Used 
Amount
385.1
50.1
57.7
51.9
19.7
564.5
Percentage in 
Total (%)
68.2
8.9
10.2
9.2
3.5
100
(Source: Financial Times, 20, May, 1994).
China felt disappointed about the small percentage of FDI that came from developed nations 
- only 10.2 per cent from the USA, and 9.2 per cent from Japan, as FDI from these countries 
was seen as good quality and big scale (Pan, 1997).
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By contrast, FDI from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan was mainly small scale and low 
quality, such as the simple processing industry that made toys, leather products and textiles 
(Jia, 1997).
Poor Industrial Structure
Table 6.8 shows that between 1979 - 1994, in terms of value, FDI in China was concentrated 
on the manufacture sectors, which accounted for 56 per cent of total value of FDI projects. 
Within these sectors, many FDI projects belonged to light industry, textile industry, and 
electronic and processing industry with low technology. Even for the electronic industry, 70 
per cent of its FDI projects were labour-intensive. In the whole manufacturing sectors, one 
fourth of FDI projects were highly polluted and energy-inefficiently-consumed, which caused 
a serious environmental problem (Chen, 2004).
FDI projects belonging to the tertiary industry accounted for 39.5 per cent, but 78 per cent of 
which was labour-intensive and capital-intensive, such as real estate, hotel development, and 
tourism projects. FDI projects in the first industry only accounted for 4.5 per cent, but 
covered China's weak but priority areas of agriculture, and infrastructure (such as power, 
transportation, and communications (Pan, 1997).
Table 6.8. Industrial Distribution of China's FDI between 1979 - 94
Type of Industry
First Industry
Secondary Industry
Tertiary Industry
Total
No. of Projects
13058
168749
39911
221718
Percentage in 
Total
5.9
76.1
18.0
100.0
Agreed Value
135.4
1696.6
1198.1
3033.1
Percentage in 
Total
4.5
56.0
39.5
100.0
(Source: Pan, 1997)
182
Unbalanced FDI Distribution of Geographical Locations
According to the custom of dividing different geographical locations of China, the whole 
country can be divided into three different regions: East Region, Central Region, and West 
Region. East Region covers cities and provinces along or near the coastal lines, including 
cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and provinces of Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. The Central Region covers inland China between 
the north east and central part of the country, including provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, 
Shanxi, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, and Jiangxi. 
The West Region mainly covers border areas between the west and northwest part of China, 
including Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, Gansu Province, 
Qinghai Province, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Shaanxi Province, Sichuan Province, 
Chongqing City, Yunnan Province, and Guizhou Province (Chen, 2004).
Most of the East Region was more developed than the other two regions, therefore it was 
decided by the government to be the first opened up to the west in order to make sure FDI 
would be attracted. This open strategy proved to be rather successful as most of China's FDI 
was successfully introduced to that region, and foreign investors also preferred to take 
advantage of the convenience of the coastal location, established infrastructure and better 
quality labour forces of this region, as well as taking advantage of favourable policies being 
offered by the government (Xiao, 2002).
However, this open strategy inevitably led to a bigger gap of economic development between 
the East Region and the other two regions - Central Region and West Region. Even after the 
open policy was eventually extended to these two regions in 1992, and China therefore saw 
three years of FDI boom between 1992 and 1994, FDI was still largely concentrated on the 
East Region. For example, the overall ratio of China's FDI from 1979 to 1994 in three 
different regions is 79 per cent for the East Region, 16 percent for the Central Region, and 4.3 
per cent for the West Region. In 1994 alone, four provinces and one city - provinces of 
Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Shanghai City within the East Region accounted 
for 64.7 per cent of national total value of actually used FDI. The government was very 
concerned about this big divide between Chinese different regions (Pan, 1997).
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What causes the above unbalanced picture of China's FDI development - rapidly growing 
quantity, but low quality of FDI? Much of the research concluded that the major factor that 
contributed to the low quality of FDI in China was the pattern the government adopted to 
introduce FDI. That is, China attracted FDI mainly by using the preferential policies to 
foreign investors, and got these policies applied to the gradually opened locations and 
economic sectors (Xiao, 2002). In addition, the Chinese central government's preferential 
policies were misinterpreted and misused by Chinese local governments and by those who 
involved in FDI activity, including those located in the Central Region and the West Region 
of China to which the open policy was extended in 1992 (Lardy 1995; Yang, 1999).
Outcome of China's Preferential Policies on FDI Development
As stated early, the government's primary strategy to introduce FDI between 1979 and 1994 
was to offer various preferential policies (see these policies in details from Table 6.7 below) 
to foreign investors, which were, in the early years of China's open door, only made available 
for Special Economic Zons (SEZs), Coastal Open Cities (COCs), and were finally extended 
to the whole country, following the open policy that was developed from the coast part of 
China to the rest of the country (Lardy, 1995; Xiao, 2002).
The preferential policies the Chinese government offered to foreign investors were mainly tax 
deductions and the tax break. For example, the ordinary corporate income tax for the foreign 
invested enterprise was 33 per cent (including 3 per cent of local tax), which was similar to 
the rate of many developing countries, but was much lower than the rate imposed on Chinese 
local enterprises. But for foreign invested enterprises located in SEZs, or involved projects 
with large scale and in China's priority industrial areas, lower tax rates of 24 per cent and 15 
per cent were offered. In addition, foreign invested enterprises could enjoy a tax holiday for 2 
years, followed by 50 per cent tax off for another three years (after the year they made 
profits), if they committed themselves to China for 10 years or longer, and involved in certain 
business areas. Some foreign enterprises were even offered the tax holiday for as long as five 
years, and another five years of 50 per cent tax off. Moreover, foreign invested enterprises 
also enjoyed tariff exemption for importing office facilities and production materials from 
abroad for their operation in China (See the Table 6.9 for China's preferential policies in 
more detail) (Xiao, 2002).
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These preferential policies proved to be very practical and effective, as they played a vital role 
in introducing FDI into China in the initial years of its open policy, and in promoting the large 
and recorded number of FDI into the country since 1992 (Xing, 1998; Zhao, 2001). When 
China opened to the outside world, its leaders were aware the country did need to provide 
some incentives or to make some concessions to foreign investors, in view of the fact that the 
country had to make certain of success in bringing in western FDI as the country was still 
weak in its investment environment and could somehow be compensated by providing 
preferential policies (Xing, 1998). These offers were therefore seen as the cost for the country 
to pay for launching its open policy and learning from the west (Xing, 1998; Yang, 1999).
However, after three years of FDI boom between 1992 and 1994, the focus of attention to FDI 
- from both the Chinese government and researchers - was shifted from its quantity to its 
quality, as FDI quantity did not seem to be a major concern any more; while FDI quality 
turned out to be a disappointment (Pan, 1997).
The negative impact of the preferential policies on FDI development was seriously reviewed, 
especially for the three-year FDI boom period when these policies were over used and 
misused (Zhao, 2001):
The preferential policies were misused by Chinese partners of the joint venture: In 
order to take advantage of these favourable policies, the Chinese partners - who were from 
Chinese state-owned or collectively owned firms - were desperate to find a foreign partner to 
form a joint venture. They therefore "generously" gave away a lot to the foreign partner. For 
example, they devalued the fixed capital they invested to the joint venture, and deducted the 
proportion of their equity in the venture so as to "encourage" the foreign partner to set up the 
venture with them. This led to the loss of the property owned by the state or by the local 
community. Another way was to overvalue the foreign partner invested assets that allowed 
them to gain more equity and therefore to share more profits in the future. This also led to the 
sacrifice of the state or the local community (Pan, 1997).
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Table 6.9. List of China's Major Preferential Policies for FDI Makers
Favourable Corporate Income Tax
Rate Application
1. Ordinary Tax
Rate:
33%
This rate is applied to all ordinary foreign invested enterprises (FEIS), which was about 
same as many other developing nations and regions, but lower than China's local 
enterprises.
2. Most Favourable 
Rate:
15%
(1) FIES located in SEZs; (2) Manufacture FIEs located in Economic and Technological 
Zones; (3) Hi-Tech and New-Tech Enterprises located in Hi-Tech & New-Tech 
Development Areas; (4) FIEs involving building up ports and yards; (5) FIEs investing 
over USD 10 millions and operating over 10 years; (6) Chinese governments approved 
tech-intensive and capital-intensive FDI projects; (7) FDI projects over USD 30 millions 
but with a long investment return period; (8) Energy and transportation FDI projects,
3. Medium 
Favourable Rate:
24%
(1) FIEs located in Coastal Economic Open Areas; (2) Manufature FIEs for Cities Along 
the River and Along the Border and Provincial Capital Cities; (3) FIEs located in National 
Tourism Zones
Tax Holiday and Tax Discount (Corporate Income Tax), and Tax Return
4. Tax Holiday and 
Tax Discount
(1) "2 years of tax free, plus 3 years of half tax" - Manufacture FIEs operating for more 
than 10 years, beginning from the year of making profits, the first two years of tax free, 
followed by three years of 50 per cent tax off (FIEs with advanced technology were given 
three further years of half tax; FIEs having 75 per cent of products for exporting, half tax 
duration was allowed for extension); (2) "5 years of tax free, plus 5 years of half tax" - 
FIEs involving building ports and yards, with duration over 15 years; for FIEs involving 
industry of agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry, or located in under-developed 
areas, they were allowed to enjoy 10-30 percent of tax off after initial 10 years of tax 
concessions.
5. Tax Return FIEs got 40 per cent of their paid corporate income tax returned if they reinvested by using 
their profits (no matter investing to the existing or new venture).
Favourable Tariff and Business Consolidated Tax
6. Tax free for 
particular imports 
and exports
(1) Import tariff free and Business Consolidated tax free for production materials that were 
used to produce exports; (2) Business Consolidated tax free for exported products, except 
crude oil and ready-for-use oil; (3) Goods that was imported as part of foreign investment, 
including facilities, meters, etc, was free from tariff and consolidated tax.
(Source: A Study on FDI of Transnational Enterprises, 2002, Wuhan University Press, China).
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Recycled FDI: Many Chinese firms took advantage of the preferential policies by 
registering a company abroad, then recycling it back to China as their overseas fund that was 
"disguised as foreign investment". According to the World Bank, this recycled amount of 
"FDI" accounted for as much as 25 per cent of China's total FDI in 1992 (Lardy, 1995; Pan, 
1997).
Keep setting up new ventures: A foreign invested enterprise that was offered a tax 
free break for two years, followed by another three years of 50 per cent tax off. Before this 
treatment ended, they formed a new venture either by closing down the existing one or by 
transferring most of the funds from the existing venture, to start enjoying the tax holiday and 
discounted tax again. According to the author's interview record in 1997, a director of a shoe- 
making joint venture in Foshan City, Guangdong province, who admitted that they now had 
two ventures after the first one being founded five years ago, the second one was just 
established a few months ago with most funds transferred from the first one. Now the second 
one was happily enjoying the preferential policies, although the first one would soon 
disqualify to enjoy the policy. This was the strategy many foreign invested enterprises 
followed (Lin, 1997).
Regional competition of offering better preferential policies to foreign investors: 
Beginning in 1992, the government extended its open policy from the East Region to the 
Central Region and the West Region, which made the preferential policies available to the 
whole country. This immediately led to a dramatic nation-wide race for FDI between less 
developed regions and more developed regions, and in particular, between less developed 
regions themselves. This race was out of control as the preferential policies were seriously 
misused (Kueh, 1992). In order to attract more FDI to their territory, many local governments 
offered much improved preferential policies to foreign investors, which was beyond the 
permission of provincial and central governments. For example, they offered foreign invested 
enterprises additional duration of tax holiday (additional 5-10 years after initial 5 years), and 
additional duration of discounted tax (additional 5-10 years of 50 per cent tax off, after 
initial 5 years). To the higher level of governments, sound quantity of FDI introduced by the 
local governments and their officials meant the better performance of their dealing with FDI 
(Chen, 2004). Strong enthusiasm for FDI from the central government and intense race for
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FDI from the local governments made FDI very popular to the whole nation, as long as the 
investment was seen as foreign investment, such investment could receive superior treatment 
unconditionally, which put foreign investors in a position to bargain for a much better deal 
(Xing, 1998).
As a result of the preferential policies being misused and overused, and the nation-wide race 
for FDI, a number of serious problems were generated.
Problem 1: great loss of the government tax income. China's standard preferential policies 
already gave foreign invested enterprises special treatment at the cost of giving away much of 
its tax revenues. The policies being misused and overused led the government to lose much 
more of its income from the tax. (Yang, 1999).
Problem 2: all levels of local governments only aimed at introducing as many FDI projects 
as possible into their regions, and they were reluctant to follow their development strategy 
based on their local strengths. This led to many FDI projects being identical and repeatedly 
introduced (Chen, 2004).
Problem 3: The race for FDI led to many low quality and small scale FDI projects being 
introduced; in other words, the government had failed to attract good quality FDI they 
planned by offering foreign invested firms the preferential policies. The reason being, the 
preferential policies were only seen as unstable and short-term measures. For world leading 
companies such as transnational enterprises, they mainly paid attention to the overall 
investment environment of a host country (e.g. a host country's political and economic 
stability, quality of local labour forces and infrastructure, etc) when they planned to make 
FDI, as they followed a long-term investment strategy. Foreign firms involving hi-tech areas 
follow the same strategy of making FDI. This was why, under the preferential policies, mainly 
those foreign firms that were small scale, low-tech, and pursued quick return of their 
investment can be attracted, because they followed a short-term strategy (Pan, 1997).
In conclusion, China's introduction of FDI by relying on offering preferential policies to 
foreign investors inevitably generated the above problems. These problems logically formed
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an important feature for China's FDI as quantity-expended, rather than quality-oriented (Pan, 
1997; Xing, 1998).
6.4.3. China's Move to Directing FDI and Withdrawing the Preferential Policies
After a three-year FDI boom between 1992 and 1994, which was accompanied by poor FDI 
quality due to misuse and overuse of the preferential policies, the central issue of China's FDI 
development was shifted from raising FDI quantity to improving FDI quality, and the existing 
role of the preferential policies on FDI development was seriously questioned (Xiao, 2002; 
Chen, 2004).
FDI researchers overwhelmingly agreed that it was the time for China to propose a new 
strategy to introduce FDI to replace the existing one - largely relying on the preferential 
policies, since the country already received large amounts of FDI, and since these preferential 
policies had failed to bring in good quality FDI to China (Xing, 1998; Yang, 1999).
Some claimed that more attention should now be given to the improvement of China's overall 
investment environment, such as: (a) removal of bureaucracy of local authorities, so as to 
deliver quality services for foreign investors; (b) making the government policy transparent, 
so as to help foreign investors to make a long-term strategy based on complete information 
available and full understanding of the Chinese government policy; and (c) improving 
infrastructure (especially for the central region and the west region), economic system 
(speeding up China's transformation from the planned economy to the market economy), and 
legal system (e.g. Contractual joint venture was running in the absence of implemental 
measures for the law on contractual joint venture, which was available in September 1995) 
(Pan, 1997).
Some argued that the preferential policies were still useful and effective, but the government 
needed to set strict condition for foreign invested enterprises to make use of them. These 
conditions should help to guide foreign investors to invest in China's priority regions (such as 
the central region and the west region), and in the priority industrial sectors (such as hi-tech
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sectors), and FDI projects that could improve the infrastructure (such as roads, ports and 
power station) (Xing, 1998).
Some pointed out that offering foreign investors the preferential policies was against the 
principle of "the National Treatment (foreign investors are treated as equally as local firms)", 
as doing this created a superior platform for foreign invested enterprises to compete against 
their local counterparts - Chinese local enterprises, which made the competition unfair for 
Chinese local firms. Local firms had to pay twice as much tax to the government, which made 
their life much harder. The preferential policies indeed provided the foreign investors a 
"Superior National Treatment" in this regard. Having had this special treatment, foreign 
invested enterprises were still not happy with their treatment relating to their operation 
aspects. For example, they had to pay higher price for purchase of local production materials 
and services, because of the dual price system (production materials were controlled by the 
government and two different prices for similar materials were set: local state-owned 
companies paid a lower price for the material, while the foreign invested enterprises had to 
pay a higher price for the same material). This price discrimination on foreign invested 
enterprises was also against the principle of "the National Treatment", which was known as 
"Inferior National Treatment" (Yang, 1999). However, in comparing the gains the foreign 
invested enterprises obtained from their superior treatment and the loss they received from 
inferior treatment, foreign invested enterprises actually gained more and lost less, and they 
were still in a better position to compete with Chinese local firms. To make the competition 
fair to both foreign invested enterprises and Chinese local enterprises, offering foreign 
invested enterprises "the National Treatment" seemed to be an ideal solution (Zhang, 1996).
To these important issues relating to China's FDI further development, the central 
government and its officials reacted very promptly. Li Langqing, then China's Vice Premier 
in charge of China's foreign economic activities urged the local governments to give up ways 
to attract FDI - relying on the preferential policies, and to replace them by introducing "the 
National Treatment", so that an equal operating environment can be created for both foreign 
and Chinese firms. He also urged the foreign investors to adjust their investment strategy in 
China, to change it from a low level short-term strategy to a long-term strategic partnership, 
and to invest their technology to gain China's market share (He, 1995).
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Substantial action was taken by the central government. On June 20, 1995, then State 
Planning Commission, the State Economic & Trade Commission, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Economy, Trade & Cooperation jointly promulgated "Provisional Regulations Guiding 
Foreign Investment", and "Industrial Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment". These two 
documents provided the foreign investors with guidelines and requirements when they 
planned to invest in China's certain industrial areas. To guide FDI, the Catalogue listed three 
different industrial areas with different policy treatment: FDI-encouraged industrial areas, 
FDI-restricted industrial areas, and FDI- forbidden industrial areas (these two documents and 
their impact on FDI will be discussed in detail in the next chapter). For the first time, the 
Chinese government comprehensively adopted a selective approach to FDI (Xiao, 2002).
___ 
j.U
Three months later, FDI, as a major issue, was discussed in the Fifth Plenary Session of 14 
Central Party Committee, and two important principles were concluded by the Session, which 
was included in the published document by the Session:
1. Introducing FDI to China shall follow the principle of "positive, justified, and effective", 
which implied that the quality of FDI, not the quantity of FDI, would become the first priority 
for FDI further development in the country (Zhang, 1995).
2. The government would "gradually offer the National Treatment to foreign invested 
enterprises", which aimed at providing a fair competition environment for both foreign and 
Chinese firms, and also aimed at meeting the requirements of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) as China was making efforts to join WTO (Zhao, 2001).
As a first important step to move to the National Treatment, on December 28, 1995, the 
China State Council took a very bold action by announcing that from 1 st April 1996, new 
foreign invested enterprises no longer enjoyed tariff free treatment for their importing of 
production facilities and production materials (Chen, 2004).
All the above significant FDI policy changes marked a new turning point of China's FDI 
development - from FDI promotion to FDI management (Brecher, 1995). Also, the approach 
the Chinese government adopted to make this historical policy change was different from the 
one in 1986. At that time, the government adopted a "reactive" approach, as it was forced to
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make an urgent and fundamental policy change, reacting to the foreign investors' complaints 
and severe situation of FDI further development. The significant policy change this time, 
however, was based on a "proactive" approach, as the government took the initiative to make 
this big decision, in the hope that FDI could play a better role in developing Chinese economy 
and helping the country to move towards internationalisation (Li and Li, 1999).
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CHAPTER 7 
From Promoting FBI to Managing FBI (1995 - 2000):
An Evaluation of the Third Period of China's FDI Development
7.1 Introduction
As discussed in the last chapter, since 1986, the Chinese government adopted a new approach 
- promoting FDI by issuing "22 Articles", so as to replace the approach of permitting FDI. As 
a result of this, China's inward FDI started to increase dramatically, especially after Deng 
Xiaoping's South China Tour in early 1992, when China saw a three year FDI boom between 
1992 and 1994.
The government had mixed feelings for the sharp rise of FDI. On the one hand, the rise was 
seen as a sign of success in the government policy of promoting FDI; on the other hand, 
however, serious problems were explored, such as the central government policies on 
promoting FDI being misused or misinterpreted by the local governments that made every 
effort to attract FDI to their governed areas, which led to a large amount of low quality and 
disguised FDI being poured into the country.
In order to improve the quality of FDI and use FDI to promote China's priority industrial 
areas and sectors, on June 20, 1995, the State Planning Commission, the State Economic & 
Trade Commission, and the Ministry of Foreign Economy, Trade & Cooperation jointly 
promulgated "Provisional Regulations Guiding Foreign Investment", and "Industrial 
Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment". These two documents provided the foreign 
investors with guidelines and requirements for them to invest in certain industrial areas of 
China.
Notably, the "Catalogue", for the first time, gives environmental issues the special 
consideration, as the Chinese government has growing awareness of: (a) China is paying 
higher cost to introduce some highly polluted industries via FDI, as a result of relocation of 
these industries by western countries (Wheeler, 2001); and (b) China's existing
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environmental problems are worsening along with large proportion of highly polluted FDI 
projects (e.g. 8 out of 10 most polluted cities in the world are located in China, and only 37 
per cent of the surface water monitored meets the national standards and less than 20 per cent 
of municipal wastewater is treated) (Qin, 1999). Thus, the "Catalogue" requires all kinds of 
FDI projects to follow the principles of environmental protection: (a) for the encouraged 
projects, the Chinese government particularly welcomes those skills which can protect 
environment; (b) for restricted projects, the government is very strict to approve the those 
which may cause environmental problems; (c) for forbidden projects, the government 
disallows any projects which pollute the environment and damage natural resources; and (d) 
for permitted projects, the government requires the projects have no pollution or little 
pollution but with measures to deal with the pollution (Environmental Paper of China, p.3, 
28, August 1999)..
Three months later, FDI, as one of the major agendas, was discussed in the Fifth Plenary 
Session of 14th Central Party Committee, and the Party Meeting announced that the 
government would "gradually offer the National Treatment to foreign invested enterprises", 
which aimed at providing a fair competition environment for both foreign and Chinese firms, 
and also aimed at meeting the requirements of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as 
China was making efforts to join WTO (Zhao, 2001). As a first important step to move to the 
National Treatment, on December 28, 1995, the China State Council took a very bold action 
by announcing that, from 1 st April 1996, new foreign invested enterprises would no longer 
enjoy the tariff free treatment for their importing of production facilities and production 
materials (Chen, 2004).
These significant policy changes marked the third turning point of China's FDI development 
- China no longer simply promoted FDI, but managed FDI by setting up a clear legal system. 
This system enabled the government to select FDI projects based on its longer-term national 
economic strategies, and to gradually open more industries and sectors, and to gradually bring 
an equal treatment for FDI based on international requirements from WTO.
It can be seen that the Chinese government adopted a different approach to make the policy 
change this time from the previous one. For the previous turning point - from permitting FDI 
to promoting FDI, the Chinese government was passive and not well prepared to make an
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emergent policy change, in order to overcome the severe difficulties the foreign investors 
underwent to take part in FDI in China, and to keep their confidence. However, this time, the 
government adopted a "proactive" approach, and took the initiative to make the big policy 
change, as they were well prepared, and they had clear aims to make such a change, that is, 
letting FDI play a better role in developing the Chinese economy and helping the country to 
benefit from the globalisation (Li and Li, 1999).
During the period of China's managing FDI since 1995, the government still found it hard to 
balance up between FDI quality and FDI quantity, the FDI distribution between east China 
and central and west China. The government was also frustrated with the difference between 
the expected outcome of FDI policy change and actual result of the policy shift. During this 
new period of managing FDI, serious national debates took place on the issues of the 
relationship between increasingly growing FDI and the strong emergence of large numbers of 
world top transnational enterprises in China and its impact on the development of Chinese 
national economy, etc. The government overcame the difficult period, moved on towards the 
direction it planned, which paved the way for the country to join the WTO in 2001, and to 
merge the tax law of foreign invested enterprises and the tax law of Chinese enterprises in 
2007.
Overall, this chapter will review major policy changes and their impact or effectiveness on 
China's FDI further development. Specifically, after this section of the introduction, Section 
2 will examine the effectiveness of "Provisional Regulations Guiding Foreign Investment", 
and "Industrial Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment", as well as the effectiveness of the 
government policy change over the tariff free treatment for importing of production facilities 
and production materials. Section 3 will assess how the "national treatment" is interpreted 
and followed by the government over foreign investors, and China's FDI policy change in 
relation with joining WTO. Section 4 will discuss then hot and key theoretical and practical 
issues including the increasingly strong growth of transnational enterprises in China and its 
impact on development of Chinese national enterprises, and Section 5 will examine the 
imbalanced FDI development between the east part of China and the west and central part of 
China. Section 6 will summarise overall features and performance of FDI development 
during the new period.
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7.2 Effectiveness of Changes of Chinese Policies
7.2.1. Issue of "Provisional Regulations Guiding Foreign Investment", and "Industrial 
Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment"
As discussed in the last chapter, some major problems in relation to China's introduction of 
FDI were explored, especially during the period of 1992 - 1994, when the country saw a three 
years of FDI boom. These problems included : (a) China lacked a clear industrial 
development policy; (b) For FDI received, technologically advanced and export-oriented 
programmes only accounted for a small proportion; (c) A majority of FDI was processing 
projects, and mainly sold locally in China; (d) The estate development projects were growing 
too soon; and (e) the rapid rise of luxury entertainment projects (Wen, 1995).
In order to improve the FDI industrial structure, on 28 June, 1995, the State Planning 
Commission, the State Economic & Trade Commission, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Economy, Trade & Cooperation jointly promulgated "Provisional Regulations Guiding 
Foreign Investment"., and '''Industrial Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment" (Chen, 2004). 
The Chinese government, for the first time, published these policies in the form of 
government regulations, which raised the policy transparency of the government, and 
improved the investment environment (Wang, 1996).
The "Catalogue" classified FDI projects into four different types: encouraged, permitted, 
restricted, and forbidden (permitted was not listed in the catalogue, which meant all projects 
that were not listed in the catalogue were restricted) (Chen, 2004). Encouraged industries for 
FDI were those China's major bottleneck industry, high-tech and new-tech industry and 
export-oriented industry. Restricted industries consider the relationship between the demand 
and supply of products of the industry and the development status of a Chinese national 
industry. An industry became restricted, when the supply of products was more than the 
demand, or an important national industry was growing but it was still in an infant stage. The 
forbidden industries included those that the country believed may harm the national security 
(such as arms industry) and social development (such as heavily polluted industry and sex
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industry, etc) (Zhao, 2001). Table 7.1 below provides detailed information about these three 
types of industries.
Table 7.1. Summary of Major Industries/Projects In the Catalogue
Type of 
Industry/Projects
Encouraged
Restricted
Forbidden
Industries / Projects of the Type
(1) New-tech agriculture, transportation, important material industries; (2) 
High-tech, New-tech, Advanced tech, energy and material saving, New 
facilities and new materials that lack supply of locally; (3) Promoting 
demand of international market, upgrading product quality, developing new 
market, and promoting exports; (4) Resources regenerated, and pollution 
prevented tech and facilities; (5) Good use of labour force and resources in 
the Central and West parts of the country, as well as in line with the 
country's industrial policy; and (6) Other projects encouraged by laws and 
regulations of the country.
(1) Technologies that already domestically develop or are being introduced 
externally, production capacity is sufficient domestically already against the 
market demand; (2) Introduced to the country at the experimental stage; (3) 
Exploring and developing of rare and precious metal resources; (4) Under 
the government planning; and (5) Restricted by the laws and regulations of 
the governments.
(1) Harming the national security and public interests; (2) Polluting 
environment, destroying natural resources, and harming human health; (3) 
Occupying substantial land, and bad for protecting and developing land 
resources, or harming military facility's safety and usage; (4) Using Chinese 
traditional and special skills; and (5) Forbidden by the laws and regulations 
of the country.
(Source: Chen, 2004).
The promulgation of the "Provisional Regulations" and the "Catalogue" is the milestone of 
China's FDI development - as it signaled that:
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- China no longer relies on the preferential policies to promote FDI. Instead, the government 
would encourage FDI by improving the operating environment, gradually opening its 
domestic market, and lifting restrictions on FDI operating areas (Wang, 1996):
- The priority of China's FDI policy was shifted from the location-oriented to the industry- 
oriented, and;
- China would pay more attention to the quality effectiveness of FDI and guide FDI, in order 
that FDI introduced is in line with the country's macro adjustment and industrial policies (Yu, 
1996).
According to Yi WU (1995), then Chinese vice premier, the promulgation of the "Provisional 
Regulations" and the "Catalogue" indicated that, instead of merely promoting FDI, China 
now started to manage FDI by directing it based on the country's industrial policies and 
macro-economic development planning. However, at the same time, China was gradually 
opening up more investment areas and industries, in order to meet the requirements to join 
WTO. For example, the "Catalogue" enlarged the inclusion of the encouraged type of FDI, 
some forbidden projects, now became restricted; some restricted projects, now became 
permitted. Many sectors, industries and projects were listed as encouraged for the first time, 
including wasteland, barren hills, hydro-junctions, local railways, city underground and light 
railways, roads, civil airports, nuclear power stations, new type of energy, ethylene, 
construction and operation of patrol and gas pipes, civil aircrafts, airplane engines, 
manufacture of civil satellites, micro-electronics, biological engineering, and consultancy of 
national economy and technological information. Some became restricted from the previously 
forbidden, including air-transportation, retail and wholesale, goods distribution, foreign trade, 
extraction and melting of precious non-metal mines, extraction of diamond and other gems 
(Wang, 1996).
China's policy change - managing FDI by making regulations and directing FDI into certain 
industries and sectors, hit the FDI growth immediately, especially for FDI from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan, the top FDI sources, who were losing momentum as the transfer of 
labour-intensive production to mainland China slowed down. The share of these three 
economies' cumulative FDI inflows had dropped from 72 per cent in 1993, to 63 per cent in
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1995. A question was therefore raised as to "is China's FDI growth sustainable?" (China 
Economy & Trade, Spring, 1996).
The Chinese government moved on with opening up more areas for FDI, rather than taking 
care of concerns from investors of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, as the government stuck 
to the strategic aim - meeting WTO's requirements in order to join it. In 1997, the revised 
"Catalogue" was published which saw many more areas and sectors opened up for FDI, 
ranging from China's strategic areas of transportation and logistics, telecommunications, and 
extracting and developing mineral products, to nationally important service sectors of banks, 
insurance, foreign trade, accounting firms, law firms, and retailing. Now, over 100 foreign 
banks from 38 countries established offices, and 25 foreign invested banks were permitted to 
operate the transaction of Chinese currency; foreign trading companies were set up on 
Chinese - foreign joint venture basis in Shanghai and Shenzhen, and foreign invested 
retailing stores were established in 11 Chinese cities. As a result, only very limited industries 
and sectors remained unopened to foreign investors, including the press industry, arsenal 
manufacture, broadcasting and film and video industry, Chinese traditional and special 
industry, etc (www.chinaacc.com, 2006-7-28).
7.2.2. Withdrawal of the Exemption of Tariff and Taxes on Imported Equipment and 
Raw Materials
On 18, December 1995, the State Council announced important policy changes to custom 
duties, that is, to withdraw preferential import tariff policies, including a notable withdrawal 
of the exemption of tariff and taxes on imported equipment and raw materials which were 
counted in the total capital of the foreign invested enterprise. This new policy would become 
effective from 1 April 1996, which meant any new established foreign invested company, 
would have to pay normal import tariff and related import taxes for their imported equipment 
and raw materials in the total amount of their investment in China. However, a foreign 
venture established before 1 April 1996, would still enjoy the exemption for one or two more 
years (Guangdong Grand Economy and Trade, 1997).
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For this symbolic policy change, Sun Zhenyu, then Chinese deputy minister of Ministry of 
Foreign Economy & Trade explained with great confidence why the policy was changed and 
that this change would affect foreign investors:
- Tariff cut was the important requirement of China accession of WTO. China's withdrawal 
of the exemption of the tariff and import taxes would actually be accompanied by the 
significant cut of import tariff - cut of 30 per cent of 35.9 per cent of China's import tariff. 
Since the import tariff was dropped, the withdrawal of the exemption of the tariff and import 
taxes became reasonable:
It was anticipated that the withdrawal would add some burden on foreign invested 
enterprises, but would be limited, as (a) the government gave a transfer period of 1 - 2 years 
for the existing foreign invested companies; and (b) the government would leave all other 
preferential policies unchanged, including corporate income tax of 24 per cent for coastal 
open cities, and 15 per cent for Special Economic Zones, and tax discount and tax holiday for 
three years and two years respectively still applied to FDI in agriculture, and hi-tech projects, 
etc.
It was also anticipated that the change of the policy might bring concerns and doubt of 
foreign investors over the certainty of Chinese investment environment. However, it was 
believed that the tariff matter would not be served as a deciding factor, as the majority of 
foreign investors doing business in China were motivated by its huge market potential, rapid 
economic growth, and stable political environment (Sun, 1996).
It was unfortunate that the reality was different from the government's expectation. The 
withdrawal of the exemption of the tariff and import taxes indeed resulted in foreign 
investors' worries and concerns of certainty of Chinese FDI policy (Li, 1997).
Take Guangdong province alone as an example where there had been more FDI introduced 
than any other provinces of China. FDI introduction appeared to be growing in the early part 
of 1996 before the policy change, and to be dropping immediately right after the policy 
change. Foreign investors were very actively finalising the deal in the first four months of 
1996, in order not to miss the last boat of the "preferential policy". The committed value of
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FDI signed in the first four months was USD 9.034 billion, accounting for 51.8 per cent of the 
all agreements of the whole year. From May 1996 when the tariff exemption expired, fewer 
foreign investors were enthusiastic to commit themselves in China's FDI, the number of 
agreements signed dropped month by month. The average monthly value of the agreements 
signed in the eight months between May and December of 1996 was USD 1.052 billion, 
which was only 46.6 per cent of the monthly average value between January and April when 
the average monthly value of agreed FDI was USD 2.256 billion. Both the number of FDI 
agreements signed and the amount committed dropped, compared with the same figures of 
the previous year - year 1995. In the whole year of 1996, the number of FDI agreements 
signed was 5,955, down 36.3 per cent compared with year 1995; the value of new agreements 
in 1996 was USD17.446 billion, down 33.2 per cent over 1995. The realized value of FDI in 
1996, however, was 14.9 up over the previous year (the realized amount was from the 
previous years of agreements. It would, however, be going down following fewer agreements 
signed (Guangdong Statistical Information, 1997).
The withdrawal of the exemption of the tariff for foreign invested enterprises' equipment and 
raw materials also severely hit the confidence of Japanese companies investing in China. In 
1996, new agreements of FDI from Japan dropped 32.4 per cent over 1995, although the 
realized FDI value increased 18.4 per cent. According to a questionnaire survey conducted by 
Japan-China Investment Promoting Society in 1997, 47 per cent of Japanese enterprises 
claimed that China's policy change had an impact on their operating in the country (China's 
Foreign Investment, 1997).
Statistical Information published on 7, April 1997 by China State Statistical Bureau showed 
that both the number of newly committed FDI projects and its agreed amount dropped. The 
newly approved number of FDI projects was 24,556, with agreed amounts of USD73.28 
billion, down 33.7 per cent and 19.7 per cent respectively over 1995. Following the 
withdrawal of the exemption of the tariff, both newly approved FDI agreements and agreed 
amount were going down. From April to December, the total number of newly approved 
agreements was 1771, down 38.3 per cent over the first quarter of 1996 in terms of its 
monthly average number; from April to December, average agreed monthly FDI amount was 
USD5.1 billion, down 44 per cent over the first quarter of 1996. As for the realized amount 
of FDI, it reached USD3.76 billion, increased 42.4 per cent over 1995 (see Table 7.2).
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Table 7.2 China's FDI in 1996 (on monthly basis)
Unit: 100 million USD
No. of New 
approved 
FDI projects
Comparison of 
same period of
previous year
Agreed 
Amount
Comparison of 
same period of
previous year
Actually used 
amount of FDI
Comparison of 
same period of
previous year
Jan
2038 
apprve 
d
-19.3
71.5
49.9
22.3
19.9
Feb
1655
-17.2
59.3
46.1
23.0
33.0
Mar
4922
77.5
142.6
105.2
34.0
6.3
Apr
2141
-19.0
79.6
134.8
30.7
33.5
May
1708
-41.0
51.7
260
42.7
47.2
Jun
1598
-49.2
51.6
-35.4
50.3
17.3
Jul
1588
-36.8
28.9
-37.9
17.4
-45.3
Aug
1666
-40.0
43.5
-26.6
41.2
36.0
Sept
1600
-28.5
45.4
-41.2
27.5
11.0
Oct
1461
-29.0
41.0
22.2
38.9
19.2
Nov
1657
-44.3
47.3
-54.4
39.6
30.4
Dec
2522
-70.2
70.4
-74.0
49.7
-19.3
(Source: China's Statistical Information, April 1997).
China Statistical Information made it very clear that the main cause of FDI drop was the 
government withdrawal of exemption of the tariff. The drop of FDI in 1996 would affect the 
increase of FDI in the future (China Statistical Information, April, 1997).
The situation was getting worse in Guangdong in the first quarter of 1997 when both the 
newly committed amount of FDI and the realized amount of FDI dropped for the first time in 
the Guangdong history of FDI development (Guangdong Statistical Information, 7, July, 
1997).
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For the unexpected and negative impact of the policy change on FDI further development, Li 
Peng, then China's premier, admitted the obvious reality derived from the policy change, and 
defensively explained that the government had no intention to slow down the growth of FDI, 
but only tried to improve the FDI structure and guide FDI to the areas China gave priority. 
However, China would still provide some preferential policies for FDI projects such as high- 
tech and new-tech projects, and the projects which could compete against other products in 
the international market, etc. (Li, 1997).
Action was followed by the Central government:
- Chinese State Council announced in March 1997 that, the treatment of the exemption of the 
tariff was extended till the end of 1997 (Foreign Investment in China, September 1997).
- In December 1997, Jiang Zemin, then Chinese President, announced that China now 
decided to renew the policy that had just withdrawn, as long as FDI projects were in line with 
China's industrial policies, and would bring China new technology, etc. (Foreign Investment 
in China, December, 1997).
7.3. National Treatment, Preferential Policies, and China's Accession to WTO
As discussed in the previous chapter, China's preferential policies - lower corporate tax rates, 
discounted tax rates and tax holiday, etc - offered to foreign invested enterprises resulted in 
"Super National Treatment"; on the other hand, however, foreign investors received "Inferior 
National Treatment", as they were restricted to entering certain local market and industrial 
areas, and they were asked to pay much more for services charges and production materials 
than Chinese local enterprises. These contradictory policies were causing a growing clash 
with ongoing reforms and further opening up of the country, and were obstacles to China 
gaining accession to WTO (Guo, 2002).
To resolve this contradictory problem, in September 1995, the Chinese leadership announced 
an important strategic decision at the Fifth Plenary Session of 16th Congress of Communist
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Party of China: the country would gradually adopt the policy of the national treatment 
towards foreign invested enterprise, so that an environment of equal treatment and equal 
competition could be established for all kinds of enterprises (China's Foreign Investment, 
November 1995).
Since then, China started to make every effort to progress towards the national treatment. The 
following were the major step-by-step strategies for realizing China's goal:
Gradually withdrawing preferential tax policies for foreign invested companies. For 
example, to begin with, China already decided, from 1 st April 1996, to withdraw the 
exemption of tariff and tax on the imported equipment and raw materials that were counted in 
the total capital of the foreign invested enterprises;
To get foreign invested enterprises included in China's internal foreign exchange 
system for buying and selling foreign exchange;
To let Special Economic Zones (SEZs) get ahead, practise the national treatment 
before it was extended to the whole country, and exercise open policies for services sectors 
(such as finance, tourism, trade, logistics, aviation) before these policies became available for 
the rest of China) (Zhao, 2001).
The national treatment is interpreted in China as a system that provides a foreigner with equal 
civil rights and obligations as a local citizen. The national treatment is applied to the FDI 
field, meaning the equal treatment for foreign investors as local partners (Chen, 1999).
To test out the national treatment, Shenzhen, the China's first special economic zone, was 
selected as the first city to practice the national treatment on an experimental basis. From 1 st 
January 1997, Shenzhen offered the following policies to foreign invested enterprises based 
on local government document, "Notice of Gradually Providing the National Treatment for 
Shenzhen's Foreign Invested Enterprises and Foreigners":
Opening local market to foreign invested enterprises;
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Allowing foreign investors to run imports and exports;
Entirely opening commercial sectors;
Widening business scope for foreign invested financial institutions;
Opening tourism sectors for foreign investors on an experimental basis;
Allowing foreign investors to involve in cargos shipping sectors.
As an initial step, what Shenzhen offered the foreign invested enterprises were two new 
policies: one was the opportunity of selling their products in the Chinese domestic market, 
and the other was to unify the services charges Selling products in the Chinese market was a 
dream for many foreign investors. The opening up of the Chinese domestic market, would 
promote FDI to China, especially attracting large foreign companies, including transnational 
firms. Unifying services charges would make foreign investors feel they were equally treated, 
and also save them a lot of money, as they were charged much more than Chinese nationals in 
charges for travel, hotel, rental, hospital, water and electricity bills, etc. The Shenzhen 
government found the cut in the services charges made a win-win situation, as it boosted 
foreign investors' confidence and enthusiasm for doing business, although their income was 
reduced a great deal. This experience of Shenzhen will be useful to the rest of China in the 
future (Guangdong Grand Economy & Trade, February, 1997).
The above discussion was the issue of "inferior national treatment" of the "national 
treatment", about which the Chinese government was making corrections. Another side of 
the problem of "national treatment" is "super national treatment".
Since the government followed the open door policy in 1979, the foreign invested enterprises 
had enjoyed preferential tax rates, which were far lower than Chinese local enterprises had 
(Chinese local enterprises paid 55 per cent of corporate income tax, whistle ordinary foreign 
invested enterprises paid 33 per cent, those located in open coastal cities paid 24 per cent, and 
those located in special economic zones only paid 15 per cent).
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After the reforms of the tax system in 1994, corporate income tax rate for both foreign 
enterprises and Chinese local enterprises became the same at 33 per cent, in other words, 
instead of bringing up the tax rate for foreign enterprises, the tax rate for local enterprises was 
cut down from 55 per cent to 33 per cent. It seemed now both foreign enterprises and local 
enterprises paid the same tax rate, therefore they seemed to be in an equal position to pay the 
tax. Remember, however, for some foreign invested enterprises, they only paid 24 per cent or 
15 per cent of tax; in addition, some foreign invested enterprises enjoyed discounted tax for 
three years and a tax holiday for two years. Taking all these into account, the actual average 
rate foreign invested enterprises paid was only a little less than 10 per cent. Indeed the foreign 
invested enterprises were very much enjoying "super national treatment".
The effective way to resolve this unequal "super national treatment" is to unify the two 
separate corporate income tax laws - corporate income law on Chinese local enterprises and 
the corporate income tax law on foreign invested enterprises. The law made by the Chinese 
authority on foreign invested enterprises follows a generally favorable principle, that is, as 
long as it is a foreign invested firm, it is eligible to enjoy preferential corporate income tax 
rate. It now became necessary to change this preferential principle to an equal principle, 
following the development of China's establishing the market economy and open policy. In 
fact, it is very uncommon that the separate corporate income law was set up based on 
different investment source countries. Unifying these two different laws will put foreign 
invested enterprises and Chinese firms in an equal position in terms of income tax treatment, 
completely get rid of problems such as "recycled FDI", and "preferential policy competition" 
(which were discussed in the previous chapter), and avoid the clash with rules of the WTO. 
As for the way of attracting foreign investment, a special favorable principle should be 
applied. That is, to set up different corporate income tax rates based on certain priority 
locations and priority industries, rather than based on the investment source country. The 
government recently published "Catalogue" is a new way to direct and attract FDI (Wang, 
2004).
It should be noted that on the way to the "national treatment" for foreign invested enterprises, 
a step by step strategy is important, in terms of satisfying WTO requirements, as
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China is transforming from a traditional planning economy to a market economy, and 
many economic and management regulations, rules, etc, still had elements of the planning 
economy, for instance, the enterprise in China is not yet an independent and equal body in the 
market. Therefore China's pace of moving towards the "national treatment" has to be the 
same as the pace of China's economic reforms and open door policy.
Applying the "national treatment" requires the adjustment of China's national 
development objectives. China has committed itself to open up more services sectors, which 
inevitably leads to the adjustment of industrial policies of the country.
Reviewing three situations when withdrawing preferential tax policies and the "super 
national treatment" over the foreign invested enterprises: (a) consider the demand China 
needed from foreign investment and the tax policy adopted by other neighbouring countries 
over foreign investors. Changing preferential policies in a rush would have a negative impact 
on FDI inflows into China. China's withdrawal of the exemption of the tariff of imported 
equipment and raw materials on foreign invested firms that seriously caused a dramatic drop 
of FDI inflows is a typical example; (b) It would be harmful if the government withdrew the 
preferential policies before they became invalid. Keeping government promise and 
maintaining stable policies are important to keep foreign investors' confidence; and (c) 
Changing preferential policies can be compensated by opening more areas, industries and 
sectors to foreign investors. This will balance the situations, and make a smooth journey for 
China to move towards the "national treatment" and joining WTO (Cai, 2006).
7.4. Threat or Opportunity?
- A National Debate on Increasingly Growing Number of FDI and Transnational 
Enterprises in China
Following strong growth of FDI in China, especially after a three-year FDI boom between 
1992 and 1994, China's FDI moved into a fast growing track. Since 1992, China had 
consistently been the world's second largest FDI recipient country, next only to the US. In 
addition, since early 1990s, a growing number of giant transnational enterprises flocked to
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China to commit themselves with big investment. Up to the end of 1996, around 200 of the 
magazine Fortune listed top 500 transnational enterprises invested in China (China' Foreign 
Investment, February, 1997).
Rapid growth of FDI and a great number of well-known transnational enterprises investing in 
China brought the country's badly needed capital and technology, but also "brought" doubts 
for some Chinese. These doubts included:
Did China have too much FDI? This doubt was based on the fact that the Chinese 
market was occupied by more and more products made by foreign invested enterprises, 
ranging from cars, home electronic appliances, lifts, films, detergents, microcomputers, beers, 
medicines, tyres, to cosmetics and clothes.
Would Chinese national industries be seriously affected? This worry was based on the 
fact that a growing number of Chinese famous and traditional brands were crumpled up, and 
replaced by "foreign" products.
These doubts or worries were developed so seriously that appeals were launched in the 
medium with slogans of restricting FDI, protecting Chinese market, protecting Chinese 
national industries, and protecting Chinese traditional brands, etc. (Ji, 1997).
To agree or disagree these points, Chinese researchers, specialists, and government officials 
concerned, actively involved in an argument focusing on: (1) whether or not FDI in China 
was overheated? And (2) whether or not FDI and transnational enterprises could not co-exist 
with Chinese enterprises?
Those who held a positive viewpoint argued:
(1) The scale of FDI in China is still not big enough:
Firstly, it is true that FDI in China has been growing rapidly, and the country has become the 
second largest FDI destination consistently for several years. However, since China is a big 
country with a large population, China's FDI introduced is still relatively low if counted
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based on per capita. Take 1995 as an example. FDI in China based on per person is USDS 1.5, 
it is USD53 in Thailand, USD110 in Peru, USD124 in Hungary, and over USD200 in Britain, 
America and France. Secondly, China's Ninth Five-Year-Plan (1996 - 2000) has planned to 
invest USD 1,800 billion of fixed capital, USD240 billion is needed for five years based on 
the FDI proportion accounted for total value of fixed capital in 1995. USD48 billion of FDI is 
needed every year, USD 10.5 more every year after 1995. Lastly, China has a large amount of 
personal bank saving (by November 1996, the amount reached around USD500 billion), but 
the large amount of personal saving cannot justify not introducing too much FDI, as (a) on 
one hand, there is a high amount of saving, but on the other hand, the amount of bank's loan 
to enterprises was even more than the saving amount. That means, there is no amount of 
savings left for the nationally planned investment; and (b) China's using FDI is not only for 
resolving the capital shortage, but also for introducing advanced technology, managerial 
expertise, international talents, new products and new market. Generally speaking, developed 
countries don't usually lack funds, but more world FDI takes place among the developed 
nations, the reason being that objective of FDI is the internationalization of production, rather 
than simply the capital movements (He, 1997).
(2) A win-win situation can be produced between the growth of development of FDI and 
transnational enterprises, and the development of Chinese national economy.
- Foreign brand and Chinese brand: Chinese brands cannot be guaranteed to take a 
dominant position when FDI and market economic system are introduced to the country. Take 
a look at drinks in the Japanese market: famous brands include Japanese own made tea - 
Wulong Tea, but also other foreign brands, such as black tea of British brand, and American 
Coca Cola. Even many Chinese brands have a big share of foreign markets, including various 
toys and clothes, etc. It is therefore fair that foreign brands should be accepted as long as they 
have market demand in the Chinese market or they are welcomed by Chinese consumers 
(Zhou, 1996).
During China's introduction of FDI, it is normal if foreign brands defeat Chinese local brands 
during fair competition. It is not right that foreign brands are blamed because of such defeat. 
In fact, Chinese enterprises can take advantage of foreign investment to strengthen and 
develop their brands. There have been many examples of this. The Huizhou TCL Co. Group
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set up a joint venture with foreign investors and generated TCL telephones, TCL colour 
televisions, and TCL mobile phones and TCL laptops, etc. Now TCL has become one of the 
top brands in the Chinese market. Qingdao Haier is another good example. This enterprise 
was a small local private factory, and was near to closing down due to financial difficulties 
(loss of almost USD200,000). After setting up a partnership with German Haier, Qingdao 
Haier grew very strongly. Now, Qingdao Haier is a world famous brand of many electronic 
products. Similar examples include Sino-foreign joint vestures of Chongqing-Qingling, 
Jianshe-Yamaha, Guangdong-Kelong, Shenzhen-Segem, and Jinan-Cowger (Zhu, 1997).
Growing investment in China of the transnational enterprise and the Chinese national 
industry. Like rapid growth of FDI in China, which brings worries and concerns to the 
country, the strong growing investment in China by the transnational enterprises make some 
people worry about the development of the national economy and the safety of the Chinese 
economy, as it is believed that the transnational enterprise is extremely strong, and they are 
taking more and more market share of the Chinese market. According to a survey, sales of 
products made by foreign invested enterprises were only accounted as 7.9 per cent of the total 
sales of China. In terms of market share of some typical products made by transnational 
enterprises, washing powder and detergent accounted for 35 per cent, cosmetics accounted for 
36 per cent, soap accounted for 40 per cent, beer accounted for 20 per cent, carbonic drinks 
accounted for 37 per cent, electronic products accounted for 10 per cent. It can then be seen 
that none of the transnational enterprise-made products dominated in the Chinese market. 
Also according to another survey involving 110 China based transnational enterprises, none 
of these enterprises have dominated the Chinese market (He, 1997). As for the issue of 
Chinese economic safety that may be affected by the transnational enterprise, this sounds over 
pessimistic. As a foreign invested enterprise, their capital investment only forms part of the 
elements of production; other elements, such as labour forces, and land, are controlled by the 
local authorities. In addition, foreign investors are enslaved by the local laws and regulations. 
Moreover, there are a large number of stated-owned enterprises that dominate China's key 
economic areas. Therefore, perhaps foreign investors, rather than local enterprises, have 
reasons to worry about the safety issue, as they are in a weaker position as they run business 
in a foreign land (Zhao,1997).
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Rethinking of Chinese National economy and Foreign invested enterprises. Foreign 
investment is private economy compared with Chinese public economy; it is foreign capital 
compared with the Chinese local one. The question now is if foreign investment can be 
deemed as part of Chinese national economy? Can a foreign invested enterprise be seen as a 
Chinese enterprise? (He, 1997). The traditional concept of the national economy originated 
after the Second World War, which is based on the fact that many developing nations 
obtained independent status from colony governing. This concept recognizes that the national 
economy is based on 100 per cent of local proportion of ownership. Following the deepening 
of the international division of labour, and increasing integration of global economy, this 
concept, however, has to be redefined. Generally speaking, a 100 per cent of the national 
economy no longer exists. Companies like Coca-Cola claims it is not an American company, 
but a global company with its headquarter in America. The bank giant HSBC emphasizes it is 
an international local bank. Foreign invested enterprises should therefore be regarded as 
Chinese enterprises, as they are registered and physically in China, governed and protected by 
Chinese regulations and laws, pay tax to the Chinese government and pay wages to Chinese 
employees (Gong, 1996).
It is true that there are some problems from transnational enterprises while doing business in 
China, such as transfer prices, trying to escape from local government supervision. However, 
if compared to problems with benefits generated by the transnational enterprise, the benefits 
outweigh the problems (Ji, 1996). It is also important to understand that to invest in China is 
a very big decision for the transnational enterprise, which often takes a few years to make. 
The Chinese should treasure this situation (Wang, 1996).
Major benefits the transnational enterprise brings China include: (a) they usually invest in 
high-tech and new-tech industries, which are exactly what the Chinese government mostly 
encourage. China's auto industry and electronic industry upgraded to a higher level is a good 
example of this (Zhou, 1996); (b) investment the transnational enterprise makes is large scale, 
pays special attention to scale of economy, and economic efficiency (Xia, 1995); and (c) The 
transnational enterprise follows the modern enterprise systems, which can help Chinese 
enterprise management and systems to move towards the new ones (He, 1996).
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The debate in China in 1996 about the relationship between FDI, transnational enterprises, 
and Chinese national industry received the attention and active involvement of the Chinese 
officials. In June 1996, China's Society of Foreign Invested Enterprises organized a big 
"Symposium of Strategies of Utilizing Foreign Investment", and over 100 specialists and 
government officials submitted over 80 papers. These papers generally agreed that FDI and 
transnational enterprises investing in China can promote the further development of the 
Chinese national industry. Meanwhile, China's number one party's newspaper, People's 
Daily, published an article, entitled "Firmly Utilising Foreign Investment" (He, 1997).
This debate is also thought to be somehow a repeat of the one that occurred in early 1990s 
when FDI was doubted as an element of capitalism, and those who doubted FDI tried to deny 
China's reforms and introducing FDI (Ma, 1997). The debate ended up with the redefining of 
China's economic ownership structure, and the affirming of China's FDI. In September 1997, 
Jiang Zemin, the then party leader claimed at the 15 th National Congress of Chinese 
Communist Party, "we shall have all-sided understanding of the public economy. The public 
economy is not only composed of state-owned and collectively-owned economy, but also 
composed of stated-owned and collectively-owned elements of a mixed ownership economy". 
The statement clearly affirmed that the foreign invested enterprise belongs to the mixed 
economy which is part of China's economic system, but not a foreign enterprise. Li Peng, 
then Chinese premier, pointed out during the Party's Congress, "Introducing foreign 
investment and developing the fixed ownership economy, will not affect the development of 
Chinese national industry, but promote the Chinese national economy to a higher level" 
(People's Daily, 14th September 1997).
7.5. Issue of Central and West Part of China
In the past 20 years of China's open door, the majority of FDI is located in the eastern coast 
regions, only a little is distributed in the central and west parts of the country. In 1980's, over 
90 per cent of FDI was located in China's coastal areas. In 1990's, especially after Deng 
Xiaoping's south China tour, this divide was slightly improved. Up to 1994, 36,065 FDI 
project were approved in central and west regions, and actual used FDI was USD8.4 billion. 
In the year 1994 alone, 9,229 FDI projects were introduced, and actually used FDI is
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USD4.29 billion. Compared with China's national total number of FDI projects and actually 
used FDI in central and west China only accounted for 16.3 per cent and 8.8 per cent 
respectively. The situation of introducing FDI in the west is even worse that that in central 
China: for example, in China's total, FDI in Ningxia accounted for 0.03 per cent, Xinjiang 
accounted for 0.16 per cent, Gansu accounted for 0.05 per cent, Guizhou accounted for 0.17 
per cent, and Yunnan accounted for 0.21 per cent. In addition, the average scale of FDI 
introduced to the west and the central is not large, is only USD0.847 million, lower than the 
national average, which is USD 1.37 million. The reason for the small average scale of FDI is 
more FDI projects are labour-intensive, and less are involved in infrastructure, services 
industry and agriculture (Luo and Li, 1995).
The important cause for the divide between the east coastal area, and the west and central 
China in terms of the introduction of FDI, apart from the long-time backward economy, poor 
infrastructure and inconvenient transportation and communication, is the unbalanced FDI 
policies offered to these two different kinds of areas. That is, the FDI policies for the east part 
of China, is clearly better than that of west and central China: (a) In terms of investment 
industry, the coastal area has permission to introduce FDI into bank, insurance, retailing, etc, 
but the central and west China does not have that policy; (b) In terms of approval right of FDI 
projects, local governments of coastal regions have the authority to approve an FDI project 
with the value up to USD300 billion; while local governments in the central and west China 
are only allowed to approve the FDI projects with a maximum value of USD 100 billion; and 
(c) In terms of preferential tax rates for foreign invested enterprises, Special economic zones 
and economic and technological development zones enjoy 15 per cent of corporate income 
tax, coastal open cities and zones enjoy 24 per cent; while only capital cities of provinces in 
the central and west area enjoy 24 per cent of corporate income tax rate, tax rate for all other 
areas is 33 per cent (Zhao and Sun, 1996).
Since China was opened to the outside world, its annual economic growth rate on average has 
been around 9 per cent. To maintain this economic development pace, the key is to improve 
the supply of power and energy, and upgrade the infrastructure and other bottleneck 
industries. The central and west part of China is a very important supply base of power, 
energy, and raw materials. Logically, the underdevelopment of the central and west area will 
largely affect the rapid, healthy and sustainable growth of China's economy (Qian, 1996).
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Central and west China has been backward for a long time. However, they have important 
resources potential, all kinds of industrial foundations, unique agricultural and livestock 
farming, low labour forces, and large market. Since China's open door and economic 
reforms, big changes have taken place. For example, the set up of the important railway 
network between Beijing and Jiulong (in Hong Kong), which go through many parts of the 
central and west regions, and hydraulic power network of Yangtze Gorges will greatly 
improve the infrastructure of this region. In terms of introducing FDI, the growth pace is fast, 
but because of low starting point, the proportion of FDI in China's total is still little. It is very 
encouraging that the Chinese government is well aware of the importance of stimulating the 
development of this part of China. A set of preferential policies are offered to this region, 
which include:
Priority is given when the central government provides the government loans and 
makes financial arrangements to this region, especially for the projects of resources 
development and infrastructure construction.
FDI projects of resources processing and labour-intensiveness will be directed to this 
region.
Providing the region with the more flexible industrial and sectoral catalogue, to 
encourage more FDI to move to that area. FDI projects that can take advantage of local 
labour forces and resources will be particularly encouraged. In addition, for some restricted 
FDI projects in other part of China, after government approval, they may become encouraged 
FDI projects in the central and west region.
Giving local government the authority to approve the FDI project with a value of up to 
USD30 billion, instead of USD 10 billion before.
The foreign invested enterprise in this region is now allowed to enjoy same corporate 
income tax rate - 24 per cent - as the coastal open cities.
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Products made in foreign invested enterprises in the region are allowed to mainly sell 
locally, regardless of ratio of exporting products and selling products in the local market, and 
regardless of balance of foreign exchange (Gan, 1996).
The government's new policies for the central and west China produced an effective outcome. 
Some of China's national priority projects attracted many foreign investments, such as 
Xinjiang Tarim oil-gas field, Sanxi oil-gas field, Gansu oil-gas field, and ningxia oil-gas field, 
Qinghai Lijiaxia hydropower station, etc (www.cbwchina.com, 25/05/07). To strengthen the 
policy stability, the government proposed a long-term strategy, that is, to gradually minimize 
the divide between south China and central and west China, and to develop all regional 
economy in a balanced way. Indeed, minimizing the gap of introducing FDI between these 
two regions will help to minimize the gap of economic development between these two 
regions too (Ma, 1996).
The new policy produced positive impact on FDI growth in central and west China. Up to 
2000, the proportion of actually used FDI in this region in the China's total goes up to 14 per 
cent, from 8.8 per cent in 1994 (Jiang, 2002). See Table 7.3 below for details.
Table 7.3. FDI of Accumulative Total Divided by China's Regions in 2000
Unit: USD100 million
Region
East
Central
West
No. of
Projects
292,561
44,580
26,744
% in
China's
Total
80.40
12.25
7.35
Committed
Value
5,835.73
516.49
408.76
% in
China's
Total
86.31
7.64
6.05
Actually Used
Value
2,988.72
305.92
188.82
% in China's
Total
85.80
8.78
5.42
(Source: Jiang, 2002).
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7.6. Overall Picture of China's FDI during 1996 - 2000 
7.6.1. FDI Inflows
During 1996 and 2000, the growth of China's FDI was chiefly affected by two factors: (1) 
significant changes in China's FDI policy; and (2) the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
(1) Significant Changes in China's FDI Policy:
The promulgation of "Provisional Regulations" and "the Catalogue" in June 1995 
encouraged more FDI to be made in China's neck-bottle industries such as 
infrastructure, energy, and transportation. Around 15 per cent more FDI was 
attracted to these fields in 1996 over 1995 (Pang, 2003). In addition, technological 
projects such as electronic and machinery projects rose 11 per cent in 1996 over 
1995. On the other hand, the government restricted real estate projects dropped 
quite significantly in terms of its percentage in FDI total, from 25 per cent in 1995 
to 17 per cent in 1996, (Zhao, 2001).
With the government withdrawal of the exemption of tariff and taxes on imported 
equipment and raw materials in April 1996, the confidence of many foreign 
investors was hit. Many of them, especially those who were from Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Taiwan started to relocate their investment in South-Eastern Asian 
countries. New agreed FDI projects were down significantly in 1996, which 
negatively affected FDI sustainable development in China (Chen, 2004).
(2) The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led to the slowing of China's FDI growth. As a result of 
this crisis, some Korean invested firms in China were closed down, some Japanese 
enterprises withdrew their investment from China, and many investors from South-Eastern 
Asia and Hong Kong either withdrew their existing FDI projects or decided not to invest in 
China for the time being. During that time, the American economy happened to see a 
downturn, which hit American enthusiasm for the investing in China. This resulted in, for the 
first time, negative growth of actually used FDI in China in 1999 (See Table 7.3. for details).
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Table 7.4. China Actually Used FDI between 1979 and 2000
Unit: USD100 million
Year
1979-82
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Actually Used FDI
Value
11.7
6.4
12.6
16.6
18.7
23.1
31.9
33.9
34.9
43.7
110.1
275.2
337.7
375.2
417.3
452.6
454.6
404.0
477.7
Growth (%)
-
-
97.8
32.0
12.8
3.1
38.0
6.2
2.8
25.2
152.1
150.0
22.7
11.1
11.2
8.5
0.5
-11.1
0.9
FDI / GDP %
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.0
0.9
2.4
4.6
6.1
5.3
5.1
5.0
4.7
4.1
3.8
(Source: Zhao,2001).
It can be seen from the Table 7.3 that a decrease in FDI growth rate occurred from 1997 until 
1999. However, the government was still happy to see the quality of FDI being improved. For 
example, world large TNEs were actively involved in China's FDI. Up until 2000, over 400
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TNEs which were on the Fortune list as the world largest 500 TNEs involved FDI in China. 
In addition, during 1996 - 2000, the amount of FDI China had introduced was still regarded 
as significant: the country had absorbed over USD210 billion of FDI, annual average FDI was 
over USD20 billion. Compared with the rest of the world, China was consistently the second 
largest FDI recipient, next only to the US (Yang, 2001).
7.6.2. The Development of FDI Form and FDI Pattern
(1) FDI Form: As mentioned in Chapter 2, among the three major FDI forms in China, 
CJVs were the most popular one from 1979 until 1986 when EJVs overtook their position. 
However, in the period 1996 - 2000, WOFEs were growing so strongly in the country that 
they became the number one FDI form - they started from as little as 1 per cent, and 
developed to 47.61 per cent in 2000, in terms of the amount introduced by all three major 
FDI forms (Pang, 2003).
(2) FDI Pattern: Between 1979 and 1997, 70 per cent of FDI China had received was 
regarded as "Greenfield Investment" (i.e. Chinese and foreign parties establish a new 
venture). The reason for this was China's strengths of attracting FDI were mainly cheap 
labour force, natural resources, and preferential policies. These strengths were fading in late 
1990s, due to the intense competition for FDI from other developing countries. Meanwhile, as 
a new FDI pattern, international merge and acquisition was growing very strongly and 
became a primary pattern of FDI. China therefore attempted to develop this FDI pattern in 
China in order to promote its inward FDI. Two methods were followed to employ this 
pattern: one is to let foreign partners take over the venture by purchasing the stock shares 
from Chinese partners, and the other is to let foreign investors buy the whole Chinese 
enterprise in one go. This new pattern of FDI started well in China, for instance, in 1999, 60 
per cent of China's FDI was introduced through this channel. The further development of this 
pattern was resisted by China's pre-matured investment environment. The relevant legal 
systems was not in place and China's capital market were not entirely open for foreign 
investment related business (Jiang, 2001).
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7.6.3. FDI Policy Changes in 2000 and Their Effectiveness
Year 2000 became an important year for China's FDI development as the government was 
aware that special efforts were needed in order to make FDI growth in the country 
sustainable, as well as to further meet the requirements of WTO, aiming at gaining 
membership in 2001.
As a result, the government amended two major FDI laws, one was Laws on Wholly Foreign 
Owned Enterprises (WFOEs), and the other was the Law on Contract Joint Ventures (CJVs). 
Some important articles in the Laws which were not in line of international practice were 
amended: (a) eliminating the requirement for both WFOEs and CJVs to keep their foreign 
exchange balancing, therefore, ending the long-lasting headache for foreign investors; (b) 
replacing compulsory domestic procurement of raw materials with optional purchase by 
WFOEs and CJVs; and (c) replacing the government's requirements of export performance 
and advanced technology with the government's encouragement of exporting and use of 
advanced technology (Chen, 2004).
In addition, more industries and areas were opened up for FDI: (a) allowing foreign invested 
enterprises to set up separate firms in the country; (b) allowing investors to involve their 
investment in the area of medical treatment; (c) allowing foreign investors to get involved in 
the cinema industry, including establishing and operating the cinema; (d) allowing foreign 
investors to invest in railway transportation; and (e) allowing foreign investors to operate 
telecommunication related businesses (Pang, 2003).
Moreover, further and more serious action was taken to promote the development of west 
China, which included: (a) the Chinese State Council set up an office to lead the all 
development issues in the west part of China; and (b) a series of preferential policies were 
made available to further encourage FDI in that region.
Consequently, committed FDI projects in 2000 rose sharply by 47 per cent over 1999, which 
indicated that stronger FDI growth was on the way from 2000 (Zhao, 2001).
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After long pursuing membership of WTO, China's dream became true in December 2001. 
This big move would lead to three major changes in terms of China's FDI related policies: (a) 
China's regions and industrial areas would shift from limited open to much more open; (b) 
China's open policy based on an experimentally-oriented approach would be shifted to a 
proactive approach; and (c) China's carefully and self-controlled opening would be shifted to 
a mutually opened environment among the WTO member countries. This inevitably led to 
FDI move to a new development stage (Jin, 2001).
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Recommendations
8.1. Conclusion
As discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, the impact of the fundamental changes in 
China's FDI related policy on the development of western inward FDI in China is explored, 
the root cause for these fundamental changes is examined, and China's approach to FDI and 
the world generally accepted FDI approaches is compared and discussed. On a whole, western 
FDI is treated differently in China, because FDI is seen in the country with the Marxist 
approach - a negative political approach associated with social political systems and class 
relations, together with Chinese characteristics - a positive approach to western FDI in the 
view that FDI from capitalist countries is useful but needs to be controlled under socialism. 
China's approach and its evolution to western FDI leads FDI development in the country to 
undergo three periods between late 1978 and 2000, in terms of overall Chinese government 
policy changes and their impact on China's FDI development.
The first period begins in late 1978 when China announced its open door policy - welcoming 
western inward FDI to enter the country. This marked the first turning point - a historical 
policy shift from the "self-reliance" strategy to permitting western FDI. The second period 
started in October 1986, when the government dramatically changed its approach to FDI by 
promulgating the "22 Articles". For the first time, China started to promote FDI, rather than 
permitting FDI. The passing of "Interim Provisions on Guiding Foreign Investment 
Direction", and "Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries" in 1995 
marked the beginning of the third period, as the government started to manage FDI, instead of 
simply promoting it. In addition, since 1995, the growing concern has been given by the 
Chinese government about environmental issues such as air pollution and water pollution, as 
many highly polluted FDI projects introduced to China are worsening already seriously 
damaged environment in the country. The severe problem costs China heavily in terms of the 
sustainable growth in its economy. To deal with the problem, the government issued the
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"Catalogue" to encourage environmentally-protected FDI projects and restrict polluted FDI 
projects.
These three different periods have brought out a number of features of China's FDI 
development:
(1) From the perspective of change in the number of FDI projects and the amount of FDI.
In the first period, FDI was growing very slowly, as China saw western FDI being 
developed from nothing to a small number of projects and to the small amount. The 
second period, however, there have been increasingly growing number of FDI pouring 
into the country, including many large transnational enterprises (TNEs). FDI has climbed 
up sharply from a small number of projects and small amount to a great number and as 
China consistently became from 1993 the second largest FDI destination of the world. 
The third period indicated that China started to give its first priority to the quality of FDI 
while still hoping the quantity of FDI remaining large.
(2) From the perspective of change of FDI form
There are three main forms of FDI in China: equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual 
Joint Ventures (CJVs), and wholly-foreign- owned enterprises (WFOEs). During the first 
period, the FDI form of CJVs has been the dominant one, although EJVs are the first FDI 
form regulated by the EJVs Law. This is because both Chinese party and Foreign party 
wanted to test out the FDI environment in China. For the Chinese side, since they lacked 
funds and experience, but were eager to participant in FDI, CJVs, as a flexible FDI form, 
were the suitable one for them. For the foreign side, since they were not confident enough 
to make serious and longer-term investment commitment to China, the FDI form of CIVs 
provided them with the opportunity of small size, and short-term commitment and quick 
return of their investment. In terms of WFOEs, this form was restricted in the limited 
geographical area of China, such as special economic zones (SEZs) in initial years of 
China's open door policy, as the government thought it was hard to control it because of 
its 100 per cent of foreign ownership. From 1986, in the second period, CJVs were 
overtaken by EJVs, as foreign investors gained experience, as well as confidence in
222
operating in China. Meanwhile, some disadvantages of CJVs were explored including 
conflicts between the Chinese party and the foreign party due to lack of a legal 
framework, although the Law on CJVs became available in 1988, but without detailed 
implementing measures until 1992 when these measures were in place. As for WFOEs, 
they started to grow at a fast pace from 1986 when the Law on WFOEs was published, 
which has made a new record - as China became the first socialist country to regulate a 
law to officially introduce western WFOEs. In the third period beginning in 1995, EJVs 
have strengthened their leading position in 1992 when EJVs Law was amended based on 
international practice, which made foreign investors feel more confident and comfortable 
to operate their production in China. WFOEs continued to grow ever stronger than before, 
since this form is believed to be the more effective FDI vehicle to bring to China a large 
amount of FDI, as well as the most advanced technology for China, which are the 
government's top priority targets. By contrast, the form of CJVs is fading, as this form 
was thought to primarily introduce low technology and small amounts of FDI projects, 
which was no longer encouraged by the government as before.
(3) From the perspective of change in the government's approach to control over FDI
In the first period between late 1978 and 1986, the location, the form of FDI, the 
industrial area, the operation of the ventures, etc, were tightly controlled by the Chinese 
government, more notably, among the three forms of FDI, only EJVs had the law 
available to follow, FDI activities of other FDI forms chiefly followed the Chinese 
relevant laws, which enabled the government to control FDI in a Chinese way.
In the second period, the government's willingness to regulate the relevant laws and legal 
framework for FDI was increased. As a result of this, the Law on WFOEs, and the Law on 
CJVs were passed in 1986 and 1988 respectively, aiming at promoting FDI. In the third 
period between 1995 and 2000, the government followed a combined approach to control 
FDI. On the one hand, the government started to direct FDI to their priority industries and 
regions in light with their national economic development strategy and national interests; 
on the other, it started to formulate and follow "the National Treatment", in order to meet 
the requirements of international organisations, such as WTO.
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(4) From the perspective of change in approach to creating the turning points
For the first turning point - from "self-reliance" to permitting FDI in late 1978, the 
Chinese government was well prepared to make it happen, as the government had clear 
aims and objectives beforehand. That is, to bring to China the western advanced 
technology, capital, managerial expertise, etc, via FDI, in order to promote Chinese 
economy, and eventually to promote its modernisation. The approach the government 
adopted is clearly proactive, but is also defensive in terms of taking cautious measures to 
prevent China being affected by capitalist elements of western FDI.
As for the second turning point - from permitting FDI to promoting it in October 1986, 
the Chinese government was facing severe difficulties, notably the foreign exchange crisis 
prior to the turning point. These special circumstances have put the government under 
extreme pressure. They would have to find a way to overcome the unexpected problems. 
This led the government to adopt a reactive, or a passive approach. The "22 Articles" are 
issued, as part of prompt action to boost the confidence of foreign investors, which in turn 
results in the door of China being opened much more widely.
With regard to the period of the third turning point from 1995, China has successfully 
attracted a large amount of FDI and FDI has started to play a major role in Chinese 
economy. At that time, the government follows two new strategies. Internally, China is 
proposing a more efficient and effective way to develop its economy and make its high 
economic growth rate sustainable. To this end, the government makes efforts to balance 
up FDI between its quantity and quality. As a result, the "Interim Provisions on Guiding 
Foreign Investment Direction", and "Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industries" were promulgated to improve FDI quality by directing FDI to China's priority 
industrial areas and making FDI more effective to promote Chinese economy. Externally, 
China is seeking the membership of the WTO, moving its economy towards the 
international economic system. For this reason, the government is prepared to follow "the 
National Treatment" for foreign investors, to replace the "Super National Treatment" and 
"Inferior National Treatment". This eventually led China to be a member of the WTO. 
The above policy changes, beginning in 1995, have shown that the government this time
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took the initiative to make these changes happen, which therefore clearly indicated that a 
proactive approach is employed by the government.
The shift of the approach from one to another implies that China's FDI has gradually 
moved from a low level to a high level: (a) China has growing awareness of the 
importance of FDI to its economic development; (b) the development of FDI in China has 
made its open door policy more open.
In terms of the development of China's FDI concept, as discussed in Chapter 2, this 
concept has undergone three stages along with the three turning points of China's FDI 
development in practice. These three stages of China's FDI concept are: concept 
introduction, concept creation, and concept development. It is important to notice that the 
evolution of the concept of China's FDI, is largely influenced by how western FDI is seen 
by the Chinese government. At the beginning of China's introduction of western FDI, the 
government adopted a traditional and typical Marxist approach - analysis of social system 
and class relations. Western FDI is believed to carry western harmful elements which may 
have a negative influence in China's socialist construction. This approach decides how 
FDI is treated in the country: FDI is permitted, but is also strictly controlled under China's 
socialist system, in terms of limited location, industrial fields, and restricted FDI forms, 
etc. This approach has not been changed until early 1992, when the then Chinese top 
leader Deng Xiaoping interpreted FDI in a new way - instead of making analysis of class 
relations and social systems, judging FDI by considering: (a) whether or not the socialist 
productivity can be developed; (b) whether or not the overall national power of the 
socialist country can be strengthened; and (c) whether or not the living standards of 
Chinese people can be improved.
This new approach has suggested that western FDI has been useful in developing Chinese 
economy, and therefore FDI in China should be promoted. This positive approach 
immediately stimulates FDI in China. However, since this approach did not challenge the 
Chinese traditional approach - Marxist approach directly, the Chinese are still unclear 
about FDI status in the Chinese economic system, therefore their attitudes towards FDI 
are still associated with class relationships, and some questions still remained doubtful, 
such as the class nature of the western FDI, as well as the relationship between western
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FDI and the Chinese socialist system. These questions were raised again in 1996 when 
serious concerns arose in China about the increasingly strong growth of FDI, especially 
the dramatic emerging of the transnational enterprises (TNEs) in China, and concerns 
about China's loss of its national market and the national economy safety. This led to a 
national debate about the relationship between western FDI and TNEs, and the Chinese 
national industry.
The debate is concluded by the Chinese leadership with a new approach to FDI at the 15th 
National Congress of Chinese Communist Party in September 1997: the foreign invested 
enterprise in China is no longer seen as a foreign firm, but a part of China's economy. 
Thus their growth will not affect the development of Chinese national industry, instead, 
will promote the Chinese national economy to a higher level.
This new approach moves much further than all previous approaches, and indicated very 
clearly that the analysis of class relations and social structure and systems on FDI is no 
longer relevant, and that the only remaining issue for western FDI in China is now how to 
develop FDI in China based on China's economic development strategies, rather than 
controlling it for the political reason.
8.2. Recommendations
Since December 2001, China has become a member of the WTO as a result of many years of 
pursuing. This marks one of the most important events since China's opening up to western 
FDI in 1979. Being a WTO member country, China started its journey to get its national 
economic system connected with the international economic system. To this end, the Chinese 
government took action to review its laws and regulations relating to its foreign economic 
issues: legal documentation which was in line with WTO requirements was abolished; and a 
new legal framework in line with WTO rules was being established.
This change suggests that: (a) the period of China's opening up has shifted from the 
government policy-oriented to the period of the system-directed (Jiang, 2002); and (b)
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China's development of its economy, including introducing FDI, would have to follow 
international practice (Pang, 2003).
Accordingly, this change will also lead to a significant change of China's FDI, in terms of its 
theory, as well as its practice.
As for the theory of China's FDI, China has created a new approach of "peacefully rising", 
aiming at connecting China with the world economic system which is dominated by western 
capitalist countries, and making China an important part of the world production chain (China 
has already been very successful in this regard). Consequently, this inevitably puts a full stop 
to China's traditional approach of dealing with FDI: making significant policy changes based 
on the willingness of the government. This leads the key issues of China's FDI to be shifted 
to how China's FDI is developed in line with international practice, including WTO's 
requirements.
In terms of the practice of China's FDI, China is gradually opening up more industrial areas, 
especially services industries. In addition, China is revising its legal framework to reach to 
international standards, for example, the Law on equity joint ventures (EJVs) was revised 
again in 2002 based on international practice. Moreover, China is taking serious action to 
realise "the National Treatment" for foreign invested enterprises, to replace the "Super 
National Treatment" and "Inferior National Treatment". In March 2007, the National People's 
Congress of China passed a historical document: the Tax Law on Chinese Enterprises. This 
Law, for the first time, treats foreign invested firms the same as Chinese enterprises in terms 
of corporate tax rate (25 per cent applied to both of them. Previously two different laws with 
different rates applied, and foreign invested firms enjoyed low tax rate and tax discount and 
tax holiday). This change has finally taken away the preferential tax policy, and created an 
equal operating environment for both Chinese and foreign firms.
In short, China's FDI of post-WTO will be developed differently, in terms of its approach to 
western FDI, and the form of FDI, and its position in the world economy. All these changes 
will generate a lot of issues relating to China's FDI in a new era. In addition, from early 
2000s, China started to strongly involve in outward FDI, which will also bring out a new 
research subject.
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8.3. Possible Further Research
As discussed above, unlike the previous three periods of China's FDI development, the 
government can now no longer as effectively as before control inward FDI by adopting its 
Marxist approach. Instead, China will increasingly have to follow international practice, or 
the requirements from various world organisations.
FDI development in China in the new era inevitably creates a number of interesting and 
meaningful topics for further research, which may include the following:
- China's new approach to FDI after 2000: from December 2001 when China became a 
member of WTO, China started to view its western inward FDI in a more positive 
way, by stating that western FDI to China is inevitable and important to China. In 
practice, the government makes enormous efforts and commitments to following 
requirements of world oganisation, such as WTO, and seriously and comprehensively 
improving its legal system. This leads China's politically oriented approach to western 
FDI to system-directed approach. Now the question is, what are the implications of 
China's new approach to western FDI.
- The motives or determinants of China's involvement in outward FDI: since 2000, 
China started to strongly get involved in outward FDI. As a developing country, as 
well as a socialist country, why does China emerge as an outward FDI maker; is it for 
political reasons, or for economic reasons, or both. Is there any relationship between 
China's inward FDI and outward FDI, if yes, what are they;
In FDI development history in China, there have been a number of important political 
and economic events, which have tremendous influence in changing the direction of 
FDI development in the country. This kind of events may be called turning points. 
Research focusing on these turning points will help produce in-depth knowledge and 
understanding of how FDI is developed in China, and why it is developed in this way.
- The relationship between the increasing inflows in China's inward FDI and the 
growing environmental problems, such as air pollution and water pollution. Can 
China manage these problems, is China's economic and FDI development sustainable 
with severe environmental problems.
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